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ABSTRACT

Conference papers address selected issues and problems being faced by contemporary educators. The presidential address describes how both analytic and phenomenological philosophers of education can cooperate and, for purposes of illustration, shows how this cooperation can contribute to the field of teacher education. In papers delivered at the general sessions, authors discuss the distinctions among intrinsic and extrinsic valuing, reflective thinking, and the concept of philosophic-mindedness. A variety of topics were addressed at the concurrent sessions. For example, one author considers the issue of schools which don't foster the development of their communities and which, to the contrary, are basically inimical to the feeling of community. Another author claims that to comprehend fully the nature of accountability, it is necessary to understand the nature of indoctrination and the aims of any moral education program. Other topics include corporal punishment, language barriers, an ethical code in teacher training, Dewey and moral education, Kohlberg, and discipline. The publication concludes with the 1981 minutes, a membership list, and style guidelines for manuscripts. (RM)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE OHIO VALLEY
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
SOCIETY - 1981

Indiana Memorial Union
December 4-5, 1981

Indiana University,
Host Institution

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SALUTATION TO PHILIP G. SMITH

The Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society is pleased to salute Professor Philip G. Smith, on the occasion of his retirement from Indiana University. The 1981 meetings of the society included a dinner, arranged by Everett Jarboe, in honor of Professor Smith, and a special general session of papers devoted to Smith's views on the topics of intrinsic valuing, reflective thinking; and philosophical mindedness. Professor Smith's many friends and colleagues wish him a happy and productive retirement.

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OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1981 ANNUAL MEETING
DECEMBER 4-5, 1981
INDIANA MEMORIAL UNION
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA
HOST INSTITUTION
INDIANA UNIVERSITY

FRIDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 4

REGISTRATION AND
COFFEE HOUR - EAST LOUNGE 9:00 - 10:00

OPENING SESSION
FRANGIPANI ROOM 10:00 - 12:00

Chair: Walden Crabtree (University of Akron)

Welcoming remarks: Howard Mehlinger, Dean, School of Education (Indiana University)

Presidential Address: John Carter (Indiana State University): "Phenomenology and Analysis: A Clarification of Teaching Methods"

Reply: Harry Broudy (University of Illinois)

LUNCH 12:00 - 1:30

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, DECEMBER 4

REGISTRATION - EAST
LOUNGE 12:30 - 1:30

CONCURRENT SESSIONS: 1:30 - 5:15

Session A - SASSAFRAS ROOM 1:30 - 3:15

Paper: Steve Kay (Kentucky State University) "Education Against Community"

Paper: Mark Sheldon (Indiana University - Purdue University at Fort Wayne) "Moral Education and the Accountability Controversy"

Reply and Chair: Robert Skovira (Greensburg, Pennsylvania)

Session B - RED BUD ROOM 1:30 - 3:15

Paper: Tim Reagan (University of Illinois) "The Concept of 'Language Barrier' and Black English"

Paper: Barbara Stengel (University of Pittsburgh) "Rawls on a Right to Education: Not Quite Right"

Reply and Chair: Bernard Rosen (Ohio State University)

Session C - SASSAFRAS ROOM 3:30 - 5:15

Paper: Eleanor Kallman Roemer (Bowling Green State University) "Pre-service Teachers and the Ethical Issue of Corporal Punishment"

Paper: Kurt Varga (Ohio State University) "Ethical Competence in Professional Ethics"

Reply and Chair: William Russell (University of Louisville)

Session D - RED BUD ROOM 3:30 - 5:15

Paper: Jo Ann Freiberg (Ohio State University) "John Dewey and Lawrence Kohlberg: Birds of a Different Feather?"

Reply and Chair: William Bruening (Indiana University - Purdue University at Fort Wayne)

OVPES PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION
PRESIDENT'S SUITE 5:30 - 6:30

DINNER 6:30 - 8:30

FRIDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 4

GENERAL SESSION -
FRANGIPANI ROOM 8:45 - 10:30

Chair: David Denton (University of Kentucky)

Paper: Clinton Collins (University of Kentucky) "Phil Smith on Intrinsic Valuing"

Paper: Robert Wilhoyte (University of Toledo) "Phil Smith on Reflective Thinking"

Paper: Walden Crabtree (University of Akron) "Phil Smith on Philosophical Mindedness"

Discussion

SATURDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 5

COFFEE - EAST LOUNGE 8:30 - 9:00

CONCURRENT SESSIONS 9:00 - 10:45

Session A - FRANGIPANI ROOM

Paper: Marilyn Stewart (Ohio State University) "Dewey's Aesthetic Theory: Art as a Special Kind of Practice"

Reply and Chair: Ronald Zigler (Maharishi International University)

Session B - DISTINGUISHED ALUMNI ROOM

Paper: Terry Barrett (Ohio State University) "Photographs in Teaching: Epistemological Confusions"

Paper: Joseph Watras (University of Dayton) "Discipline: Who Needs It? A Critique of Assertive Discipline"

Reply and Chair: Richard Brosio (Ball State University)

BUSINESS MEETING -
FRANGIPANI ROOM 11:00 - 12:00

INTRODUCTION

"The fox knows many things, but
the hedgehog knows one big thing."[1]

This edition of *Philosophical Studies in Education* again presents to our readers a variety of issues and problems to be had in the contemporary educational arena. Like the fox of legend, we find ourselves faced with many concerns --but is not this our way of being in this world? One issue is whether consensus among guild members is more valuable than conflict. But, this concern raises the problem of establishing the working agenda as a guild, or becoming clear about philosophy of education's function.

The problem of fitting the school's goals to the goals of the community raises a question about the function of education: as communities ask for accountable teachers and programs, are we to become concerned about indoctrination? The proposed clarification of the idea of "language barrier" poses the issue of the relationship of language to learning and learning to culture; and the analysis of the concepts of justice and human rights suggests that we look at the consequences of these ideas as socially rather than psychologically grounded.

The discussions of discipline raise questions about the criteria of a "good character" and about discipline as a form of self-presentation and power. Because Dewey's ideas are claimed by many theorists of moral education to be fulfilled by their particular brand of it, must we view Dewey as a godfather or a midwife? Also, by integrating Dewey's theory of art into his theory of experience, we can claim that each valued (valuable) experience has an aesthetic quality in it. And, for those interested in educational media, we can ask not only how but whether a picture represents or symbolizes reality. Finally, some problems and results with which Phil Smith repeatedly has challenged us are described and reviewed.

Is rapprochement possible between analytic and phenomenological philosophers of education? In his presidential address, Carter argues not only that is it possible, but that it is necessary for our survival as professional educators. Agreeing with Professor Pratte's contention that conflict within the guild is deterious to our "political" position in higher education, Carter has initiated a dialogue aimed at consensus. He attempts to demonstrate the "fit" of the analytic and phenomenological methods and how they should be used to describe and understand educational concepts. Does Carter succeed in his efforts? And what are the responses of philosophers who do not consider their work to be either analytic or phenomenological?

Broudy's response to the presidential paper argues that it is more important to other educators that philosophers of education come to agree about their agenda than it is for them to continue the internecine conflict in imitation of "academic" philosophers. He argues that the role of philosophy of education is to organize the conceptual structure of the educational arena. He then adds to the consensual dialogue by suggesting elements of this agends.

Kay asks us to cnosider the issue of schools which don't foster the development of their communities and which, to the contrary, are basically inimical to feeling of comminity. This, then, leads him to discuss the nature of comminity and neighboorhood. In order to comprehend fully the nature of accountability, Sheldon claims that we must understand the nature of indoctrination and the aims of any moral education program. He asserts that indoctrination may result if, in the interest of increasing accountability, comminities are the only legitimate generators of educational goals based upon their parochial needs.

Does speaking a particular language or dialect constitute a learning disability? Reagan questions the sense of the idea "language barrier". He describes three contexts of use: linguistic, cognitive, and affective/social. He states that claims about learning in terms of the first context are false, being based on a misunderstanding of the nature of language; the assertions made from the second are true but trivial. But, he says that the claims founded on the third context of use raise issues of discrimination. Consequential to this, are our notions of justice and human rights social constructs? Stengel claims that Rawls and others base their theories of justice and rights on the individual and do not recognize that the self and knowledge, and hence justice and rights, are social products.

Is there such a thing as a good spanking? Roemer argues (along with Jughead) that there is not. In her discussion of corporal punishment, she further argues that one's attitude or disposition toward corporal punishment should be an essential criterion for judging the character of a future teacher. And speaking of character, can a code of ethics solve moral issues? Varga raises some interesting questions about the function of an ethical code in teacher-training. He claims that it is problematic to rely upon a professional ethical code to resolve moral problems.

In the same vein, how can we best educate the young morally? Freiberg states that this is a confused notion and brings up some prior questions: is it possible to educate morally, what is morally conceived education, and what is moral education? Freiberg points out a Deweyan distinction between "to educate morally" and "to conceive education morally". She, in her contrasting of current theories of moral education with Dewey's position, claims that none of them are Deweyan. And while we are on the subject, is Kohlberg, despite his claim that he is, really Deweyan? Altepeter argues to the contrary. Altepeter argues that Dewey and Kohlberg differ not only in their understanding of human growth and development, but also in their use of reason and will in their moral theories.

According to Collins, Phil Smith has added significantly to our understanding of intrinsic and extrinsic valuing, and he has provided us with some interesting research areas in value theory, especially the area of symbolics and valuing. Wilhoyte, after a brief description of the philosophical climate surrounding Professor Smith's co-authored text: *Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education*, asserts that contemporary education needs the methodology of reflective thought more than ever. Also, as philosophers applying our wits within the educational arena, we assume the value of Philosophic-Mindedness, PM, for educators. Crabtree describes Smith's generation and elaboration of this concept, and subsequent empirical studies. Viewing PM as a significant area of competency for educators, Crabtree argues that its promulgation may mean survival for philosophers.

Whether there can be art in a Deweyan curriculum is the question which Stewart asks. She argues that Dewey's theory of art is an essential part of his theory of experience. Art and science alike must possess an aesthetic quality to make the experiences they represent worthwhile. In line with this, does a picture capture the reality or the essence of the thing? Barrett questions some epistemological assumptions about photographs and suggests both criteria for judging their representational qualities and categories for understanding their meanings.

Will explicitly stating behavioral rules and designated punishments create a misunderstanding of the nature of discipline? Watras argues that it will, especially if the package, Assertive Discipline, now being marketed for schools, is used as a panacea for behavioral problems. Rather, he argues, discipline is a form of self-confidence and power in controlling our way in the world.

In concluding this brief exposition of the contents of this volume, it is advantageous to view these essays and their interrelatedness to both philosophy of education and education in general, in light of Hofstadter's[2] idea of "Strange Loops". The articles pick up and join with existing discourse on selected issues and problems being faced by contemporary educators. These discussions are variations of themes already researched and expressed in different ways. Consequently, they are increments of our knowledge and understanding of the affairs of the educational arena. At the same time, they provide the subject matter of further reflection; in their different ways, these essays give us the opportunity to ask questions, to clarify, and to criticize constructively. Thus, they express a continuation and extension of existing loops of discourse (or paradigms) in education generally, even as they continue the patterns of doing philosophy of education. Good thinking to you all.

Robert J. Skovira
Associate Editor

NOTES

[1] Archilochus. See I. Berlin's essay, "The Hedgehog and the Fox" (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 1 and Bontempo and Odell, eds., *The Owl of Minerva* (New York. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975), p. 14.

[2] Douglas R. Hofstadter, *Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Gold Braid* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Vintage Books Edition, 1980), p. 10.

PART I

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANALYSIS:
A CLARIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONAL METHOD

John E. Carter
Indiana State University

Introduction

On January 6, 1981, *The New York Times* reported that "the analysts soundly defeated candidates of a coalition of 'pluralists' who charged that they have been unfairly excluded from positions of leadership" in the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. The *Times* article proceeded to list a few derogatory and insulting exchanges between the two groups. Perhaps the clue to the lack of understanding that exists between these groups is illustrated by Professor Quine's comment "I do not know their work."

This lack of understanding is evidenced in philosophy of education by an address at the national Philosophy of Education Society meeting in 1977 when David Silk in his article, "The Poverty of Phenomenology in Education," praised analytic philosophy but criticized phenomenology in education as "obscurantism, at best; mysticism at worst." He ended his paper implying that maybe phenomenologists in education are doing bad phenomenology.[1] Donald Vandenberg in 1979 countered Silk with the following accusation: "In truth he (Silk) criticized but one paper and surrounded it with misquotations that failed to justify the broadside condemnation of the approach."[2] Leroy Troutner, the following year at the PES meeting, gave a systematic defense of phenomenology,[3] and Richard Pratte defended analysis.[4] We might note too that the formal responses to both Silk's and Troutner's papers were not given by those criticized but by those sympathetic to the position being expressed.

My paper attempts to move away from the heat of political exchange and to present a different response to the debate that has been going on for years. I am in some agreement with portions of Richard Pratte's Presidential address at the PES meeting in 1980. Professor Pratte stated that the field of philosophy of education is "relatively powerless and inefficient in a political sense." The solution to this problem is not in our "strife-ridden factionalism," which Pratte views as a "debilitating and destructive" debate; rather, the solution is to work together in "a strong cooperative effort aimed at furthering the position of philosophy of education."[5] With Professor Pratte's views in mind, I have written this paper in an effort to facilitate dialogue between these two groups. A basis of mutual understanding needs to be developed. My primary goal is to describe how both analytic and phenomenological philosophies of education can cooperate and contribute to the understanding of a specific concept I have chosen for purposes of illustration. I will, first, clarify 'instructional method' using analysis; and, second, I will describe how a phenomenologist would go about a similar analysis. A secondary goal is to invite the exploration of this basic concept in the field of teacher education.

I. Instructional Methods: an Analysis

Students in our schools of teacher education are often required to take courses in instructional teaching methods. Since methods fall into many categories (e.g., lecture, discovery, training, motivational, behavior modification, and so on), deciding upon a method for instruction often becomes a formidable task. When prospective teachers are questioned about their teaching methods, they often report using methods that a favorite teacher once applied. Such a selection process may have some value but it also raises a number of questions. When a prospective teacher selects an instructional method for teaching a subject, an understanding of method, itself, may open the door for a logical choice.

A. The Formal Structure of Method

As we begin this analysis of instructional methods let us turn first to what method is not. One may hear the comment, "His presentation was too informal to be said to have had method." By "informal" is meant that he lacked an orderly arrangement of steps in his presentation or activities. To illustrate, consider the following contrasting situations: first, talking before a class of students concerning the development of moral education in today's schools and, second, an informal conversation on the same topic with a friend one evening over a couple beers. The first illustrates the use of an instructional method because the teacher arranged the talk formally and systematically, whereas the second would be considered a social event in which the planned logic and orderly arrangement found in a teaching method is absent. The formal organization of a teaching method can be contrasted to my informal discussion with a friend. The latter may have some orderly arrangement, but orderliness here is not intent and occurs rather accidentally in the flow of conversation. In providing classroom instruction, on the other hand, my intent is to organize the activites in a cohesive and coherent fashion so that they are understandable.

Casual conversations are not necessarily devoid of logical or orderly arrangement of subject matter, and so we ask: How organized and systematically arranged must a method be in order to be called an instructional method? Describing several terms that are often associated or sometimes used interchangeably with "method" may be instructive here. These terms, "procedure," "system," "mode," "style," and "manner" will be described in relation both to formal (logical, orderly arranged steps in a sequence) and to informal (random, haphazard, without sequence) activities.

B. The Formal/Informal Continuum of Method

One may find the term "procedure" used in such sentences as the following: What is the procedure for demonstrating the collection of hydrogen?" If one does not mix the proper chemicals under the rights conditions, while following a step-by-step process; then either the hydrogen is not formed, it becomes contaminated, or it is lost to the surrounding air. If any of the steps in this procedure are violated, the demonstration fails. When using the word "procedure," we mean that there are particular steps which follow in a set order or sequence leading to desired results. However, if we say, "She has a system for getting the most (learning) out of her students," we imply not that she relies on only one or two procedures for dealing with her students, but that she has brought together a number of procedures that are fully worked out and carefully formulated. Here the suggestion is not only that there is a scheme or approach for teaching, but also that there are various schemes and approaches brought together into a unitary complex, a complete whole, or a gestalt.

On the other hand, one should not state that a "system" is made up of a number of "modes," because the two terms have different meanings, with "system" emphasizing the orderly arrangement of activities and "mode" emphasizing a particular set of behaviors. When one speaks of a burglar having a "modus operandi," one means that the burglar has a customary pattern of behavior, that is, the burglar always enters through a basement window, only steals underwear, or always uses a stolen, new automobile as a get-away vehicle. This customary or habitual way of acting is identifiable with this particular burglar. While the burglar may follow a sequence of events in an orderly pattern, the stress here is not on the orderly or logical arrangement of that sequence but on a course pursued out of personal preference. The same can be said in the following case: "This teacher has a characterisitic mode of expression when lecturing"; however, in addition to the emphasis here on personal preference, there is a suggestion of other possible modes besides the one chosen. While "mode" does not often occur in common usage, a closely related term, "style," often appears in teaching methods textbooks and has a meaning similar to mode. Closely related to mode and style in meaning is "manner." For example, the Shakespearean phrase "Mark the manner of his teaching" refers to a personal course of action that can be identified with that individual. Two teachers may have closely related modes or styles of behavior in the class; however, manner indicates a difference in behavior to a greater degree.

Apparently these terms, "procedure," "system," "mode," "style," and "manner" form a continuum. "Manner" may be placed at one end, indicating less emphasis on order, sequence, etc., and more emphasis on uniqueness and personal preferences regarding instructional activities. "System" can be positioned at the other end of the continuum, indicating a greater emphasis on logical order and less emphasis on uniqueness and spontaneity or the customary behavior of an individual. Nonetheless, when speaking of methods, it appears that in ordinary usage these terms are used more or less interchangeably. Is "method" then a synonym for "procedure" or "system"? Before we can answer this question let us look at a particular variety of methods, namely, teaching methods.

C. Instructional or Teaching Methods

In this section, we will focus specifically upon teaching method. The analysis, not an exhaustive one, will be limited to three features of teaching method that directly affect their selection by teachers. After distinguishing between methods "of" and methods "for," I will make the following claims:

1. Teaching methods are purposeful, directed to some end. That end is the clarification of principles and methods of a subject area and is not a lofty aim extrinsic to the teaching process.
2. Teaching methods are based in the logical grammer of a particular subject area.
3. Teaching methods do not have to parallel the logical sequence of a subject in order for the subject matter to be learned by students.

1. Method can be further clarified by looking into the prepositions "of" and "for." Let us look first at the preposition "of" as in the methods of science, of history, of teaching. In these examples we are noting that "methods of" are generated in or have their origin in each area. In addition "method of" indicates that the method is area-specific, inherently characteristic of a certain domain--for example, to do science or to do history a *particular* method is used. Granted, a method of one discipline, such as the scientific method of science, may be used when teaching another discipline. However, such use relegates the second discipline to a position subordinate to science. In other words, to avoid this problem one teaches a particular subject using the methods inherent in that subject. Now, let us look at methods "for." I described earlier two contrasting cases. In one case a friend came over, had a beer, and discussed with me the topic of moral education. In the other case the same topic was discussed in a classroom. Then a distinction was made between the former which was considered as an instructional method, and the latter, which wasn't. The basis for this distinction was that teaching involves a formal, systematic arrangement of activities. It appears, therefore, that a second meaning can now be described--namely, that the teacher arranges the elements in the discussion into an order *for* the purpose of making the subject intelligible. The preposition "for" suggests that in addition to formal arrangement there are intents or purposes in the use of a method: he used the scientific method for making hydrogen; he used Cremin's historical method for describing colonial education; he used the analytic method for clarifying concepts. In these examples "for" indicates that the method is put to use with a purpose or object in mind.

The description of method as "for something" raises the question of means-ends. R.S. Peters in his article, "Must an Educator Have an Aim?," finds fault with educators' use of "high-sounding" goals as a basis for what teachers do:

> For this model of adopting means to premeditated ends is one that haunts all our thinking about the promotion of what is valuable. In the educational sphere we therefore tend to look around for the equivalent or bridges to be built or ports to be steered to . . . . It is my conviction that this model misleads us in the sphere of education. We have got the wrong picture of the way in which values must enter into education; this is what occasions the disillusioned muttering about the absence of agreed aims.[6]

The wrong picture is to have "high-sounding" goals (i.e., self-realization, life, happiness, equality, and so on), that are removed from and extrinsic to subject areas. These goals are inappropriate because they allow the teacher to justify manipulating the student to the teacher's preconceived construct. Peters favors, rather, objectives which are intrinsic and inherent in the procedures (methods) and principles of subject areas. (We must note here that Peters is not against very positive sounding goals, but his point is that those goals should originate in the procedures and principles of a subject.) Through knowledge of a subject area, as in the liberal arts, a student learns to think critically and to imagine. He states "I have suggested that the crucial valuative questions, when we come down to moral brass tacks are questions about principles and procedures."[7] The point I am making here is that Peters describes the subject areas as having their own inherent, *purposeful* procedures and principles which he calls "objectives." Peters own conceptual analysis of means-ends parallels my previous linguistic clarification of "methods for" in that both describe methods ("procedures") as used to achieve purposes.

2. Peters' distinction between extrinsic "aims" and inherent "objectives" prompts a closer look at the subject area, the procedures and principles that are being taught. Paul Hirst refers to these procedures (methods) and principles of a subject as the "logical grammar" of a domain.[8] All subjects such as history and science, he notes, have a "logical grammar which governs the meaningful use of the terms of the subject." Space does not allow us to follow Hirst's argument in full but a brief description is needed. Let us imagine a baseball game (my example). Here one plays according to the rules which define the distinctive features of that game. The rules or the logical grammar of the game do not determine how fast one runs the bases or how far one hits the ball, for these activities are still within the basic structure of the game. However, to carry the ball in the manner of a football player is not within the domain of baseball, but in the domain of something else. Likewise, to think historically, or scientifically, or philosophically, and so on, depends on knowing certain features that characterize these domains. These features are the logical grammar of the subject, and they determine the order, arrangement, and principles. As a consequence of his description, Hirst was able to conclude that all teaching of a subject must conform to the rules of its grammar or will not even qualify as teaching the subject.

3. Earlier when describing procedure and system on the method continuum, *a sequence of steps* was described as a distinguishing characteristic of some methods. Harry Broudy also cites sequence as a salient feature of method:

> Method refers to a set of procedures that are carried out according to some rule . . . . The rule prescribes that in certain circumstances steps are to be taken, and . . . the procedures . . . to use . . . in certain ways at certain times. To know the rule is to know "how to" carry out the procedure.[9]

By sequence we mean the hierarchy in which concepts and propositions are built upon a necessary step-by-step progression. As I have already argued, teaching method must respect a subject area's logical grammar. But when it comes to sequence, we know that teachers present subject matter in many different sequences. Are teachers in error here, or can the logical grammar be taught using a variety of sequences? We know that the basic axioms and theorems of mathematics are logically *prior* to the multiplication tables in that the latter presupposes the former, but in the temporal order in which mathematics is taught and learned, the multiplication tables come *first*. So subject matter might be taught in a different order than its logical, necessary, step-by-step progression, without an error necessarily being made. Perhaps what I am getting at, here, can be better described if we return to the example of the baseball game. There is in baseball a logical grammar which we will call the rules that direct the game's activities (rules concerning how many players, the distance between bases, fair and foul balls, and so on). There is also a second set of rules, the logical or temporal sequence in which the game is played such as: The pitcher throws the ball, the batter hits the ball, the batter runs toward first base, the fielder catches the ball, the fielder tries to tag the runner. My question is: Do the methods of teaching, to be consistent with the logical grammer, have to conform to the logical sequence, or can the subject (baseball) be understood if a different sequence of events is presented: To answer this question, I wish to make two points: (a) Teaching methods can use different sequences and remain consistent to the logical grammar.10 While some areas of math and science do have a clear hierarchy of sequential steps, there are alternative ways that their grammar can be understood (e.g., different proofs for arriving at the same conclusion in math). When looking at many other knowledge domains, such as history, religion, art, and so on, there appear to be numerous sequential patterns in which the concepts can be arranged to reflect the logical grammar of each particular subject. (b) Although teaching methods are distinct from learning methods, learning methods enable students to understand the relation of logical sequence to the logical grammar. The formal structures of learning itself, and not the logical sequence of presentation, can result in one's understanding the logical grammar; that is, one can develop higher order concepts from partial knowledge or one can re-construct and re-organize his concepts. For example, being able to perform the calculation 2+2=4 does not mean one understands the logical proof or grammar that verifies this calculation, but the fact that one can perform this calculation (a partial understanding) can, through a building or reorganization of concepts, lead to a fuller understanding of that grammar in math. The analysis of learning goes beyond the scope of this paper, and we only touched on it here to indicate that the logical grammar can be presented in different sequences and still be learned. We have shown in this last section that teaching method can involve different sequential patterns, and we have indicated that learning also appears to have its own sequential patterns. We can now return to the method continuum. As you recall, on one end there is a more formal emphasis with a structural, sequential, and logical arrangement; and at the other end there is a more informal emphasis, with a focus on the unique, spontaneous and personal choices. Does this mean that "mode," "style," and "manner" are terms that describe this personal choice of sequence by the teacher and students? No, when a teacher selects an alternative sequence it must still take into account the logical grammar; as such, it does not represent a spontaneous choice, but is still determined by the rules of that subject. How can one learn *x* if *x* is not presented in the form of *x* which can be recognized as *x*? What does the spontaneous personal end of the formal/informal continuum mean for our study of method? It would appear that the activities occurring at its farthest point have little to do with method as we have described it.

II. Instructional Methods: a Phenomenological Investigation

My original objective in writing this section was to test a hypothesis suggested by Herbert Spiegelberg in *Doing Phenomenology*.11 He believed that the differences between analytic and phenomenological philosophy may be clarified by applying both methods to the same concept. A second hypothesis that I wished to test was that presented by Alexander Pfander, who believed that the phenomenological method had three steps in which the first included an ordinary language clarification.12 In both of my objectives, I believe that I have failed. First, with the time restrictions placed on this paper, I had to be satisfied with describing how a phenomenologist would do the analysis and not with carrying out the analysis itself. Secondly, in an attempt to make phenomenology clear by using ordinary language as much as possible, I feel that my descriptions may, at times, be overly influenced by the analytic position and thus a distortion of phenomenology.

Perhaps a brief explanation concerning my selection of Husserlian phenomenology is also needed here. While current phenomenology has evolved in differing ways from the earlier position of Husserl, I feel that an adequate understanding of phenomenology can only come with some appreciation of Husserl as the founder and still the major contributor to that field of study. The following study is broken into two parts: The first part describes the epoche, bracketing, and some of the problems one may expect to encounter with it. The second part illustrates how the subject (nosis) object (noema) correlates of intentional consciousness can serve to clarify the essential structures of a phenomenon.

A. A Beginning: Establishing a Phenomenological Attitude

The phenomenologist's task is to shift his attention away from a common sense acceptance of everyday, familiar meanings, understandings, perceptions, and concepts to the ways those meanings, understandings, perceptions, and concepts were developed. In other words, he attempts to describe, as faithfully and completely as he can, how the meanings that he uses in daily activities came to be established, constituted or structured. The phenomenological investigation described in this paper is in some ways analogous to the Gestaltists' metaphor, namely, the peeling of an onion. An onion is composed of layers of pulpy flesh with each successive layer covering over a more inner layer. When we remove one layer, we find another layer which, in turn, still covers other layers. The phenomenologist starts with current common sense meanings which may be symbolized by the intact onion itself, and he begins to peel back layers of meaning to see how that onion has come to be constituted or formed. One side effect of peeling onions, I fear, is tears, tears from phenomenologists who will possibly disagree with what I say, and tears from the analyst who will possibly disagree with what I say as well as with how I say it. My hope, however, is to bring clear vision to a rather thorny problem rather than muddle it further. Phenomenologists perceive themselves as clarifying, uncovering, or peeling back, in order to describe the ground upon which one's ordinary life understandings, theories, and concepts have been based. I will begin this description by looking at the onion, itself--that is, by looking at the meanings which arise in my everyday life situations.

Our daily life is filled with perceptions, experiences, attitudes, and understandings that we take for granted. We accept this taken-for-granted world, our view of things, our orientation, as our everyday reality. This reality, this daily life orientation, has been built-up (constituted) over time through the organization of our experiences both informally and formally. Informally, through daily habits, we develop customary ways of behaving and, formally, through the development of sophisticated theories, we plan and direct our actions.

If we are to pick up once again, our question concerning the constitution of teaching methods, we would begin by looking at our everyday world, in which each of us has been immersed in methodologies of many varieties and levels of sophistication. Our parents showed us a method of tying shoes, raking leaves, washing dishes; our teachers showed us how to write, how to decipher spelling through phonetic pronunciation, and how to do laboratory projects. My father taught me methods for fishing and farming. At other times in our schooling, particularly in teacher education courses, we were introduced to formal methods for teaching.

I have, on occasion, asked my students, "Why do some of us use inquiry when teaching, many use lecturing, some use problem solving, and others behavior modification?" Their responses are usually brief and rarely go beyond this statement, "I find that it works for me." A student or teacher is able to find a method "that works" or "that is useful," based on his history of successful experiences with that method accompanied with future expectations that similar results can be repeated. Through repetition a view of continuity between past, present, and future is developed. In this case, the same methods used in the past are expected to bring the same results in the future. If the results do not "work," then the teacher looks at himself to see how he applied the method incorrectly; or he looks at his world to see how the situation has changed. His understanding or orientation to the world is tacitly accepted as "out there" and as being "real" without questions, likewise his empirical ego, or his belief that he acts as a causal agent in that world is accepted as matter-of-fact. In other words, if a theory or method does not "work," then the structures that one has developed in his way of viewing the world are not questioned but, rather, the method that failed to bring about a desired result is questioned and, as a consequence, other methods are sought.

Before we proceed further with an analysis of teaching methods, we will describe how this natural attitude (that attitude referred to above which provides the basis for many teachers' understanding of method) can be brought into question. A phenomenologist attempts to shift his attention away from describing how an empirical ego functions in a fact world, a world of naive understanding, to an effort of describing how he came to perceive his world as he does. The shift is from the empirical fact world itself to "a world being perceived," from "attending to" by empirical fact ego, to the "attending" itself.

When moving from "the attended world" to the "act of attending," at least two psychological factors are involved. First, one has always viewed his familiar world as having continuity, in other words, one has always felt fairly sure that tomorrow would come and not be greatly different from today just as today is not too different from yesterday; but to bring these views and feelings into question may result in a psychological threat evoking resistance to that questioning. Perhaps we are like the characters in Plato's cave, who, upon approaching the cave entrance and seeing sunlight, are overwhelmed and draw back to the comfortable shadows of the familiar world. Second, not only is there a feeling of risk or insecurity in moving away from the familiar, but there is also a problem of bringing the world into a new, possibly clearer focus; our customary ways of seeing (our assumptions) have so colored our view that it might now be difficult to break out of habitual and comfortable patterns of behavior. For example, as I sit here writing this paper, I find myself so familiar with the content that it is easy to fail to express a logical step and thus to skip over to another point; but, the reader who is unaware of all my thoughts finds my statements incomprehensible. Similarly, a girl at the point of starvation, suffering from anorexia nervosa (a fear of becoming overweight), when placed before a mirror continues to perceive herself as fat and interprets her sunken cheeks and boney prominences as evidence of good looks. Our task in phenomenology is to bring into question our accepted and familar methods and ideas, as found in the common sense world, and to sustain that questioning in the face of psychological resistance to the assault on familiarity.

Thus far we have accomplished two things: first, we have shown that methods, as customarily viewed by students, fit into the natural attitude. Second, we have shown that to move beyond a natural attitude is difficult. How we must show the natural attitude to be inadequate in its explanations. I am presented with a difficulty from the very beginning--that is, how to bracket the natural attitude in a brief fashion that will fit into this paper. This process of questioning or doubting and sustaining the questioning is referred to in phenomenological literature as the process of bracketing, reduction, or epoche. What these terms mean is the attempt to describe the-way-we-have-come-to-view-the-word by not allowing the-way-we-have-come-to-view-the-world to distort our analysis. There are two processes by which we can bracket the common sense world: one is psychologically oriented; the other, philosophically oriented. The first, psychological reduction, involves an examining of the world and self by presenting a questions that does not fit into the general continuity of things. Merleau-Ponty was particularly adept at this, often using examples of people who suffered from unusual maladies, maladies which could not be explained by using customary theories. The introduction of inexplainable pehnomena fractures the expected continuity of our fact-world, and as a result, compels us to attempt a description of our world which takes the new phenomena into account. We will not use this particular form of bracketing because the formal structure of method (see the previous analytic section), does not readily lend itself to psychological reduction but is better analyzed philosophically. While there is not one preset formula for bracketing, and while the phenomenological investigation proceeds on several levels at once, the difficulty of presenting even a simplified version while doing phenomenology goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, I believe that I can get at the issues by reporting the steps taken by others, thus avoiding a lengthy, exhaustive argument. To describe a philosophical attempt at bracketing, I will briefly summarize the argument by Richard Zanner which is found in his book, *The Way of Phenomenology*, and which is critical of assumptions found in the natural attitude:

1. For sensory data to be organized there need be non-sensory processes, i.e., categories, schema, etc.

2. These non-sensory processes (subjective) are regarded as internal, private, and inaccessible to the senses. The sense processes (objective) are considered as overt and objective data.

3. As a consequence it is necessary to reduce or translate the private (subjective) into the observable and scientific language or it is necessary to regard the distinction between objective (public) and subjective (private) as nonsense.

4. "Such translation of 'subject' into 'objective' data--the thesis that, for instance, psychological affairs, like 'needs,' are ultimately but the behavior of nerve-tissues, which are bio-physical or biochemical imbalances, essentially presupposes the acknowledgement that there are phenomena that are not the same as 'natural' or physical data."

5. These data are viewed as private and accessible to no one else. Therefore there is a need to translate the private (subject) into the public (object). To do so there must be some guide to follow that would make sure the translation is carried out properly. This guide would have to contain the objective and subjective data as well as appropriate rules for defining a proper translation. But this cannot be done because: "The 'rules' by which the translation is to be done (usually, 'logic') are not at hand, since, in a consistently held naturalism or behaviorism, even these must be at the same level, or have their source and justification in the 'objective data'--and thus cannot function as 'rules.'"

6. The natural attitude also refers to the objectively observable in the world. But Zanner argues, "If it is true that human beings respond, not to externally existing objects open to inspection by a multiplicity of observers, but strictly to 'stimuli' which are by definition 'internal,' and thus also private, to the organism of the supposedly observed organism, then no data of any kind are observable, much less objectively verifiable, but more than the one unique organism which alone has the data."[13]

B. The Correlates of Consciousness: The Experiencing and the Experienced

In order to shift my attention further from the empirical realm of the natural attitude and to uncover further how my meanings came to be structured, I will discuss two examples of reduction that use the two correlates of the conscious act, noesis and noema. The first example suggests how an analysis might proceed if instructional method were viewed as having sequential steps and, the second, if viewed as a tool.

1. *The sequential steps in instructional method.* A method is not a mere

succession of distinct steps, but in method the present step is intended along with past steps just completed (retended) and future possible steps to be taken up (protented).

The steps in a method are like a stream, with each step connected in a temporal continuum. When listening to a melody, for example, I hear the notes A, D, G . . . . These notes, when sounded sequentially, are related to each other as occurring earlier and later in time. I experience them in their relative temporal positions as well as in a whole-ness of which they are intrinsic parts. When intentive of particular steps within a method such as the scientific method (collection of data), there is a retention of an an earlier step (hypothesizing that one's treatments of radiation will interfere with cell reproduction) and a protention of arriving at a conclusion (cell reproduction slowed to a desired level). Both retention and protention are intrinsically intentive in the present. The collection of data then becomes layered with complex remembering and expectations. In the lecture method of instruction, for example, the lecturer is aware of the content to be taught, as well as the content taught while he is in the process of teaching. As with a melody in which one note is removed and the meaning thereby changed, each step is necessary to the total meaning of a method. If a note is missed in the song, "Mary Had a Little Lamb," we would still recognize it as the same melody, but only if, from our own recollection, we substituted the correct note. Steps in a method are not like cars passing on a street or beads on a string which are distinct. Each car or bead is independent of the others for its meaning. Like the notes in a melody, the steps of a method are dependent on one another. The present step of a method, it would seem, becomes determined by previous steps which are weighed in the light of future possibility. A method then, in practice, has a dynamic character in which the meaning of the whole comes not from a sequence of distinct steps, but from the dynamic structure that links the steps together in an integral pattern.

2. *Experiencing instructional method as a tool.* Not only is the "mental life" of the natural attitude intentive to the sequential steps in a method as just described, but it also intends the content of method (noema) as not immanent to the consciousing process (noesis). The experienced content is perceived as transcendent to the experiencing consciousness. Whether I experience this content as physical objects, theories, melodies, values, or methods, I experience each as transcendent to me; as not immanent to my stream of consciousness, and as existing "out there" or "over there" in the world. When I see a teacher using the scientific method in a classroom, I am aware that her behavior (like physical objects, numbers, melodies, theories, and so on) is transcendent to me. When a student sees a color or reads a novel, each phenomenon is perceived as being not a part of his stream of consciousness--that is, the red color is onthe flag, or the story happened in Boston. And the student is not conscious of each of these phenomena in the same way. He perceives the rock through sense perception, and he perceives the novel through imagination. I experience food as tasteful, red as a color, a very young person as a child, freedom as a value. How then do I experience method? It becomes the phenomenologist's task to describe the way a particular method appears to a consciousing person. I experience method as a tool, as something to be used, as a vehicle leading to some end. Method is experienced as a process that is applied to a purpose, to accomplish something. When I use the lecture method I am using it as a tool for presenting the subject matter in a way that makes learning by students possible. However, since each kind of subject matter or object is experienced in consciousness in an originally characterized way (i.e., food as tasteful, a novel as imagination, method as a tool, etc.), then would not the method used necessarily attempt to present that subject matter in its most characterized way? For example, one would attempt to teach an experiment in chemistry using a method that would reflect how one experiences *this* scientific phenomenon, he would not teach chemistry by using a historical method. While the experiment may be comprehended in the case of the latter, it would be comprehended historically and not scientifically.

C. Uncovering the Essential Features of Instructional Method

If I were to use in my classroom instructional procedures such as lecturing, discussions, projects, and behavior modification, how would I recognize each as a teaching method? In order to identify common features, phenomenologists use a technique often referred to as "imaginative variation." By systematically varying in my imagination different methods and holding the invariant constant, I am able to determine essential features of a phenomenon. I saw a colleague lecture yesterday, and his lecture was somewhat unlike mine; however, I still recognize both as lecture methods. What is continuous in each of these cases of lecturing? I cannot think of a teaching method, whether different types of lecture are used or different activities altogether, that does not involve three fundamental features--namely, (1) the content to be taught, (2) that content in the process of being taught and, finally, (3) that content perceived and possibly learned by a student. To end our study with these fundamental features of method would be premature, because each of the three features can be further reduced phenomenologically to a more fundamental level.

1. *The content to be taught.* A phenomenological investigation would attempt to unfold or peel-back layers of meanings that have successively covered over the fundamental layer of content. Our task is to uncover sedimented layers of meaning until we arrive at a fundamental structure upon which other layers of meaning have been based, that most basic layer being referred to as the "founding stratum." Once the "founding stratum" of a subject (i.e., the logical grammar of history, math, science) has been uncovered, it serves as the basis for the principles and procedures to be used in the teaching of the subject. The teacher first inquires to the founding stratum and, second, he inquires to the layers that have successfully been built upon it. For example, as in the subject of science, there are some basic principles and procedures that can be referred to as the logical grammar or founding stratum. This founding stratum is often layered with implications and applications to a variety of practical affairs in the sciences. These successive layers, such as the chemical breakdown of food, the digestive processes, the food chain, the processing and growing of food, etc. are built upon the founding stratum of science, but they also tend to obscure that stratum.

2. *The content in the process of being taught.* In addition to certain procedures of instruction based on the founding stratum, let us turn our attention in this paper to the actual process of presentation. When I employ a teaching method, I often find myself caught up in the content to the extent that I am scarcely aware of myself as the person who is using the method. In using the lecture method, apparently, I have developed habitual ways of dealing with my world to the point that my ego appears anonymous or, to speak differently, there is little awareness of my self as an 'ego' acting. However, as I reflect over the sequence of steps or some other aspect of method, I become increasingly aware of my own self as a conscious ego using this method. Apparently there are methods which are operational--that is, they are employed much of the time, but my awareness is minimized as I use them routinely. At the same time, when applying the low awareness methods, I am not aware of my own ego involvement. The phenomenologist attempts to bring these operational (pre-reflective) methods to "wide-awakeness," that is, to a reflective level of consciousness. In bringing operational methods to wideawakeness, the constitution of teaching method is unfolded for us. This unfoldment of operational methods has been characterized by some writers as "consciousness raising" through the bracketing of the familiar and the comfortable. For example, I am lecturing on a particular topic, and a student expresses an unanticipated questions, inquiring as to why he should learn educational theory since he finds it irrelevant to his needs. Before responding to him, I direct my attention to the ways or methods of my teaching. As I begin to reflect over the workability of my teaching methods, operational methods are brought into focus, and I begin to picture how my own teaching methods have been constituted.

3. *The third element in the teaching method is that of the student possibly learning the content.* Let us return to an example used earlier in which

I lectured on x, but let us now assume that what was learned by two different students varied. This development can, I feel, be attributed to the correlation between the experiencing (noesis) and the experienced (noema). Perhaps this can be made clearer if we imagine ourselves sitting in a theatre, the lights becoming dim, and the actors entering the stage. As I sit in the audience with the lights on, I am aware of those sitting around me, but as the lights dim, I become increasingly only aware of the actors on the stage. Consciousness, it seems, is aware of its content in different ways at different times. For example, I can be attentive to a melody or a particular note within the melody, and when I am aware only of the note, the melody slides into the background. When my attention shifts, the content also shifts: when a component of experiencing varies, so does the content. The two students, it seems, vary in their learning because of these correlative components in consciousness. Therefore, one student, because of a neotic positioning with regard to the noema, is attentive to certain structures of the content and thus learns only that to which he is attentive. The content is brought to consciousness, is given (presented) to consciousness, depending on the position taken with regard to that content. Stated differently, the position taken affects how the content is perceived; for example, an apple can be tasted; smelled, touched, remembered, imagined, expected or disliked.

D. Final Remarks

1. At the beginning of this paper I noted some conciliatory remarks by Richard Pratte to various factions in philosophy of education. Apparently, although withholding endorsement of any specific philosophical groups, he believes that constructive dialogue and working together to enhance our common status in education across the country out-weighs our needs for self assertion within the differing factions. At one point he comes close to encouraging differences, stating, "We need each other," for sharpening the tools of our trade. Allowing these views to guide me, I have attempted to illustrate how to analyze an educational concept phenomenologically using clear language which will, I hope, not be obscure to the analyst.

2. I would like to redirect the reader's attention to the informal/formal methods continuum found in the first section. The question which I left unanswered, but which I feel important, is "Where does one draw the line separating method and spontaneous activity?" A number of implications for instruction can be based on the methods-continuum distinctions, but a complete description was beyond the scope of this paper and will have to be examined at a later date.

3. Finally, I believe that Herbert Spiegelberg is correct in his suggestion that what we need are more papers from both groups which analyze the same concept. Unfortunately, his own analyses wind up subordinating analytic philosophy to phenomenology. His approach is not entirely unlike the method of Alexander Pfander whose first step in phenomenology was a clearing of the ground with the analysis of language. Unfortunately, restrictions of space did not permit me to carry through with Spiegelberg's suggestion in this paper. Perhaps this study can be taken up at a later time. In such a paper, Heidegger's distinctions regarding "tools" may serve as a likely starting point.

NOTES

1. David N. Silk, "The Poverty of Phenomenology of Education," in *Philosophy of Education*, 1977, Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois), pp. 222-230.

2. Donald Vandenberg, "Existential and Phenomenological Influences in

Educational Philosophy, " in *Philosophy of Education Since Mid-Century*, ed. Jonas F. Soltis (New York: Teachers College Press, 1979), p. 56.

3. Leroy F. Troutner, "The Promise of Phenomenology: A Response to Silks's "The Poverty of . . ." in *Philosophy of Education, 1980*, Proceedings of the Thirty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University), pp. 62-73.

4. Richard Pratte, "Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: Criticism of Something Called Analytic Philosophy of Education," in *Philosophy of Education, 1980*, Proceedings of the Thirty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University), pp. 14-16.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-16.

6. R.S. Peters, *Authority, Responsibility, and Education* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p. 85.

7. R.S. Peters, "Must an Educator Have an Aim?" in *Concepts of Teaching*, eds. Macmillan and Nelson (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 96-97.

8. Paul H. Hirst, "The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Teaching," in *The Concept of Education*, ed. R.S. Peters (New York: The Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 52.

9. Harry S. Broudy and John R. Palmer, *Exemplars of Teaching Method* (Chicago: Rand McNally, Co., 1965), p. 9.

10. Paul H. Hirst, "The Logical and Psychological Aspects of Teaching," pp. 54-56.

11. Herbert Spiegelberg, *Doing Phenomenology, Essays On and In Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 190-212.

12. Alexander Pfander, *Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 71-92. The reader may also like to refer to *The Monist*, Vol. 49, No. 1, January 1965. "The General Topic: Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology."

13. Richard M. Zaner, *The Way of Phenomenology* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 51-62.

RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS BY JOHN CARTER

H. S. Broudy
University of Illinois

I can hardly hope to do justice to the clutch of issues raised in Professor Carter's presidential address: philosophical strife, the putative benefits of ameliorating it, and a demonstration of how a comparison of analytical and phenomenological accounts of a very important topic in education, viz., teaching method, might promote clarification of it. On the contrary, I shall do considerable injustice to the paper by making what Professor carter uses as the occasion for his address, viz., the need for conciliation of philosophical styles to make educational philosophy effective, my principal text. By doing so, I shall be giving far too little attention to the perceptive analyses of teaching method, which constitute the body of the paper.

As to the strife among schools of philosophy, the question is not so much whether we can overcome it successfully, but rather whether we should even try to do so. It might not be advisable in academic philosophy--say at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association--but we might agree with Pratte and Carter that in educational philosophy it may be necessary.

It may not be shrewd entrepreneurship to bring peace to the warring factions within the philosophical guild because the agenda of philosophy in the academy is a set of problems that can neither be solved nor left alone. Although the guild's professed mission is to seek the wisdom it cherishes, its occupational viability depends on not finding it. Like the military, its *raison d'etre* is war, keeping the peace is its official justification. Accordingly, the problemata of philosophy remain fairly constant, only the style of dealing with them changes. This maintains its vitality and charm for active minds with a taste for abstraction and eristic. Logico-linguistic analysis and phenomenology are such stylistic variants. Their respective devotees venerate the founding fathers, quarrel over interpretations and, in many other respects, behave like cultists. Philosophy, of course, is not alone in this professionalization of intellectual games. All scholarly guilds follow the same patterns and with strong justification. For progress in science, the arts, technology there must be a playground of ideas where they can be entertained as well as a workplace for their serious cultivation. This is the fundamental rationale for the university. It is also a warrant for "irresponsible" professors who are so-called because they are responsible to the demands of their discipline rather than to the uses to which knowledge might be put.

The phenomenology-analysis strife is a phase of the post-Kantian search for the Dinge-an-sich, which Kant had interdicted with the enthusiastic approval of various forms of positivism and relativism. Fichte and Hegel, among others, sought to show that the absolute could be reached by reason. Others placed their faith on intuition, religion, or racial purity. Husselian peeling of the onion was a trategy used by one of the search parties, while linguists argued that the layers were layers of language. The bracketing of suppositionless thought, only another layer of language and interpretation. as for the efforts of pure reason to reach metaphysical truth, Kant noted that it always landed in antimonies and, for example, that the world must have a first cause and that it cannot have one were equally irrefutable on logical grounds.

The same sort of strife in later periods took the form of arguing for and against the egocentric and logocentric predicaments, for and against value-free interpretation and interpretation-free findings in science. About the only anchorage in these tides of doctrine is that they are all products of mind. Mind is a theater in which plays *within* plays *within* plays *within* plays can be staged. The mind's capacity for reflexive iteration is apparently unlimited, except perhaps by fatigue. It respirates between reification (the conversion of words into things) and verbification (conversion of substance into logical structure, images, and words).

This delightful play of words, images, and ideas is rudely interrupted by the demands of action, and education, especially instruction, sooner or later is an action. Educational philosophers, therefore, are accountable not only to each other as players of guild games at meetings such as this and in our journals, but also to a clientele in the school establishment, which, in turn, is accountable to a clientele of citizens, which is not much interested in intellectual games.

Yet, so important an enterprise as education cries out for order, an intellectual order such as is provided by the disciplines, including philosophy. Especially so because over 20 centuries of preoccupation with pedagogy in the western world have yielded a bewildering agglomeration of theories, toxonomies, models and designs, not to mention anecdotal wisdom such as, "The best teacher I ever had never went to college." Annually AERA treats us to the spectacle of 5000 researchers pursuing educational truth through the corridors of the convention hotels, which unaccountably eludes them year after year. Why is so much study and research so feeble in its impact on schooling?

One reason is that education is virtually coterminous with human life itself. Its complexity resists the simplification theory, while its commitment to individuals makes the search for generalization not only awkward, but at times almost indecent.

Another factor is the lack of paradigms a guild uses to regulate the modes of inquiry, canons of evidence, and the criteria by which it judges its members, old and prospective. Research and ideas in education are not subjected to critical scrutiny, and no member is constrained to examine them. The result is a potpourri of writings that accumulate without being cumulative. Philosophers of education might help sort it out by testing for consistency, clarity, coherence, completeness, and above all, relevance to educational problems.

Professor Carter gives an admirable demonstration of how educational philosophy might go about it. First, he chooses a topic that is persistently important, controversial, and overgrown with dozens of models, approaches, and taxonomies--teaching method. Second, he examines a number of what he calls "sources of clues" for characterizing teaching method. Thus, one can look to the technology of production for sequential procedures; to the logical structure of the disciplines for clues to the content of instruction, and to phenomenological description for the ways in which "method is experienced as". If teachers and teachers of teachers were adept in recognizing and organizing these clues, knowing that, why, and how could be melded into a teaching strategy, that is, teaching method. Presumably methods courses and practice teaching would convert these clues into classroom procedures.

I cannot discuss these contentions with the fullness they deserve. Instead, I shall ask how will Professor Carter's scheme and schema affect the complex we call the training or the preparation of teachers? That depends on many factors. One is the extent to which teacher education personnel reach and understand what Professor Carter has written. Another is whether his analysis would replace any of the multitude of those now in use; another might be the publicity that could be mustered in its behalf. For example, his findings would achieve far greater effect if published under the auspices of a Carnegie grant than in an educational journal. In short, the absence of guild paradigms randomizes the reception and therefore, the efficacy of any theory, model, taxonomy, etc. Furthermore, inasmuch as the rationale for method is likely to be drawn from educational psychology, we might ask to what extent educational psychologists are likely to encounter--let alone take seriously--the efforts of linguistic analysis or phenomenology. Yet these circumstances make it almost imperative that we *do* have our colleagues' attempts at clarification, of which Professor Carter's address is an example.

The influence of Professor Carter's comparative examination of teaching method might be assessed by its usefulness in distinguishing between what method entails for the training of paraprofessionals and professionals--a distinction that today marks an important cleavage in teacher preparation.

If a paraprofessional can operate with a set of rule-governed procedures, then the technological clues can guide competency-based programs for perfecting of such behaviors. But do paraprofessionals need to master the logic of content or the subtleties of phenomenological description? Do we need to recruit students who can cope with such materials?

However, if we are thinking of a genuinely professional cadre of teachers, can they stop with proficiency in a predetermined set of rule-governed procedures? Clearly, we have wasted a good deal of time and brains in educational philosophy if they could. Much of what Professor Carter has set forth functions tacitly as context-building resources for *understanding* the educational enterprise in general and teaching method in particular. Such intellectual resources are indispensable for the professional, but quite dispensable for the paraprofessional--once we fully appreciate the difference.

In a similar vein, teaching method has to take into account the ways in which the pupil will *use* the contents of instruction. Will he/she be expected to *replicate* content as learned? *Apply* it to predictamental situations? Allow it to enrich *associations*? Provide schemata for *interpreting* a wide array of materials that an educated adult is called upon to read? Do these different uses of schooling have directions or caveats for methods of teaching? Or is this bundle of considerations just another taxonomy?

PART II

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

COMMENTS ON PHILIP G. SMITH'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC VALUING

Clinton Collins
University of Kentucky

When Keith Raitz called me to participate in this tribute, I attempted to demur on the grounds that I had had my say on this topic at last year's meeting of OVPES, in my response to Dennis Senchuk's paper, which, in turn, was part of a larger exchange that began with Phil Smith's paper and Jerry Popp's response at our meeting two years ago in Cincinnati. But I didn't want to miss out on the opportunity to honor Phil, so I decided to repeat what I said last year and perhaps add a few additional thoughts, in the hope of getting some more discussion going about what I think is Phil's very important contribution to a theory of value. My premise is that Phil is one of the few authors writing in philosophy of education to go beyond Dewey in a way which has the potential to add greatly to our understanding of education.

As I noted last year, the influence of John Dewey on philosophy of education is long, and not totally benign. From a philosophical point of view, the most regrettable aspect of Dewey's influence is the impetus it gave to educational research efforts which have steadily diminished the role of philosophy of education in efforts at educational reform. Such efforts currently are typically led by researchers in psychology, with occasional major contributions by sociologists, such as James Coleman.

In my judgment Dewey's greatest contribution to philosophy is his theory of the continuity between ends and means, his articulation of the way in which human goals are continuously reconstructed while means are selected for their implementation. It is a consideration which makes, for example, educational evaluation far more complex than it would be if ends could be presumed constant while various means are evaluated for their efficiency in reaching those ends. There is, however, one serious difficulty in Dewey's theory, and Smith, following the lead of C.I. Lewis and others, has shown what it is.

By focusing almost exclusively on the relation between ends and means, Dewey tended to turn every problem of evaluation into a need for *instrumental* evaluation. In Smith's 1976 article in *Educational Theory*, he pictures the impact of this orientation on subsequent educational research. Permit me to quote at some length:

> Much of the difficulty with this form of evaluation in education probably stems from Kaplan's, "The Law of the Hammer." The training of many researchers in education is focused, almost exclusively, upon the use of certain statistical procedures designed to produce reliable estimates of how much of the observed variance can be attributed to various factors... Since this kind of research is easily confused with studies of so-called "cause-effect," and since cause-effect sounds very much like means-ends, and since one way to compare means is to compare their utility, educational researchers are inclined to hammer all evaluation problems into at least the appearance of something that could be studied by the methods and techniques that they understand... Actually, however, assessment of instrumental value is either inappropriate, or else of only supplemental importance, in connection with most problems in the field of education. (p. 33)

Having recognized this difficulty, Smith went looking for a wider array of methods of evaluation, some of which may be more appropriate to problems in the field of education. He began the search by attempting to construct a taxonomy of types of valuing, in the hope that this would suggest alternative methods of evaluation. In this regard, he has retained Dewey's functional distinction between valuing and evaluating: if I desire something, I value it; but, in order for me to evaluate it, I must determine whether the desired thing is desirable.

Smith's first move to replace Dewey's emphasis on ends-means relationships with functional distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic valuing. By doing so, Smith was able to identify a variety of modes of extrinsic valuation, only one of which is instrumental; i.e., concerned with choosing the most effective means to ends sought. The other two major categories of extrinsic evaluation which Smith has identified are what he calls "exemplified value" and "contributory value." Smith has also suggested the possibility that there may be other possible modes of extrinsic evaluation, one candidate being what might be called symbolic value.

With regard to intrinsic value, on the other hand, Smith contends that when people are engaged in intrinsic valuing of something, that valuing does not involve evaluating; and that intrinsic values are therefore incommensurable, incomparable, invaluable, and unique to particular experiences. While I think Smith is substantially correct in this description, there is a danger, as Jerry Popp noted, that philosophers will take such a description as suggesting that intrinsic valuing is irrational and of a lesser status as a cognitive activity than is extrinsic evaluation.

It is my suspicion that intrinsic valuing, even as Smith describes it, is far more prevalent than Smith's analysis would appear to indicate. As I suggested last year, intrinsic value can be used to refer to *any* value that some thing or activity has apart from the extrinsic value being attended to in a given context. It seems to me that Dennis Senchuk states well the functional relationship between intrinsic valuing and extrinsic evaluation when he writes that "*evaluating* is a second-order process directed upon the first order process of *valuing*."

Indeed, I suspect that the only place it makes sense to say that something is being valued extrinsically is when some implicit or explicit evaluation of it is being made. That is, it seems to me that extrinsic valuing is exhausted in the act of evaluation. People intrinsically value, and they extrinsically evaluate. Without the other process, neither process would have meaning. Furthermore, anything intrinsically valued can be extrinsically evaluated. Indeed, much of the effort of philosophers is aimed at getting people to evaluate on the grounds the things which they implicitly value intrinsically.

Suppose, for example, that as a teacher it is my preference to give a spelling test to my class every Friday. So long as I do so uncritically, giving a spelling test on Friday can be described, I think, as an intrinsic value I hold; it qualifies as what Phil Smith calls a considered preference--i.e., one choice of action that eliminates other available alternatives. The example illustrates what I consider to be an important, seemingly unnoticed, characteristic of intrinsic valuing: it does not necessarily involve the "enjoyment" of what is valued. For a teacher to admit enjoying giving students tests might strike many people as sadistic. What is involved in intrinsic valuing is preference for a course of action; not the enjoyment of that course of action. Indeed, if as Smith and Dewey maintain, "value" is primarily a verb, intrinsic valuing is best conceptualized as an undergoing of a kind of restraint on one's actions.

In an unpublished manuscript on values, Smith gives the example of choosing between beer and pretzels and champagne and caviar. (The example can be confusing: I, for example, prefer champagne and pretzles to beer and cavier, so I'll limit the choice just to beer and champagne). My choosing champagne may lead to considerable enjoyment; but my intrinsic valuing is perhaps *more* marked by a *foregoing* of beer than by an anticipation of the champagne. And even if my host offers *only* champagne, which I enjoy, I may experience the choice as a foregoing of sobriety. The same is true if I intrinsically value honesty. The valuing is *not* my honest actions, but rather my choice to forego deceit and dissembling; and it is as likely to be painful as enjoyable.

On the whole, there is generally far more enjoyment in arriving as the result of an evaluation, at the extrinsic judgment that something, such as giving spelling tests on Friday, is valuable than there is in the valuing per se. Such an experience is liable to yield the kind of enjoyment that comes closer to what Dewey calls a consumatory experience. That kind of extrinsic evaluation comes as the result of a challenge, either by the teacher himself, or by the students, their parents, or the administrators, which asks whether the teacher's preference is, in fact, valuable.

As Smith writes,

> It is certainly possible for men to strive for objectivity in evaluating, both in the sense of using impersonal standards and in the sense of accuracy and reliability in the assessment of the degree to which an object meets or fulfills the standard... The claim "X is valuable" (to a certain degree in terms of certain standards) may, in principle, be treated as a knowledge claim. [This and subsequent references are to a presently unpublished manuscript by Philip G. Smith.]

It is, in my judgment, precisely for that reason that it is important, even for non-philosophers, to be aware of the distinction between valuing and evaluation.

There is, I think, an important gap to be noted between "*X* is valuable" and "I value *X*." The claim, "*X* is valuable," is, as Smith argues, a knowledge claim that can be as objective as any other type of knowledge claim (e.g., "*X* is real"; "*X* is true"). That is what renders the satisfactory conclusion of our evaluations enjoyable.

Objective evaluations, however, are *a*temporal; they exist in what Alfred Schutz calls an enclave from everyday life, one in which truth claims are not subject to erosion by time. Having arrived at the objective conclusion that a thing or experience is extrinsically valuable, however, the inquirer reenters the world of everyday life where his valuings are *not* objective or certifiable, but serve as guides to actions into an uncertain future. If, as I think Smith demonstrates (albeit indirectly), extrinsic values are best understood as valuables; intrinsic values might be described as "actables." An extrinsic value or valuable is a knowledge claim. An intrinsic value or actable, is a risking and foregoing toward an uncertain future; it can claim no factual basis.

Even if the spelling test on Friday can be shown to be objectively valuable, the next set of changing conditions in the culture, or in the universe, may render it valueless -- and irrelevant. The teacher chooses and acts with that uncertainty in the back of his or her awareness. Intrinsic valuing isn't all fun and games; it is more nearly, as Sartre suggests, a dreadful freedom. When the teacher's course of action is challenged, he or she can take refuge in an objective evaluation. Even if that results in a determination of valuableness, however, the next choice of action is still his and still risks uncertain consequences.

Smith makes what I think is a provocative challenge to the kind of evaluations typically made with regard to education and schooling. Schooling is now generally regarded as a large-scale, public undertaking in which instrumental, or ends-means evaluations are presumed to be most relevant. In my example of the teacher is giving spelling tests on Friday, the teacher will typically respond to the challenge to evaluate the practice by assuming that what is being asked for is evidence that taking such tests will result in members of his class becoming, by and large, better spellers in their own written work.

As Smith stresses repeatedly, such a type of evaluation may be the *least* relevant for many aspects of the school program. Indeed, the results of such evaluations in the past have been almost universally disappointing; they leave educators with little objective basis for justifying anything that is done in schools. Having failed to demonstrate the instrumental value of his spelling tests, the teacher is likely to encounter resistance from his class and discouragement in his work.

As a way out of such dilemmas, Smith puts forward Dewey's normative concept of education, a concept which views education as the goal of schooling. What such a move accomplishes is to encourage educators to consider the deucational aspects of a person's experience as making up a kind of whole. From that perspective, evaluation which looks at the *contributory* value of various elements of a school program becomes more important than evaluation which focuses narrowly on their instrumental value.

From that perspective, for example, the spelling test on Friday becomes an experience for students which stresses the importance that schools and teachers (as surrogates of the culture) place on written communication; on competitive performance; and on attention to detail. If that is effectively communicated by test and teacher, the experience can be educationally valuable even though there is no measurable increment of improvement in the spelling performance of students in the class as compared to students undergoing other types of experience.

Smith also identifies a related difficulty in many current evaluations of schooling; viz., the assumption that the ends to which schooling should be instrumental are the observable, or elicitable, wants and needs of students. As he writes, "One of the best indications that education (in the value-loaded sense) is taking place is not that it is [assisting] students in terms of the concerns and preferences they bring to the experience, but rather that the experience is resulting in a reconstruction of these concerns and preferences."

There is, that is to say, a relationship between the kinds of evaluations preformed in schooling and educating the students to value intrinsically. If educators overstress (as seems currently to be the case) the instrumental evaluation of schooling, they obscure from the view of students the possibility that other types of evaluation, particularly evaluations of contributory value, may serve as a starting point for their own intrinsic valuings. The results of our evaluations become the source of our future valuing. Therefore, to the extent that our evaluations are instrumental in nature, we are engaged in a process of transforming our means into ends -- a possibility that horrified Arthur Koestler in his picture of totalitarian society in *Darkness At Noon*. Smith warns specifically against those pressures in the schools and in the culture generally which might incline one "to maintain an almost constant instrumental posture toward everything one encounters."

There is also the possibility that using instrumental evaluations as the basis for our intrinsic valuings may increase anxiety toward the future; since we can never be certain that the means we have chosen (and thereby endowed with intrinsic as well as instrumental value) will result in the consequences we foresee as desirable. A greater emphasis on the contributory values of schooling, on the other hand, can give encouragement to holistic awareness and the ability to live more contentedly with the emerging, uncertain future.

I, therefore, concur with Smith's conclusion that, "teaching for improved valuing in the intrinsic mode...must be part of an education that increases the ability and inclination to engage in independent thought and judgment concerning the contributory value of having various experiences of intrinsic valuing under various circumstances." No matter how thoroughly we know the facts, our choice of action may result in consequences which we will later evaluate as deplorable. Over-emphasis on the instrumental can be a source of endless existential angst. Only the recourse to other forms of evaluation can make it possible to live comfortably with the risks and uncertainties of intrinsic valuing and with the realization, which rationality and ethical action require, that each person is responsible for his or her part in bringing about undesirable consequences, even though they could not have been foreseen. I hope that I have said enough so that you can contribute, by your questions and comments, to the important work which Phil Smith has initiated.

REFLECTIVE THINKING: THEN AND NOW

Robert L. Wilhoyte
University of Toledo

It is now 65 years after the publication of *Democracy and Education*, in which John Dewey attempted to show that each (democracy and education) was a necessary condition for the other. Difficult philosophical questions immediately arose: (1) If he was writing from the perspective of science (i.e., if there was an empirical base for his thesis), then he was only rendering explicit that which already obtained implicitly and was publically verifiable. Clearly there were problems with this view. If Dewey was doing nothing more than rendering explicit that which is the case, then the *possible* is reduced to the *actual*; the ought is reduced to the *is*, and all of that. So much for that idea. Dewey would never make such a mistake. He had to be giving us an account of the way things *ought* to be. After all that is what philosophy is all about. But then a new problem arises: As in any case where scientific grounding is lacking, non-empirical reference must be posited--enter metaphysics.[1]

All of Dewey's works, in general, and *Democracy and Education*, in particular, have been subjected to the intense scrutiny of those who devote themselves to this kind of task--proving that Dewey was really a closet metaphysician. No one has ever succeeded.

What then can we conclude? Why should anyone accept a thesis the truth of which cannot be verified *either* through experimentation *or* through reflection (the Kantion view)? Philosophers, as we know, have pondered this question and have seldom, if ever, satisfactorily (to them) resolved it. Philosophy without metaphysics is like evolution without teleology or, in the language of the so called "common man," it is like going on a trip without a destination in mind, or what is worse, without even the idea of what a destination would be like. It should not be surprising that, given this vacuum, the work 'pragmatic,' as an adjective in our language, has taken on two meanings, one functioning as a premise and the other functioning as a conclusion: now that it has been established that there are no eternal and/or absolute verities, I am thus free to maximize gains on criteria of self interest. For example, such phrases as "Let's be pragmatic" often precede the offering of a bribe, taking a short cut on a construction project, or even buying (or selling) a term paper.

I have simplified, but I do not think distorted, the philosophical problem in historical perspective. Since the age of Heraclitus and Permemides, there has been (and is) a cosmological dichotomy within the totality of experience.

Science is meaning over-restrained by truth (verification). Religion is meaning under-restrained by truth. Dewey attempted, if not to provide the synthesis of these two universal experiential contraries, then at least to provide a prolegomenon to such a synthesis. But what happened? We all know the answer to this. In a world in which the dichotomy is manifested as theory vs. practice, professional philosophers made a feeble attempt to assimilate Dewey's philosophy. I say "feeble" because I do not think anything else was possible. They were part of the problem. Just as neither of the attorneys in the dialectic of justice can function as the judge, in a similar manner, neither the thesis not the antithesis can function as the synthesis. On the practical side we are all too familiar with what happened. Since Dewey seemed to be enthroning education at the apex of something or other, people in the educational establishment from all across American treked to the fount of knowledge at Teacher's College and then returned to preach the new gospel from the many educational pulpits. Again disaster. And, in retrospect, there should not have been any reason to expect anything else. Success would have entailed the greatest operation bootstrap anyone could imagine.

By way of summary, and to use another pair of terms to expose the dichotomy, on the one hand, philosophers could not fit the seemingly relativistic pieces of Deweyan philosophy into their absolutistic categories.[2] We can all document this point with stories about where our philosophical friends put Dewey's works on their book shelves. On the other hand, practical educators, schoolmen, as it were, translated the Deweyan message into field trips, the core curriculum, the child centered curriculum, and those cartoons we saw of the child looking at the teacher and saying, "Teacher, do we have to do today what we want to?" In short the Deweyan synthesis, as possibility, was reduced, through pluralistic relativism, to practical actuality or actual practice.

What was the philosophico-educational climate like in 1961 when Hullfish and Smith published *Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education?* What were the author's expectations? Clearly, there were those who *did* understand what Dewey called growth, functional intelligence, etc. Hullfish was certainly one of them. Phil Smith, as joint author, and then only a few years into his professional career, must have made predictions about the impact of their book. Aside from its intrinsic value, what did Professor Smith see as the book's function in the broad perspective of education encompassing one, two, and even three decades? Did he hope to provide a new impetus to the Deweyan synthesis? Could this provide the focus for an educational grass roots movement that could, and would, get American education back on the track of process?

I do not think any of these expectations would have been inappropriate. And they must have crossed the authors' minds.

I have attempted to recreate the philosophical climate that prevailed at the time when *Reflective Thinking* was published. I did not want to get lost in the particulars of what kind of philosophies (and philosophers) were around (e.g., second rate metaphysicians, naive pragmatists, practical existentialists, ordinary language people, and the like.) I may have erred on the side of being too general. But I hope my thesis is clear.

The challenge was great in 1961. But the challenge is even greater today. In a world where secondary education tends to be reduced to content, and where elementary education, more often than not, is reduced to skills, the need for reflective thinking, the (ought to be) method of education could not be greater.

An obvious example is that of construct validation. In a typical class (probably secondary) a series of so-called "objective" tests are given. The average is computed and a grade assigned. The reasoning is as follows: Since John learned 78.4 percent of the material, therefore John is given a letter grade of C+. If anyone suggests that maybe other samples (tests) from this same population (content) might produce a numeral contrary to 78.4, he is looked upon as nit picking. Similarly, if it is suggested that maybe in two weeks "learning" might regress down the scale, the response is one of irritation.

The other side of the evaluation is to grade "on the curve" to use percentiles rather than percentages as a means of differentiation. Learners who score at one end of such a distribution of scores are designated "high achievers." Those who score at the other end are branded "low achievers." The distribution of scores may represent what would be expected to occur by chance alone, but this does not deter this indefensible practice.

The need for *Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education* could not be greater.

NOTES

1. At this point educational practice seems to proceed according to a model of epistemology based on optics. If someone claimed that he opened the shutter of his camera and has an image on the film even though the corresponding object was not in front of the lens, he would be thought to have uttered an absurd claim. Similarly, in the learning process, if it can be claimed that the learner has learned a concept, then it seems necessary to look for an object in the external world that corresponds in this. If this object is not ascertainable in the empirical world, then it must be posited in the non-empirical world.

2. How did they deal with other treatises on the reality of process? Einstein was not regarded as a philosopher, and a metaphysical substratum was found to underlie Whitehead's philosophy of process.

SOME CLAIMS RELATED TO THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHIC-MINDEDNESS

Walden Crabtree
The University of Akron

The theme of this paper is that it would be reasonable for some philosophers of education to continue the work on philosophic-mindedness (hereafter, PM) that Phil Smith began almost thirty years ago and a mistake if it is not done, to make clear to ourselves, other teacher educators and the public that philosophers of education teach intelligent decision making about problems in education. Progress in this direction could help remedy deficiencies in teacher education today, which needs to convince the public and itself that teacher education teaches students how to teach well, and it would teach us what it is we are doing and help us do it better or admit that it isn't worth doing.

In his 1954[1] and 1956[2] studies, dealing with PM and the school administrator, Professor Smith had many intelligent and educational things to say about the function and purposes of philosophy; science; value statements; the discipline of philosophy of education and its relation to schooling; the role of teachers of philosophy of education; education and learning; and the purposes of schooling. In this paper, however, I wish to emphasize not the ideas just listed, as important and instructive as they are, but rather Smith's ideas on PM (comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility), and their relation to schooling, the teaching of philosophy of education, and to teacher education.

In his study on PM, after Smith had identified 11 schools, of the 46 being studies, where principals were operating with high PM, 13 where principals exhibited medium PM, and 10 where principals exhibited low PM, he gathered information on questionnaires from teachers at all 46 schools, statistically analyzed this, and concluded that in high PM schools communication was better, principals were perceived as more helpful, responsibilities were well-defined, principals gave approval, morale was better, approved modes of problems selection were used, teachers were well-organized, and the year-long curriculum study was viewed as helpful.[3] He also found that in low PM schools, teachers expressed fear and lack of trust of administrators in their buildings, and that high PM was correlated with recent graduate study.[4]

After presenting his findings, Smith proposed, using some qualitative data gathered in the study, that school administrators could be taught to learn how to use PM in their work, or solve professional problems intelligently. It was Smith's conviction that his study showed that PM had a "consistently salutary effect on the attitudes and opinions of teachers and general atmosphere of the schools."[5]

This original work of Smith was carried on by Smith and Felker and by Felker, in a series of well-done projects that were published in a dissertation, a book, and several articles and papers.[6] I have space here only to list briefly their contributions. An 84 item PM scale, later (1968) reduced to 24 items, using flexibility as a criterion, was constructed and shown to have a reasonable measure of construct validity.[7] The scale was used in several empirical studies and the following finds emerged:

1. Students in philosophy of education classes who were rated high in PM by their instructors scored higher on the test of PM.

2. Studen[illegible]' scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism scale correlated negatively with their scores on the PM scale.

3. After a course in philosophy of education, students' scores on PM increased significantly.

4. A significant correlation between pre-test scores on the PM scale and course grades was found.

5. A significant correlation between post-test PM scores and course grades was found.[8]

After these conclusions--and significant progress in constructing a valid PM scale--Felker suggested that the scale be further evaluated and extended, that it might be used in philosophy of education classes, and that efforts should be made to related PM to teaching skills.[9] And, in spite of his useful work in clarifying the construct, he cautioned that the meaning of PM "at present . . . is undetermined."[10]

Further empirical and theoretical work of the type suggested by Felker and Smith was done by Crabtree and Newman and presented in papers at the American Education Research Association Annual Conference in 1973[11] and at the Ohio Academy of Science (Psychology Division) Annual Conference in 1973.[12] Their research was involved, and I can only summarize it briefly here. In a study involving 169 subjects, with a quasi-experimental, four group 2x2 design, PM, Dogmatism, Semantic and Behavioral Differential Scales were administered before and after a ten-week course in philosophy of education. Oblique and orthogonal factor analyses were used to analyze responses, and it was found that after a course in philosophy of education, cognitive complexity (construed as less stereotypical, more analytical thinking) of students in experimental groups increased significantly, but that scores on PM and Dogmatism did not change significantly. Factor analysis supported the underlying conceptual framework of the PM scale, with three factors accounting for 70 percent of the variance, and a four-factor solution for the entire measure. It was also found that the PM scale and Rokeach scales were measuring different concepts, as Felker and Smith had stated.

Reacting to Smith's work on PM, one critic complained that Smith's work was simple and reasonable, but not profound philosophically and rather on the level of common sense.[13] This reminds me of the criticism of one Brother Benignus, who while expounding and defending the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as the *philosophia perennis*, criticized David Hume's work as merely clever.

In his 1954 study, Smith suggested that school administrators should be taught how to make good judgments about professional matters, and, in his 1974 Bode lecture, he said that one component of professional teacher training should be the development of skill in applicative procedures.[14] These suggestions are consistent with a recent proposal by Don Medley[15] who claimed that the central competency of teachers is professional decision making, or problem solving, and involves using four components: (1) professional knowledge; (2) perceptual and information gathering skills; (3) professional values; and (4) accurate perception of alternate courses of action.[16] Medley has devised and is now testing methods of instruction and evaluation to teach this component and to test for it and is having success with the program at the University of Virginia. Smith and Felker's work on PM was along these lines and a continuation of such work would be good.

In his work on PM, Smith has analyzed "thinking," as has Ennis, Scriven, Dewey, and just about every other philosopher from the pre-Socratics to the present. What "thinking" is and how to teach it may be very difficult to say, however, because of the multiple and varigated operations included under such a broad mantle, ranging, as they do, from the theoretical speculations of an Einstein or an Ennis to the securing of a rattle by a baby. Noddings has suggested that it may be better to say that rational thinking "develops," i.e., "appears gradually as a product of maturation, learning, and cultural immersion"[17] than that it is taught directly and, therefore, "must be nurtured in ways we are far from understanding."[18] We might, she continues, "rather than attempting to construct curricula for direct instruction of rational thinking, recommend guidelines for the sorts of experiences which should be imbedded in all curricula and modes of instruction which will model and perhaps induce . . . rational thinking . . . ."[19] In response to these suggestions, I have concluded that if, as Nodding says, "we are far from understanding how rational thinking develops," then it makes sense, as Smith has done, to study it, to explicate some guidelines and sorts of experiences that model and, according to the evidence Smith and Felker have collected, that help to develop rational thinking. Good swimming or good tennis or good engineering or doctoring could be said to develop, too, but such skills develop better in the context of good coaching and good teaching.

In Smith's study, a team of eight trained observers interviewed principals, used a prepared set of questions and rated principals on PM. This was, in a sense, a study of teaching behaviors, or of "administrating behaviors." In current research on effective teaching, Good, Biddle, Gage and others suggest that research should be done *in situ*, or in naturalistic settings. In studies of Aspy, Flanders, and others, uses of trained observers to judge audio-tapes or video-tapes or live behaviors have been accepted strategies, also. But, in this connection, it is interesting to notice what the trained observers in Smith's study were observing. They were observing principals who were talking to an interviewer, or talking about how they dealt with their problems. There are also problems in such studies of observer intrusion, the g factor (general intelligence), the h factor (the ability to make a good imporession), and the k factor (the ability to appear socially desirable), which are claimed by Medley to be the most important factors in rating scales, tests of cognitive knowledge and self-report instruments.[20] So, in Smith's study, principals were not really observed or rated as they went about their jobs *in situ*, e.g., as they deal with the central office, secretaries, assistant principals, teachers, preachers, cooks, janitors, paper work, parents, students etc. Could we say then that when these principals talked to raters, they were rated on how philosophically they could talk? Studies by Bob Brown and Combs have concluded that teachers know the answer to the questions about how to teach, but they don't necessarily carry out in practice these states beliefs.

This leads me to ask the question: What was the relationship between the principal's "talking to an interviewer" behavior, and the PM in their school administrating? Although these kinds of questions about the validity of modes of measurement and about the predictive validity of the findings need further study, this work by Smith was a well-conceived and successful start in the right direction.

Smith's work resulted in several empirical studies and in further work on validation of scales for use in philosophy of education courses; but, as Smith and Felker suggested, more work needs to be done on the following questions: What is the relation, if any, between scores on a paper-pencil test of PM and the use of PM as one teaches (predictive validity)?

In Biddle and Dunkin's chapter on research on teaching thinking,[21] the authors report studies that relate explicit logic, verbal fluency, and explicit discourse to effective teaching; these behaviors seem related to PM (logical thinking and fluent thinking) and, having been related to effective teaching, give hope than PM may also be.

When Smith in his study made suggestions as to how PM might be better taught in education courses, he said that methods of instruction would have to change. We may add that, if one wanted to teach PM, knew what it was, and how to identify or measure it, then one would have to devise a way to teach it. In regard to this, Medley has said that we shouldn't worry so much about instruction; we should improve our evaluating, because if we can specify what it is we want teacher trainees to learn, they will learn it. "I am firmly convinced," he has said, "that the greatest obstacle to the improvement of teacher education lies not in the way we train students but in the way we evaluate them."[22] This suggests then, that a very important part of our teaching should be valid measures of whatever it is we claim to be teaching.

At a recent conference at the Ohio State University on the evaluation of teacher education, it was a general theme that "there is a growing concern these days about the image of professional teacher education. Many members of the public and their elected representatives are convinced that teacher education is turning out too many incompetent teachers . . . . Many question whether there is any content in the teacher education curriculum that could possibly make our graduates more competent than liberal arts graduates. Many would abolish teacher education entirely."[23] As teacher educators, we philosophers of education don't seem to have accomplished much in the way of educating teachers that has impressed anyone. Little has changed, apparently, since the days of Bestor, Koerner and others when teacher education was so assiduously derided.

In 1974 Smith said that "we are engaged in a power struggle for control of public education,"[24] that the "present situation is precarious,"[25] and that if schools of education don't reform fundamentally, they may lose control to those who are satisfied with teaching as a craft. According to Medley, we teacher educators have to prove that we teach students something, and we can just as well say that we philosophers of education would do well to convince the public and our professional colleagues that we teach something, if we want to work toward making teaching a professional practice, and if we want to keep our jobs. Medley claimed that "as teacher educators, we cannot begin to answer these charges until we can convince the public--and ourselves--of the existence of a relevant body of knowledge and a professional culture unique to the teaching profession;" and "the best, if not the only way to convince anyone is to produce a professional examination that measures relevant content and one on which our graduates do better than graduates of other programs."[26] So, it seems to me that good measuring instruments are of crucial value in our teaching of PM, and in getting evidence that we teach teacher trainees important skills.

Another important point Smith makes is that if we are successful at helping to develop PM in students, we will be helping persons change; i.e., teaching students to think involves the whole person; grounds of belief change, statements of belief change, cognitive maps change, experience is reconstructed. "Teaching people to think means remaking individuals," Smith said.[27] This may remind us that the business we are engaged in is a sacred one, involving as it does the characters of persons. If we are not successful in remaking individuals, we have accomplished little; if we do have success, we have helped bring about changes in persons that will affect their lives, the lives of their associates, their communities, and the definition of man. These things are worth working to improve and to prove, and valid modes of assessment are essential.

It is interesting to me that 25 years ago, Smith said that "school administrators at all levels are faced with enormous problems . . . Public education is under widespread criticism . . ., and tremendous pressures are being brought to bear by groups who would subvert the schools to serve their own special interests."[28] This description of the schools of 25 years ago in the U.S. could be applied to the schools of today. If PM in the behavior of school administrators could be offered as an aid 25 years ago, it could also be offered again today, because the problems are at least as severe.

But, one might retort that today, when there lies heavy in the hearts of many the realization of the failures of liberal ideas and reforms, when pessimism and despair seem rampant, advocating the development of PM is just another one of these high sounding liberal ideas that is too little too late. Perhaps the words of Will Durant are a reasonable response to such skepticism. He has said: "The only real revolution is in the enlightenment of the mind and the improvement of character, the only real emancipation is individual, and the only real revolutionists are philosophers and saints."[29]

If philosophers of education, then, could learn more about what PM is and how better to teach it, and if we could show that PM is a competency of an effective teacher, and if we could teach our students this competency and teach them to value it, we could not only improve our teacher education and respond to our critics, but also make a contribution toward development of an educated citizenry for a democratic society. If we could add to that the teaching of moral ideas instead of just ideas about morality, and show that we do, we will be doing all we can toward helping society survive and maybe even progress at a time when immorality, greed, fundamentalism and militarism threaten to engulf us before the dawn arrives.

NOTES

1. Philip G. Smith, *The Role of Philosophy in the Preparation of School Administrators* (Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1954).

2. Philip G. Smith, *Philosophic-Mindedness in Educational Administration* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1956).

3. Smith, *Role of Philosophy*, p. 98.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

6. D. W. Felker, "A Measuring Instrument for Philosophers of Education," in *The Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society 22nd annual meeting*, 1966, ed., Francis T. Villemain, pp. 237-240; D. W. Felker, "Further Validation of a Scale to Measure Philosophic-Mindedness," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, Vol. 26 (1966), pp. 1007-1013; Donald Felker and Philip G. Smith, "The Measurement of Philosophic-Mindedness on the Criterion of Flexibility," in *The Bulletin of the School of Education*, Vol. 42 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 1-138. D. W. Felker and Philip G. Smith, "Problems of Construct Validation in Developing Philosophic Scales," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 18 (1968), pp. 3-12.

7. Donald Felker and Philip G. Smith, "The Measurement of Philosophic-mindedness on the Criterion of Flexibility," in *The Bulletin of the School of Education*, Vol. 42 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1966).

8. D. W. Felker, "A Measuring Instrument for Philosophers of Education," in *The Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society 22nd annual meeting*, 1966, ed. Francis T. Villemain, p. 239.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Walden Crabtree and Isadore Newman, "An Experimental Inquiry into the Relationship of Cognitive Complexity and a Teacher Education Core Course," paper presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, Louisiana, February, 1973.

12. Walden Crabtree and Isadore Newman, "An Inquiry into the Measurement of Higher Level Cognitive and Affective Outcomes," paper presented at the Ohio Academy of Science (Psychology Division) Symposium on Evaluation, Cleveland, Ohio, April, 1973.

13. *Philosophies of Education* (author and date n.a.).

14. Philip G. Smith, *Teacher Education at the Crossroads* (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1974), p. 11.

15. Donald M. Medley, "Training Teachers to be Professional Decision-Makers," paper presented at the American Educational Research Association

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Convention, Los Angeles, April 14, 1981, p. 1.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

17. Nell Noddings, "Response to Ennis," in *The Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, ed. Jerrold R. Coombs. Toronto, Canada, April 1979, p. 34.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. Medley, "Training Teachers," pp. 4 and 5.

21. Michael J. Dunkin and Bruce J. Biddle, *The Study of Teaching* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), pp. 231-272.

22. Medley, "Training Teachers," p. 4.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

24. Smith, *Teacher Education at the Crossroads*, p. 7.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

26. Medley, "Training Teachers," p. 11.

27. Smith, *The Role of Philosophy in the Preparation of School Administrators*, p. 43.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

29. Will and Ariel Durant, *Lessons of History* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 72.

PART III

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

EDUCATION AGAINST COMMUNITY

Steve Kay
Kentucky State University

In May, in conjunction with National Historical Preservation Week, I received a notice from my neighborhood association. At the head of the notice stood the logo and identification of the National Trust for Historic Preservation and their motto, "Conservation: Keeping American's Neighborhoods Together." Now it so happens that my neighborhood is rife with preservation activity which is displacing poor and working class folk. They constituted a neighborhood until this invasion by new people whose minds were filled with notions of improving the housing stock and changing the neighborhood. So the motto strikes me as ironic. For all its positive aspects, the preservation movement has disrupted neighborhoods almost without exception. It has preserved buildings, not neighborhoods. The National Trust motto changes the meaning of the word "neighborhood" to signify the dwelling in which people live instead of the residents themselves. For poor folks, preservation is the city-planning equivalent of the neutron bomb.

I share the anecdote not merely to vent my displeasure about gentrification, but because it exemplifies one particular way words are used to distort reality. In this case the group of people who make up the neighborhood disappear as the referent of the very word meant to describe them. In what follows I present a parallel example of shifting reference for the "community" which the educational system is meant to serve.

My interest in the relationship between schools and the communities they serve grows out of a small field project in an inner-city elementary school. I have augmented continued work at that site with a larger project which examines four rural public school systems and their respective communities.[1] In becoming familiar with the rural schools I have been struck by how similar they are to city schools, despite the differences in settings.

This particular city school is one small piece of the sixteenth largest school system in the country, a system with one hundred thousand students. The school sits across the street from the truck entrance to a commercial bakery, in an almost unrelieved panorama of old warehouses, light industry, overgrown lots, and small, densely packed, run-down dwellings. One comparable rural school is the sole elementary school in a county system with eleven hundred students. The school sits on a ridge overlooking miles of farmland. Despite these striking differences and a host of other differences which are related to the setting of the schools and their surrounding communities, the schools are almost indistinguishable in their internal functioning. The curricula of the schools are essentially the same, as are the textbooks and materials. The structure of the school day is the same. The teachers vary little in background and training. Although the city school happens to be quite old while the rural school happens to be quite new, once inside either school, one would be hard pressed to determine whether one was in a large city, a small city, the suburbs, or the countryside. The schools have almost the uniformity we associate with fast food franchises. Their great similarity suggests that at least one of the schools is not oriented to the community it serves and that possibly neither of them is.

An adequate understanding of the various uses of the term "community" is crucial to the argument that follows. Lack of clarity in using the term has masked significant changes in the conduct of public education. The term is both relative and ambiguous. It is relative because "community" is arbitrarily applied to any size locality. The "local community" in one context is the "larger community" in another context. The state is local compared to the nation; the county is local compared to the state; the city or town is local compared to the county, and so on. The term community is applied descriptively both to a wide spot in a country road and to an entire nation.

The term is ambiguous because common locale is but one among a host of factors held to be definitive of community. One way to use the term is as a qualifier for places or groups of people, to maintain that they have more or less community. This is Tonnies' use in his classic study, *Community and Society*.[2] Tonnies' work provides the intellectual framework for describing and measuring the decline of community life as well as the shift to and rise of the less personal forces of society. His contrast outlines modes of being, values held, and relationships of individuals within localities.

One confusion in keeping these uses straight comes from the possibility of referring to the amount or extent of community--in the sociological sense--possessed by a particular community--in the sense of place or group of people. Those most directly concerned with the study of community and communities have had little success in settling on a standard usage or a set definition of the term.[3] Consequently, we need to be aware of its use and meaning in any particular context, and we need to be sensitive to its referents.

Without dwelling further on the technical difficulties inherent in defining the term closely, let me make the rough generalization that there is a greater sense of community--by which I mean shared values, common feelings, mutual support--in smaller than in larger communities. That is, smaller communities have more community feeling. For our purposes we can think of concentric geographic circles of community, beginning with the small, face-to-face community of an urban neighborhood or a rural town, progressing to a school district or school system, then to a city or county, then to the state. I am claiming that the educational system is at odds with the vast majority of these smaller communities, and thus at odds with the existence of community feeling.

Let me amplify this statement. I mean to say that the system of public education as presently constituted works against the maintenance and development of community in each ring of the circle, for the sake of the next larger ring. The only exception occurs where the values of the one ring are the same as those in the successive ring. To put it another way, the neighborhood community is subject to the demands of the district, which is subject to the demands of the state, which in turn is subject to the demands of the nation. These formal, legal, centralizing forces are important in themselves, but of equal importance are the forces generated by the standardizing tendencies of the educational establishment.

These latter forces contribute to the schools' lack of orientation to the particular circumstances of their immediate communities. Negative impact thus comes not so much from educators who do not do their jobs well enough, but from one aspect of the understanding these educators have of the nature of their task. This aspect derives from a combination of three prevailing views. The first view holds that the route to opportunity for individuals lies outside their immediate communities. The second holds that success is measured on a scale of values determined by those outside the immediate community. The third view holds that individual opportunity and achievement according to these external criteria are the best measures of successful educational endeavor. When combined, the three views prompt educators to hold the position that educational opportunity means providing opportunity for the best students to leave their native communities behind. Standardization of educational values and concentration on the individual thus contribute directly to the decline of certain specific communities as well as community in general.

The community served by a school may be a rural county legally in control of its own school system or an urban neighborhood embedded in a much larger system. In either case, standardization and the companion force of centralization, marching under the banner of individual opportunity, operate to the detriment of the expression of local values, and to the detriment of the inclusion of local values in policy formation and execution. In its worst form, this tendency results in the importation, from remote sources, of values which have doubtful applicability.

In rural areas, we see the effects of this imbalance most clearly in the battle over consolidation of schools and school systems, a program pushed successfully by national educational leaders and state departments of education, over the futile objections of small communities and small school systems.[4] In urban areas we see the effects of this imbalance most clearly in the total failure of programs designed to return a modicum of control over schools to their local communities.[5] Reformers, in the first case, claimed to be improving the schools, while counter-reformers, in the second case, claimed to be protecting the schools from harm. In both cases the unspoken assumption was that schools are institutions which should focus primarily on providing opportunity to the individuals who attend them.

Historically, the prevailing presumption of educators has been that benefit to the community would result from such focus on the development of the individual. However, the reference community of the term changed over time, and the gap between the individual and community referred to has consequently widened. A brief excursion into educational history in the United States should illustrate this point.

Throughout the Colonial period there was concern for education for the common good. At first, the states acted to enhance the common good through concern only for those children from families at the extremes of the economic spectrum. Efforts were made both to educate the children of the wealthy to become leaders in religious, economic, political, and cultural affairs and to educate the children of the poor to become minimally useful and productive citizens. In both cases, the common good of the larger society involved no separation of students from their individual communities, or from the values of those communities. Gradually, concern broadened to include making common schools available for all children. From there it was but a short step to compel education of all children in the interest of the larger community.[6]

This intrusion of the state into local affairs seemed to many at the time to be of less importance than the benefits which would flow from the establishment, by state statute, of common schools which would provide free universal education. The gap between local communities and the state was not as great as it is now, and the state's intrusion was limited to its mandating that communities provide schools.

There is some disagreement among historians of education about the intentions and motivations of the various factions involved in the next great reform movement, which began at the turn of the twentieth century, but there is little disagreement about what actually happened in this crucial period: in the cities, elites increased and centralized their power through the abolition of systems of ward representation, the establishment of smaller and smaller school boards with greater and greater powers, and an increasing reliance on professional administration; in the countryside, elites increased and centralized their power through a program of consolidation of schools and school districts, a consolidation undertaken with the virtually unanimous consent of professional educators and commentators. In both cases, power shifted from the local community to centralized agencies and professional administrators. The theme of the inability and unwillingness of average citizens to determine and provide for the needs of their children became elevated into a cause. Tyack views the two movements as intimately related: "This transformation of rural education into a consolidated and bureaucratized institution reflected, and in microcosm illuminated, a broader change in educational ideology and structure. Beginning in the cities, this organizational revolution set the pattern for public education in the twentieth century, in the countryside and metropolis alike."[7]

Ambivalence during that period about the community to be served by the schools is well illustrated in the work of John Dewey. Dewey preserves the strain of concern for the common good, with education as a key element in achieving that good; but a tension exists in his work between advocacy of the schools' mission of preserving and improving the larger society, on the one hand, and support of a necessary link between schools and their immediate communities, on the other. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey argues that education in both its formal and informal aspects is concerned with transmission of "ideas, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions" to the young members of the social group. In fact, he says that the existence of the group and its group life depend on this transmission.[8] Interpreters of Dewey have had grounds for endless debate over the source of the values Dewey believes the schools should transmit, and the nature of the social group to which he refers. When Dewey writes" "We speak of education as a shaping, forming, molding activity--that is, a shaping into the standard form of social activity,"[9] it seems reasonable to conclude that he believes the schools should transmit the dominant values of the society at large. Dewey was aware, however, that the older, simpler communities, with their traditional values, were disappearing. Dewey makes an argument, in *The Public and its Problems*, which in part parallels that of Tonnies in bemoaning the disappearance of community. Dewey maintains that schooling is best when conducted by groups which most closely approximate the democratic community, and he makes explicit the nature of this group: "In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse."[10]

Despite his awareness of the importance of the immediate community, Dewey was at times, so focused on "the way in which a social group brings up its immature members into its own social forms,"[11] that he did not distinguish between the social group of the immediate community and the social group of the nation.

When Dewey does consider conflicting values between these levels, he concludes that the role of the schools is to harmonize those values in a more comprehensive whole.[12] Here he speaks from the perspective of the more-inclusive community, which in order to survive must impart its own values to members of the smaller communities which compose it. Dewey felt that the schools could produce a common faith for the entire nation. He wrote in praise of "the assimilative force of the American public school,"[13] and he wrote that "it is the office of the school environment to balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born."[14]

On the one hand Dewey holds that education functions as a process of transmission of values. On the other hand, he holds that education is to transmit the most important and comprehensive values. Were education to transmit all values indiscriminately, there would be no possibility of improvement through education. In *Democracy and Education* Dewey's argument favors larger societal goals and the subservience of the values of smaller communities to those values, even though he also argues against national control of education and for close links between schools and their immediate communities. Here Dewey seems to be concerned with the need for societal stability, with possible threats to that stability from unassimilated forces, and with the general societal process which can be generated by using the schools to advance the best values of society and eliminate the worst. He does not link educators to dominant or elitist values. He sees educators as enlightened counter-forces in society who can--or who have the potential to--provide the necessary balance between stability and change. With the improvement of the nation, the larger community, in mind, Dewey ignores the dangers to the smaller group, the immediate community, of the values he advanced.

This aspect of Dewey's work exemplifies one direction of liberal reform at the turn of the present century. I believe we are all heir to that tradition to some extent. These views reinforced the trend toward increasing bureaucratization and professionalization, a trend which overwhelmed what little concern for community values existed at that time. This reform movement triumphed over immigrant, rural, and poor folks generally in the fight over socialization of their children--a fight which reformers mounted in the name of improving society. The improvements in education which they achieved, while often significant in themselves, nevertheless were often based on an unrecognized elitism which undercut individual and community power.

So successful has this reform movement been that its values are generally accepted even by the people and communities harmed by them. The gospel of individual success in the larger society has removed concern for community from consideration.

In the desire not to condemn children to the perceived limitations of the world of their parents, in the desire not to have a society where birth is the determinant of socio-economic class, we have created a constant bias against all but upper-middle class communities, to the detriment of all other communities. Let us consider a contrast between the immediate communities which I have mentioned and those which are found in the most affluent communities outside our larger cities--those served by schools such as New Trier, Shaker Heights, Newton, Walnut Hills, Staples. These schools have the same style and the same goals of education as the schools previously cited, but in contrast to those schools there is no gap between the circumstances and values of the immediate community and the larger community. These children are being trained for the world their parents already inhabit; they are being trained to succeed them. The children are already in the social strata for which their schools are training them. They do not suffer the curse of upward mobility--of having their success defined in good part by the distance they place between themselves and their community of origin and its values. Similarly, their communities do not suffer the curse of upward mobility--a curse which robs them of persons or some of their spirit.

When a person is successful in leaving a rural or inner-city community, that community loses the person's talents. When the person is not successful in leaving, the person often has an overlay of negative attitudes towards his or her self and the community in which he or she feels trapped as a failure.

We need to think of what it would mean to reverse the prevailing presumption, and, as a first priority, to focus educational resources on the development of the immediate community, with the presumption that benefit to the individuals will follow. We need to think of what it would mean to structure education for community development rather than for individual competition in the dominant economic system, since such competition entails the desire for escape from all but the most privileged communities. We need to think of what it would mean to have schools which serve the needs of their immediate communities. We need to recognize that the dominant culture is defined by a minority which routinely assaults the values of other minorities as deviant and counter-productive, a minority which, in its own interest, defines neighborhoods as buildings and overrides the values of all immediate communities except its own.

NOTES

1. Kentucky State University, Office of Education/Psychology Research, United States Department of Agriculture, Science and Education Administration/Community Research, Grant #KYX1581000005.

2. Ferdinand Tonnies, *Community and Society*, trans. by Charles P. Loomis (East Lansing: The Michigan State University Press, 1957).

3. For an extended discussion of the difficulties attending the attempt at such a definition in sociology, see Colin Bell and Howard Newby, *Community Studies* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 27-32.

4. The best current exposition of the consolidation issue can be found in David B. Tyack, *The One Best System* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).

5. See, for example, Mario Fantini, Marilyn Gittell, Richard Magat, *Community Control and the Urban School* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968); Leonard J. Fein, *The Ecology of the Public Schools* (New York: Pegasus, 1971); Joseph M. Cronin, *The Control of the Urban Schools* (New York: The Free Press, 1973).

6. Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Roderick F. McPhee, *The Organization and Control of American Schools* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1965).

7. Tyack, *One Best System*, p. 15.

8. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1916), p. 3.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

10. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1946), p. 213.

11. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 11.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

MORAL EDUCATION AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROVERSY*

Mark Sheldon
Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne

Increasing there is, from the general populace, a demand for the accountability of those in the various professions. What the term "accountability" actually means in the context of the practice of particular professions requires extensive conceptual investigation.[1] Of course, educators have long been concerned with the evaluation of teaching methods and approaches, especially in terms of studies that measure the extent to which a particular content has been successfully communicated to students and properly absorbed by them. Determining what content is to be absorbed, however, is another question. In *Accountability: A State, A Process or a Product*, William J. Gephart writes, "The call for accountability in education has everyone's blessing. Like motherhood, God, and country, it is almost unassailable."[2] However, he points out, what the term means is very unclear: "The term will crop up in discussion of performance contracts, behavioral objectives, teacher professionalism, urban schools, or school finance."[3] Towards, the end of the volume, Gephart appears to conclude that it is best to speak in terms of an "accountability system," and argues as follows:

> The legitimate locus of the ends, the goals of education, is with the people who have the need for education. It lies in the community. Their educative needs specify the ends toward which the schools should focus. The professionals in education ought to be in the situation of stating or determining the procedures, the means used to obtain these ends . . . One role is the determination of goals, and the appropriate individuals in that role are the people in the community. The second role is the technical role or program design and operation related to the accomplishment of the goals.[4]

Gephart suggests that an analogy with medicine may be helpful: "The community is, in effect, the patient; the community has the educative needs and should state them. The educators are the physician. They have the knowledge about techniques and procedures and can make prescriptions for accomplishing those goals."[5] The purpose of this paper is to examine the complexity overlooked by such a solution.

It is not too difficult to see the problems in the view that Gephart expresses above, the extent to which, in fact, it may be argued that the community does not necessarily have a privileged perspective on its educational needs, that the community may, in fact, be narrow, racist, provincial, etc. Examination of the accountability issue should, therefore, involve examination of various notions of moral education, the objectives of such programs actually applied in the classroom, and the problems involved in distinguishing these moral education programs from indoctrination. What I want to emphasize is that, prior to any discussion of accountability, issues involved in distinguishing indoctrination from education must be settled.

The first view of moral education that I will discuss I will label the Moral Truth View (MTV). The MTV has many proponents. By way of example, consider the following bill, presented in 1978 in the Indiana State Legislature, titled "Moral Instruction":

> (b) All teaching materials may not degrade, and where appropriate shall teach high moral standards including:
>
> (1) honesty;
> (2) acceptance of responsibility

(3) respect for the individuality of others;
(4) respect for parents and those properly in authority;
(5) the importance of the work ethic in achieving personal goals; and
(6) the existence of absolute values of right and wrong.

(d) Teaching materials shall:

(1) emphasize the importance of the family as the core of American society;
(2) present the historical, philosophical, ethical, religious and other underpinnings which influenced the political institutions of this country and which have preserved the liberties of the American people;
(3) include the principles of the free enterprise system and the effectiveness of the system;
(4) demonstrate the importance of obeying the law; . . .

(f) Teaching materials shall not invade the privacy of the pupil, the pupil's home and parents.

(h) Each superintendent, assistant superintendent, principal or supervisor who willfully or negligently permits the use of teaching materials in violation of this section in a school under his supervision, shall be dismissed from his employment.[6]

This bill, of course, reflects the increasing interest among some parents that the public schools obtain results in maintaining certain standards of behavior and specific fundamental values. Clearly, there are political motives involved in the presentation of such legislation. In many ways, we are still immersed in the sensibilities of a post-Watergate period, and Sidney Hook's comments in his 1975 Preface to Dewey's reissued *Moral Principles of Education* are obviously pertinent to this particular point:

> Every time a political or moral crisis engulfs the nation, sooner or later the ethical deficiencies of public life have related to the prevailing ethics of the community and to the education its citizens have received or have failed to receive, in school and out. Wherever schools have existed they have been expected to reinforce, supplement, sometimes even substitute for, the moral education children have acquired at home or church.[7]

The drafter of the Moral Instruction Bill and the critical individuals to whom Hook alludes are proponents of the MTV. For them moral education involves the process of instilling, in the child (or adult), the True Moral Doctrine. This view is also defended by Patrick Devlin. In a well-known passage from *Enforcement of Morality*, Devlin, arguing to justify state intervention in areas that might otherwise be viewed as matter of private morality, writes:

> Societies disintegrate from within more frequently than they are broken up by external pressures . . . The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities: it is no more possible to define a sphere of private morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity.[8]

He is, of course, making the point that immorality, in his view, is equivalent to treason: it has the same disintegrative effect on the state. He makes the following statement toward the end of the essay:

> A man who concedes that morality is necessary to society must support the use of those instruments without which morality cannot be maintained. The two instruments are those of teaching, which is doctrine, and of enforcement, which is the law.[9]

It seems clear that both the Moral Instruction Bill and Devlin reflect the view that teaching and instilling doctrine are the same thing. This is the MTV. The advantage of this view, of course, is that what counts for indoctrination is quite clear. Indoctrination involves instilling falsehood. Education and indoctrination involve the same *procedure*; they can be distinguished only on the basis of content.

The second view that I want to discuss I will label the Moral Search View (MSV). The views of Mill and Dewey, to some extent, typify this position. Mill's primary concern is the individual. Defining good as that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, Mill admits that what, in fact, actually produces happiness for the greatest number of people is very complex, and, for this reason, extensive discussion is always in order. It is in open consideration of all views, genuinely tolerated for the sake of meaningful discussion, that some notion of what will produce the greatest happiness emerges.

Mill was, of course, a Nineteenth Century optimist who, in human experience and history, detected evidence of moral progress. This optimism was a fundamental part of his perspective. He writes in Chapter III of *Utilitarianism*:

> . . . the moral feelings are not innate but acquired, they are not for that reason the less natural . . . Like other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it . . . susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a high degree of development . . .
>
> . . . there *is* this basis of powerful natural sentiment . . . The firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind;the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influence of advancing civilization.[10]

Here Mill has expressed in full the descriptive premise of his proof for the utility principle,[11] his claim for the existence of a social instinct of some sort that has a tendency to gain strength in a progressively civilized society. (It might be argued that the concern for unity is as great as or greater than the concern for happiness.) But it is curiously Hegelian in some sense, putting emphasis on a particular reading of history and its apparent record of increasing movement towards greater civilization.

Dewey, of course, also expresses optimism. He argues that it is through viewing the school experience not as preparation for life but as life itself that we will come to understand the proper approach to moral education. Life is conflict, and intelligence, properly applied, leads to the resolution of conflict (at least temporarily). The school should not consciously devote itself to moral education. A direct approach would harm, what also appears to be, from his perspective, a social instinct. Rather, Dewey's argument is that *all* subjects in school should be approached in view of their social implications. The "native instincts and impulses"[12] of the child, in being introduced to the perspectives of others in social studies, geography, etc., will be developed until "almost instinctive sensitiveness to conditions, to the ends and interests of others"[13] will occur.

Being optimistic, neither Dewey nor Mill has to concern himself with the enforcement of morality (as Devlin does). For Mill there is the assumption of progress, and for Dewey there is the assumption that social instinct, left free but stimulated, will bring about in individuals a greater concern for social cooperation. But the important point, significant for the purposes of this paper, is that neither Dewey nor Mill sees moral education as constituting the procedure of instilling doctrine. Both appear, instead, to encourage a plurality of doctrines, convictions, and moral viewpoints. Pluralism is not regarded as a threat to society, but as that which allows for the pursuit of individual happiness (a very complex matter) within society.

At this point, I want to look at these two views (MTV and MSV) in terms of the issue of distinguishing education and indoctrination. *X* (MTV) argues that moral education involves an effective procedure of instilling a specific doctrine (which is viewed as certain). Or, a variation of this view, it is not that doctrine is instilled; rather, it is reinforced. It is, after all, the absolute truth and thus does not require implantation, only constant and effective reinforcement.

Y (MSV), on the other hand, interprets the program of *X* to *be* indoctrination. In *Y's* view the world is complex. Truth is not simple, nor necessarily absolute. Instead, the state of the world (however one defines it) is ambiguous, uncertain. Response to this human condition requires a tentative, experimental approach. Most significantly, indoctrination must be avoided. Independence of judgement must be encouraged in the child; and autonomy must be fostered and protected, regardless of whether one is protecting a natural instinct (Dewey) or an ability to deal with and evaluate experience (Mill).

This is, of course to *X* (MTV), absolute blasphemy. The last thing *X* would want even to entertain is the possibility that values are something which can be questioned, discussed or made the subject of experiment. *X* would argue that it is extremely dangerous to suggest such possibilities to children. The approach to moral education as outlined by *Y* (MSV), of dealing with moral dilemmas in an open and critical way, of not actually, at the end of class discussion, clearly stating the "answer," is viewed as utterly irresponsible and nihilistic.

The following should be considered as an illustration of this difficulty. In his recent book, "Moral Philosophy for Education," Robin Barrow argues: "To indoctrinate somebody with moral beliefs is to cause them to hold moral beliefs in such a way that they are unable to recognize the uncertain nature of such beliefs, but rather regard them as unquestionable truths."[14] Of course, this view, pertaining to the "uncertain nature of such beliefs," rests on the validity of Barrow's conclusions concerning the inquiry into the basis of moral knowledge and the unavoidability of conflicting moral maxims (such as Thou shalt not kill and Thou shalt protect the innocent). However, this epistemological question does not concern us directly. What I do want to indicate concerning Barrow's definition of indoctrination is that it is exactly the "uncertain" nature of such beliefs that *X* (MTV) for instance, does *not* recognize. Therefore, if one does not *regard* his or her beliefs as uncertain, then he/she would not, even in Barrow's view, be indoctrinating students.

At this point, then, the matter is quite complex and appears perhaps impossible to resolve. To settle the accountability issue in moral education requires one to be clear about the objectives of any such program, and these are obviously subject to very complex argument. It may be, however, that *Y* (MSV) has a greater problem. *X* has a clear view of what is meant by education--essentially, it is indoctrinating with the Truth. How can *Y* defend the procedure he/she advocates as moral education? I am not sure that *Y* can. There is much that remains unsubstantiated in *Y's* view. What is "moral progress"? Why be optimistic about human experience? The argument is that various viewpoints should be tolerated in the belief that progress will ensue, that a workable view or compromise will emerge. *Y's* argument is that these limits will be determined through open discussion, reason reflecting on experience. Obviously there is no guarantee that this will be so. It remains, I think one must admit, a matter of speculation, supported by the assumption of a social instinct or belief in experience and the desire for happiness.

One might wonder what Richard Hare[15] would contribute to this discussion. Does he provide a solution to this problem of distinguishing indoctrination from education? He writes " . . . morality is something that has to be handed down; if it were not--if the process were interrupted--our children would grow up as barbarians."[16] Therefore, unlike Dewey but like Devlin, Hare, argues that morality is something that must be passed along. What does he mean by morality? On the one hand, he clearly means the formal features of moral judgement; prescriptiveness and universalizability. But he also means something more. He writes: "Doubtless it is not possible in practice to pass on the mere form of morality without embodying it in some content; we cannot teach children the abstract idea of a moral principle as such without teaching them some concrete moral principle."[17] At this point, having conceded the necessity of teaching some moral principle, he must distinguish between education and indoctrination. He writes, "This . . . is not indoctrination provided that our aim is that children should in the end come to appraise these principles for themselves."[18] This, of course, resembles the views of *Y* (MSV): Students are being encouraged by the teacher to form critical perspectives of their own. Of course, Hare does not have to wait apprehensively to see what principles will be chosen for, as he writes, "Fortunately there is a close connexion between the form of morality and its content."[19] This, he argues, he has demonstrated in *Freedom and Reason*. I will not take this up here. What I do want to deal with is his point that "education might sometimes have to use the same methods as indoctrination and that therefore the two cannot be distinguished by their methods."[20] What does distinguish them? The intent, it seems. Hare writes:

> The educator is waiting and hoping all the time for those whom he is educating to start *thinking*; and none of the thoughts that may occur to them are labelled 'dangerous' *a priori*. The indoctrinator, on the other hand, is watching for signs of trouble, and ready to intervene to suppress it when it appears . . .[21]

One reading this passage first wants to ask what *thinking* means. It might mean *agreeing*, but Hare, of course, does not allow that. So presumably one so educated, even in terms of Hare's views, could grow up to be a Nazi. And it may, of course, be true that from Hare's point of view the person who grows up to be a Nazi has not been morally indoctrinated; but the real question that must be asked is whether such a person has been morally educated. "At the end of it all," Hare writes, "the educator will insensibly stop being an educator, and find that he is talking to an equal, to an educated man like himself--a man who may disagree with everything he has ever said; and unlike the indoctrinator, he will be pleased."[22] One, presumably, would not be pleased if one's student turned into a Nazi, but it does appear that such would be possible, given that one may *totally* disagree with one's teacher. Of course Hare would not want to allow for this possibility, but it is consistent with the position outlined in "Adolescents into Adults."

In terms of this issue, between moral education as inculcation and moral education as encouraging autonomy, it is difficult to know where to place Kohlberg. Also, it is not clear what he would argue concerning the distinction between education and indoctrination. He writes, in his "Stages of Moral Development," "It will be our contention that ethical principles are distinguishable from arbitrary conventional rules and beliefs and the stimulation of their development is a matter quite different from the inculcation of arbitrary cultural beliefs."[23] Of course, the concept of "stimulation" calls for close examination. R.S. Peters in "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism"[24] has pointed this out. The most significant issue involves the question of whether a notion of the proper pattern of moral development can be fixed prior to a resolution of the philosophical questions concerning the meanings of terms and concepts. And since it may be that we are unable to arrive at either a neutral concept of moral education or a neutral procedure, i.e., ones which do not presume some ideology or set of values (reflecting interest or commitment), are we simply turning to another set of problems when we attempt to identify justice or the sentiment of justice as the basis of our approach? Could it be argued that such a move would simply be an attempt to structure an approach to resolving the moral education issue on the basis of what a moral education program, especially in Kohlberg's view, is intended to impart--a sense of justice?

In conclusion, it does seem clear that any attempt we make to settle the accountability issue requires us to agree on the objectives of any programs in moral education, and this seems to be very difficult. I am not arguing that such objectives cannot be established, only that establishing such objectives is a very complex matter and that there is nothing, as of yet, that clearly mandates that "the appropriate individuals in that role are the people in the community."[25]

NOTES

*A version of this paper was presented at the Values Issues in Education Conference, Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware, 1978.

1. The American Section of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy devoted its 1979 meeting to various conceptual and normative issues that relate to "accountability" in the practice of the professions. Those interested in obtaining a list of the papers presented should contact M. Bayles at Westminster Institute, Westminster College, London, Canada N6G 2M2.

2. William J. Gephart, *Accountability: A State, A Process or a Product* (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa, 1975), p. xi. (See also *Accountability in Education*, eds. Lassinger and Tyler (Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1971).

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

6. Gubbins and Hall, Senate Bill 48, Indiana State Legislature, January 5, 1978.

7. Sidney Hook, Preface to John Dewey's *Moral Principles in Education* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University, 1975), p. vii.

8. Patrick Devlin, "Morals and the Criminal Law," *Ethical Issues*, eds. Durland and Bruening (Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1975), p. 110.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

10. John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism," *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, Volume X, ed., J.M. Robson (Canada: University Toronto Press, 1969), p. 234.

11. See my "Community, History and Proof," *The Mill News Letter*, Vol. XIV (November 1, Winter 1979), pp. 9-14, for further discussion of this issue.

12. John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975), p.47.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

14. Robin Barrow, *Moral Philosophy for Education* (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1975), p. 208.

15. R.M. Hare, "Adolescents into Adults," *Moral Education*, eds. Barry I. Chazen and Jonas F. Soltis (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974).

16. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," *Moral Education: Interdisciplinary Approaches* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 33.

24. R.S. Peters, "Moral Development: A Plan for Pluralism," *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, ed. T. Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

25. Gephart, *Accountability*, p. xi.

ON COMMUNITY AND INDOCTRINATION: A RESPONSE TO KAY AND SHELDON

Robert J. Skovira
Greensburg, Pennsylvania

From different viewpoints, Kay and Sheldon have raised in their papers some interesting and important issues and conceptual problems. In different ways, both Kay and Sheldon are asking two important implicit questions in their papers. One is: "Who has the legitimate responsibility to formulate the educational goals of a school?" The other is: "What are significant educational goals?" But Kay and Sheldon have other agenda and concerns; and, consequently, they raise other questions.

Kay asks about the meaning and use of the concept of community and raises the issue of the relationship of school and community. According to Kay, educators view the schools and education as a means to opportunity and success, which are best found outside of the home community. Schools are viewed as successful providers of education and, hence, opportunity, when their graduates go out into the larger world and succeed. This happens because schools, their teachers and programs are not geared to the educational needs and goals of local rural or inner-city communities. Kay states that this does not occur in upper-middle class communities. Thus, schools try to reconstruct rural and inner-city youth into upper-middle class individuals. Because the goals of schools and educators do not reflect the needs of the community, those goals, in consequence, are inimical to the community (except the upper-middle class one) and to any communal sense. Kay, then, suggests that schools should become agents for their community's development.

Kay is right to focus upon the ambiguity of the concept of community. His definition of community as a sharing of values, common feelings, and a basis for mutual support and face-to-face interaction is a step in the right direction. But does this mean that a community is a cultural unit? Or, is it a political and economic unit? What further criteria, sociological and cultural, must be met? Furthermore, while Kay is attempting to clarify the idea's meaning and use, he clouds the issue more by seeming to use "neighborhood" and "community" as synonyms. It isn't that a neighborhood may not be a community, but a community need not be a neighborhood. So, while Kay has opened up our discussion by pointing out some aspects, the problem is more complex.

On the other hand, Sheldon argues that it is simplistic to say that accountability is a system where the community, because of its educational needs, plays a legitimate role in generating and formulating goals of educational programs. In effect, this view argues that schools should inculcate norms of behavior and the basic values of their local communities. For Sheldon, the problem is more complex. It may even be dangerous. For, if local communities generate the content and goals of educational programs, especially moral educational programs, then the issue of indoctrination must be raised. It is necessary, then, prior to any discussion of accountability, to clarify the meaning of indoctrination.

Sheldon looks at two perspectives of moral education. One he labels MTV or the Moral Truth View; the other he calls MSV or the Moral Search View. The former is absolutist, the latter is relativist. What the MTV regards as teaching and education, the MSV interprets to be indoctrination. On the MSV, teaching means helping or causing individuals to think for themselves and to evaulate rationally moral principles. Of course, the MTV has it that this is the destruction of any moral sense. Sheldon concludes that any moral education program may be indoctrination, since even to teach the art of appraisal and thinking (according to Hare), one must also teach moral content.

Thus, Sheldon raises a serious question about the accountability of educators for the content and objectives of moral education programs in his analysis of indoctrination. He ends by suggesting that there may not be any neutral or objective moral education program. And I would like to end this response in the following way.

Perhaps we should take a lesson from 20th century science. Many scientists now are realizing that there is no value-free or purely objective way of doing science. I refer you to Bronowski's *Science and Human Values* and a recent essay by Toulmin, "The Emergence of Post-Modern Science" (in *The Great Ideas Today*, 1981). I would ask if it is possible for a moral educational program to be value-free, if there is any moral perspective which does not indoctrinate; and indeed, if it is education when it isn't indoctrination?

THE CONCEPT OF 'LANGUAGE BARRIERS' AND BLACK ENGLISH

Timothy Reagan
University of Illinois

There has been a great deal of interest and concern in the last twenty years with problems faced in the public schools by children who come from non-English speaking backgrounds as well as from backgrounds in which some variety of English other than Standard English is normally employed. Central to much of the educational discussion which has taken place is the notion that such children are either prevented or at least substantially hindered in the learning process as a consequence of "language barriers" which make some necessary sorts of classroom interactions (both between teacher and student and among students themselves) difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Such a position has been argued not only by the cultural and linguistic deprivation theorists of the 1960s,[1] but also more recently by both advocates and opponents of the King decision,[2] in which the issue of the responsibility of the school toward speakers of Black English was specifically addressed.

In this paper, I would like to suggest that the concept of a "language barrier" is a problematic one, due to the interchangeable usage of the term to cover a number of significantly different meanings. Toward this end, three distinct meanings of the term "language barrier" will be examined: the linguistic meaning, the cognitive meaning, and the affective/social meaning. Each of these meanings will be explicated in light of its applicability both to the case of two or more separate languages in contact, and to that of two or more varieties of a single language in contact.

The first of the senses in which the term "language barrier" is used will, for our purposes, be labelled the "linguistic" meaning. When the term "language barrier" is utilized in this sense, it signifies that there is a problem (or, more specifically, a *deficit*) inherent in the language or dialect under discussion. For example, it has commonly been held that Spanish is not an appropriate language for discourse of a scientific nature, that Black English is simply a sloppy form of Standard English (and one which therefore tends to obscure both communication and understanding), and so on. Such a position has been argued by no less venerable a figure than the Vice President of the United States, George Bush, who was recently quoted to the effect that Labov's work on language variation (and specifically on Black English) was a waste of taxpayers' money.[3]

Although such attitudes and perceptions are common, they are nonetheless rejected by virtually *all* linguists, regardless of school or ideological orientation. The scientific study of language is yet young, but one of the things of which we *are* reasonably certain is that every language or variety of language thus far studied in detail (and this includes a sizable and diverse sample) has been marked by a complete and complex grammatical system.[4] The notion that some languages are somehow more "evolved" or "developed" or even more "modern" than others is a remnant of a much more ethnocentric period in the history of linguistics, and one which linguists (if not all laypersons) have long since abandoned as being incompatible with the evidence.[5]

There is, of course, a sense in which any language, at a given point in time, is more able than others to accommodate certain sorts of concepts. The dozen or so words, in some Eskimo languages, for "snow" are a well-known case in point, emphasizing the variations in vocabulary due to social context, geographical and climatic considerations, and so on, which can be found from language to language. It should be noted that this difference is solely of a lexical nature, however, and applies just as much to the languages of wider communication (LWCs) as it does to languages which have not as yet developed large technical vocabularies. Hebrew may well have trouble identifying and differentiating among parts of an automobile without a high degree of lexical borrowing[6] (although this is, in fact, one of the major methods languages use to meet new lexical needs).[7] English, on the other hand, is similarly unable adequately to express the Hebrew concept "yi-she-ah," which is highly significant theologically in distinguishing between the Jewish and the Christian notions of salvation.[8]

Just as it is the case that a language cannot be dismissed as inherently of less precision, clarity, and so on, than another language, so is it the case with differing varieties, or dialects, of a single language. William Labov has convincingly argued this with respect to Black English.[9] Similar arguments have been made about Appalachian English[10] and could probably be made about any variety of English (or, for that matter, of any language). In short, the term "language barriers" when used in the 'linguistic' sense, is simply a misunderstanding of the nature of language in general and of the complexity and the basic adequacy of a specific language or variety of a language in particular. The only inadequacy, in a 'linguistic' sense, which might be observed is lexical, and this need can be met by lexical borrowing and lexical creation,[11] both natural processes for all human languages.[12]

In its cognitive sense, the term "language barrier" is employed to suggest that the lack of a common, mutually understandable language form will make the learning process especially difficult. Further, this may be expanded to include the pedagogical problems and learning difficulties manifested as a result of various sorts of linguistic interference (which may be lexical, syntactic, or semantic in nature).[13] It is important to note that the cognitive sense of the term "language barrier" represents quite different kinds of claims when made of two separate languages in contact than it does when referring to two varieties of a single language.

When applied to the case of two separate, clearly recognizable languages, the notion of a 'cognitive language barrier' to learning is a viable and fundamentally reasonable one. If, for instance, we consider the case of a monolingual English-speaking teacher, and a monolingual Spanish-speaking child, it is readily apparent that at least initially (i.e., before second language acquisition begins to take place) communication, and therefore understanding and learning, will be possible only at a fairly superficial level. This is the most down-to-earth of the meanings of the term "language barrer," and the one which seems to me to be basically indisputable: without any common language form, learning is greatly hindered.

As noted earlier, this sense of the term may also include different sorts of linguistic interference. Such interference is quite real, and in all likelihood probably affects all bilingual speakers to some extent. This interference will most commonly be exhibited in code-switching and code-mixing,[14] though other kinds of interference (e.g. phonological) are also possible. It is, however, not the case that linguistic interference, when properly handled in the classroom, need present any especially serious problems for learning, and such interference could indeed be used quite effectively as a learning tool.[15]

The situation is somewhat different when the "language barrier" at issue is one presumed to exist between two varieties of a single language, as is the case with Black English and Standard English. The major difference here is the question of mutual intelligibility. In the Spanish-English case, native monolingual speakers of one of the two languages cannot, under normal circumstances, easily or naturally comprehend speakers of the other. Such is not the case with speakers of Black and Standard English. Although there may be gaps in understanding, as a general rule it is safe to assert that the two varieties of English are reasonably similar, and do allow for a great deal of mutual comprehension. This can be demonstrated empirically in two ways. First, despite some quite interesting differences,[16] *most* of the syntax of Black English, at both the deep and the surface levels, is basically the same as that of Standard English. This is the case regardless of whether or not one opts for the decreolization theory of the development of Black English.[17] There are also even more extensive lexical and semantic similarities between Black and Standard English. Were this not the case, communication between Blacks and whites in the United States would be in a sorry state indeed.

Second, there is evidence to suggest that children who speak only Black English may, in fact, be *receptively* competent in both Black and Standard English.[18] That is, they understand both varieties of English, but can produce (or, in test settings, reproduce) only Black English locutions. If this is correct, children who speak Black English may in fact have more, rather than less, developed linguistic systems than do many of their teachers.

In its cognitive sense, then, the term "language barrier" may be true but trivial (where it suggests that the lack of a common language hinders learning), or true but not necessarily a serious impairment to the learning process (where it refers to the problems posed by linguistic interference), or simply false (where it refers to a non-standard variety of a language, as in the case of Black English).

The third sense in which the term "language barrier" is used is the social/affective. Unlike both the linguistic and cognitive senses of the term, the social/affective sense refers not to the language or language variety per se, but rather to societal attitudes toward and normative perceptions of the language or language variety.

When the term "language barrier" is used in the social/affective sense, the claim which is implicitly being made is that a particular language or language variety is a "marked" one--that is, it bestows on its speakers a lower social status than would some other language or variety. This is a commonly observed phenomenon, and is highly dependent on the social and geographic context in which a language is spoken. French, for instance, is a high prestige language in much of the world (and, indeed, to some extent in much of the United States), but is a "marked" language in many parts of New England. Spanish, rather than Quecha or other Indian languages, is the prestige language in most of Latin America, but in many parts of the United States it is clearly a "marked" tongue.

The use of the term "language barrier" in the social/affective sense, when applied to the case of Black English, is a recognition of the relatively low social status accorded to Black English, which in most contexts is a "marked" variety of English. When the term is thus employed, what is generally being argued is that, regardless of linguistic defenses of the "logic of non-standard English"[19] or pedagogical arguments for its usage in the school,[20] children must be able to *produce* Standard English if they are to be able to gain access to much of American society. It should be noted that such an argument may be a highly ideological one, grounded in an acceptance of the status quo and a willingness to acquiesce in the use of language as a subtle form of racial discrimination.[21] It may, on the other hand, simply reflect a realistic understanding of the world as it is, rather than as we might prefer it to be. Most of us recognize that language is, in fact, used to identify and differentiate us in many ways, and that the variety of language which we speak is an important aspect of self-presentation. This recognition is even embedded in our popular culture. A recent popular song, "Good Old Boys," by Don Williams, includes the line:

> "But I was smarter than most,
> Learned to talk like the man on the six o'clock news."

And, of course, the point was made even more vividly by Professor Henry Higgins in *My Fair Lady:*

> "If you spoke as she does, sir,
> Instead of the way you do,
> Why, you might be selling flowers, too."[22]

In short, the social/affective sense of the term "language barrier" may be used either as a prescriptive lable to describe a subtle, and no doubt highly effective, form of racial discrimination, or simply as a descriptive label to portray the importance of language in a society in which racial and social class divisions are maintained and defended by, among other things, the exploitation of linguistic diversity. In the former sense, the usage is a racist and dangerous one; in the latter, it is one which is potentially both realistic and helpful.

What I have tried to show in this paper is that the term "language barrier" has a number of distinct meanings, which convey quite different concerns and, implicitly, quite different sorts of educational consequences. The usage of the term, as a result of this diversity of meaning, tends, therefore, to obscure, rather than clarify, the serious educational problems faced by children who do not speak Standard English. Educators concerned with the education of such children might, then, be far better off were they to avoid using the term "language barrer" altogether and, in its place, use terms which more clearly express the specific concept they wish to convey.

NOTES

1. For examples of this genre of literature, see Benjamin S. Bloom, Allison Davis, and Robert Hess, *Compensatory Education for Cultural Deprivation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965); Richard Corbin and Muriel Crosby (cochairmen), *Language Programs for the Disadvantaged* (Champaign, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1965); and Eldonna L. Evertts (ed.), *Dimensions of Dialect* (Champaign, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1967).

2. See Geneva Smitherman, "Talkin' and Testifyin' on Ann Arbor's Green Road," in *The Ann Arbor Black English Case*, ed. Arthur Brown (Gainesville, FL: The John Dewey Society, 1980), pp. 26-51; and idem, "'What Go Round Come Round': *King* in Perspective," *Harvard Educational Review* 51,1 (February 1981), pp. 40-56.

3. See William Robbins, "Philadelphia Linguist Draws the Praise of Colleagues and Gibes of Politicians," *The New York Times* (30 March 1981), pp. 13-15.

4. This point was forcefully made by Edward Sapir as early as 1921: "We know of no people that is not possessed of a fully developed language. The lowliest South African bushman speaks in the forms of a rich symbolic system that is in essence perfectly comparable to the speech of the cultivated Frenchman." Quoted in David Crystal, *Linguistics* (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 49.

5. See Dieter Wunderlich, *Foundations of Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 11-17; or John Lyons, *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 1-38.

6. Yafa Alloni-Fainberg, "Official Hebrew Terms for Parts of the Car: A Study of Knowledge, Usage, Attitudes," in *Advances in Language Planning*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), pp. 493-518.

7. Robbins Burling, *Man's Many Voices: Language in its Cultural Context* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 176-179.

8. I am grateful to Rabbi Stephen Sniderman, of the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation of the University of Illinois, for this example.

9. See, for example, William Labov, *The Study of Nonstandard English* (Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 1978); and idem, *Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972).

10. See Walt Wolfram and Donna Christian, *Appalachian Speech* (Arlington, VA: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1976); and R. Hackenberg, "Appalachian

English: A Sociolinguistic Study," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1973.

11. See Franklin C. Southworth and Chander J. Daswani, *Foundations of Linguistics* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), Chapters 21-22; and Burling, *Man's Many Voices*, pp. 176-179.

12. *Ibid.*

13. See Uriel Weinreich, *Languages in Contact* (The Hauge: Mouton, 1968), pp. 7-70.

14. See Muriel Saville-Troike, *Bilingual Children: A Resource Document* (Arlington, VA: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1973), pp. 12-13; Erica McClure and James Wentz, "Chicano Children's Code-Switching: An Overview," in *Bilingual Education*, eds. Hernan Lafontaine, Barry Pevsky, and Leonard Golubchick (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1978), pp. 180-184; and Douglas Shaffer, "The Place of Code-Switching in Linguistic Contacts," in *Aspects of Bilingualism*, ed. Michael Paradis (Columbia, SC: Hornbeam Press, 1978), pp. 256-274.

15. See Muriel R. Saville and Rudolph C. Troike, *A Handbook of Bilingual Education* (Washington, D.C.: TESOL, 1971).

16. See either Jim Haskins and Hugh F. Butts, *The Psychology of Black Language* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973); or J.L. Dillard, *Black English: Its History and Usage in the United States* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).

17. See Paul D. Brandes and Jeutonne Brewer, *Dialect Clash in America: Issues and Answers* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1977), pp. 320-329.

18. Rudolph C. Troike, "Receptive Competence, Productive Competence, and Performance," in *Linguistics and the Teaching of English to Speakers of Other Languages or Dialects*, ed. James E. Alatis (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1970), pp. 63-73.

19. William Labov, "The Logic of Nonstandard English,: in *Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics*, No. 22, ed. James E. Alatis (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1969).

20. See Ralph W. Fasold and Roger W. Shuy (eds.), *Teaching Standard English in the Inner City* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1970).

21. I am grateful to James Anderson for this insight.

22. Alan Jay Lerner, *My Fair Lady*, Act I, Scene 1.

RAWLS ON A RIGHT TO EDUCATION: NOT QUITE RIGHT

Barbara S. Stengel
University of Pittsburgh

The past decade brought with it a revival of interest in social philosophy, especially as it involves questions of justice and human rights. In a recent issue of *Harvard Educational Review*, Israel Scheffler cites a number of general works in this area which have had an impact on educational theorizing as well as those recent works which deal explicitly with the issue of a right to education.[1] Scheffler notes, among the former, the particular importance of John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*[2] in initiating dialogue about questions of justice and rights in the educational arena.

It seems to me that much recent theorizing about rights to and in education is flawed in the same way in which I believe Rawls' theory to be flawed, i.e., in its failure to take adequately into account the radically social nature of the self and of the construction of knowledge. This failure accompanies a presumption that it makes sense to focus on individual rights as the major chord in a theory of justice. In this paper, I wish to challenge that presumption and to point out the accompanying failure. To do so, I will set up John Rawls as a proponent of a right to education, in order to use his widely discussed theory as a foil for some critical questions about the use of rights-talk as well as about our understanding of the relationship between the individual and society, especially with regard to education.

I

It is common today to hear some people claim for themselves or others a 'right to education.' Their usage of this concept is varied. Some, like Pope John Paul II[3], speak in general moral terms of the natural rights of all human beings regardless of their particular social and legal circumstances. Others, like U.S. civil rights leaders or the parents of handicapped children in our society, speak from within a specific legal context to demand performance, i.e., to claim not *rights* in any moral sense independent of law, but *education itself* as legally provided.

Beyond these (not always clearly distinguishable) differences in usage, there is a common sense of what is desired when anyone claims a right to education. It is that the benefit of education should be provided for some class of persons entitled to that benefit (whether the entitlement is of legal or moral derivation). In other words, a right to education is usually thought of as a welfare right, rather than as a political, procedural right.

Even with agreement that a right to education is a passive right to the reception of some benefit, there remains the question of in what that benefit consists. In other words, how do we specify education? Does education equal schooling? Clearly it does not. Probably it should not. But for most practical purposes it does, and for the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed to do so. Those who speak of a right to education commonly consider the fulfillment of that right to consist in some sort of schooling.

When a right to education is invoked, it is not usually accompanied by an explanation of the genesis of or justification for that right. Yet, users of rights talk need to be at least implicitly aware of just such an explanation if their claim and/or argument is to have any force, in either the moral or legal sphere. I believe John Rawls offers, in *The Theory of Justice*, an explanation which is helpful, and I intend to outline his contribution in the next part of this paper. I will argue from Rawls that there is a right to education in its common form which is schooling.

There is, of course, a question which is even more fundamental than one concerning the basic justification of a right to education--namely, why talk about a right to education at all? Why do so many find it expedient to talk about a right to education, whether legal or moral? What does the positing of such a right add to or subtract from the relationship between the individual and society? What should be said about a society in the concrete and/or a social philosophy in the abstract which relies so heavily on rights in general and the right to education in particular? These questions reflect my central concern in this paper, and I will return to them in the final section.

II

John Rawls' theory is a comprehensive one which talks about rights in the framework of an overall conception of justice. His primary concern is the justice of institutions, i.e., the "basic structure of society" (p. 3).

The method of *A Theory of Justice* borrows heavily from Kant. In seeking to account for "considered judgments" of morality, Rawls incorporates intuitions regarding the primacy of justice, general knowledge of human behavior, and rational judgment in a method of "reflective equilibrium" (p. 20). Weak principles are subject to rational judgment which in turn gives way to strong principles. Clearly, Rawls wants to arrive at some "first principle" of justice which will obviate the need for ad hoc judgments in actual moral dilemmas.

In common with the social contract tradition, Rawls utilizes the notion of an "original position" within which free, rational, and equal persons may designate that conception of justice which best embodies human moral sentiment. The original position is set up to reflect the status of persons as free, equal and rational and, therefore, those in the original position operate under a "veil of ignorance." They have no knowledge of their class or social status, their own natural assets and abilities, their personal psychological propensities or their own system of ends, i.e., that which is good. They do know that there are certain things which all people want no matter what else they want. These are the "primary goods" of rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, and self-respect (p. 92). They know further that they *do* have interests and that their interests probably do not coincide with those of others. Otherwise, there would be no need for a theory of justice.

Rawls argues that rational persons (in the economic sense), deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, will choose the following principles:

1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. *(Equal Liberty Principle)*

2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

    a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, *(Difference Principle)* and

    b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. *(Fair Opportunity Principle)*

According to Rawls, the Equal Liberty Principle is chosen to take priority over the Distribution Principle, i.e. liberty can only be restricted for the sake of liberty. Within the Distribution Principle, the Fair Opportunity Principle is lexically prior to the Difference Principle (p. 302).

These are the principles which must be used to order the basic structure of society, i.e. the distribution of "primary goods." What Rawls calls "fundamental right" (political, procedural rights) arise out of the first principle. Powers and opportunities appear to be derived from the second part of the second principle, while the first part of the second principle yields a fair distribution of wealth and income. Self-respect is related to both principles but seems, in Rawl's view, to be generated primarily by the prior acknowledgement of fundamental rights (p. 544).

If we seek a "right to education," where in Rawls' overall program should we look? Nowhere does he specifically argue for, or even mention, a right to education. If we are to find justification for a right to education, we must look to Rawls' two principles, since it is these principles which assign basic rights in a just society (p. 11). And we must consider each principle separately since Rawls maintains that the two are lexically ordered, with the rights generated by the first principle having absolute priority over the rights generated by the second.

A right to education issuing from the first (Equal Liberty) principle would be a basic or fundamental right, intrinsically tied to political rights. Alternatively, a right to education stemming from the second (Distribution) principle would be a welfare right (as that term is commonly used), because it is the second principle which orders the distribution of benefits such as powers and opportunities, income and wealth. I believe that Rawls would argue for a right to education from his first principle rather than from his second. However, since a right to education is usually thought of as a welfare right rather than as a political right, I will discuss both possible positions.

If we examine the second principle first, we are faced with the weaker claim and, ironically, the weaker argument as well. The claim is that a right to education is validated by Rawls' second principle as a welfare right. The argument focuses on education as a resource and/or benefit directly related to distributive shares, i.e. related to access to, and distribution of, income and wealth. Since principles generally yield rights in some sense, and since education is assumed to affect positively distributive shares, there exists for all a prima facia right to (at least some minimum level of) education.

There are at least three difficulties with this position. The first is that there is an assumption that education positively affects distributive shares rather than any demonstration that it does.

The second is that Rawls does not talk about a right to education as a welfare right. It's not clear that this omission is purposeful. It may be that Rawls' obvious concern with political rights obscures his position on this less important issue. Still, to say that Rawls advocates a right to education as a welfare right is to put words in his mouth.

The third difficulty is simply that, even given such a welfare right, it's force/role is uncertain. A prima facie right to education as generated by the second principle is always overridden by rights of equal liberty, and must be weighed against competing rights generated by the second principle.

We might strengthen the above argument a bit by viewing education as an opportunity, rather than as something akin to money or income.[4] Since the Fair Opporunity Principle takes priority over the Difference Principle, a right to education, though still intended in a weak sense, would at least hold favored status within the scope of the second principle.

There is, it seems to me, still a stronger claim which Rawls can make with regard to a right to education, and again ironically, a stronger argument to go with it. Both the claim and the argument are related to Rawls' first principle. The claim is that a right to education exists in a strong, fundamental sense as an enabling right, i.e. as a right which gives value to political rights. To understand the argument supporting this claim, we must understand how Rawls relates equal citizenship, political liberty, fair equality of opportunity, self-respect, and education itself.

Equal citizenship is the appropriate standpoint for appraising the basic structure of society. "This position is defined by the rights and liberties required by the principle of equal liberty and the principle of fair equality of opportunity" (p. 97). If, then, there is a right to equal liberty and a right to fair (not formal) equality of opportunity, there is a presumption that the rightholder has (access to) the wherewithal to take advantage of these fundamental rights. Education provides that wherewithal. A right to education is an enabling right which allows an individual to take part in the affairs of his society (p. 101). Education can insure the fair value of political liberty, i.e. it can prevent the lesser worth of liberty caused by ignorance or poverty (p. 205). Any right which is "more basic" than education is nonetheless worthless without it.

In addition, there is some evidence that Rawls thinks of opportunities (of which education is surely one) as closely related to political rights, at least in importance. He says, for instance, that "[T]he primary goods that vary in their distribution are powers and prerogatives of authority and income and wealth" (p. 93). By their omission, opportunities seem to be lumped with fundamental rights within a system of liberties which do not vary.

Rawls clearly links education with self-respect (p. 101) and fundamental rights with self-respect (p. 544). If this is not enough to tie education to fundamental rights, it is enough to demonstrate that education should be viewed as integrally related to primary goods.

This points to the essential difference between the weaker and stronger claims offered above. The weak claim (i.e. that a right to education is a welfare right) views education as just another in a series of goods and services to be distributed using the difference principle. The strong claim (i.e. that a right to education is a fundamental right, not a political right per se, but an enabling right) views education as a facet of all the primary goods identified by Rawls. I believe that in the overall framework of Rawls' theory, and in light of Rawls' specific comments regarding education,[5] this view makes more sense.

The above offers a justification for the existence of a natural right to education. While not derived directly from Rawls' first (absolute) principle of equal liberty, the right to education is fundamental in that it is an enabling right. It holds privileged status by virtue of its being a right which enables important liberties to be held with their full value. A right to education is a natural right in that it is generated by principles chosen by rational human beings freely acting in society within the original position.

To acknowledge that there is ample justification for a right to education in general does not clarify how we are to respond to a person's assertion of a right to education, whether moral or legal. Further, the justification provided above rests on the assumptions of a particular mode of social philosophizing, without clarifying those assumptions. My tentative argument that there is a general right to education leaves open two kinds of questions about the use of rights talk with regard to education. The first looks at what it means to have a right; the second asks if our social and moral states of affairs are bettered by the use of such assertions.

III

Does it matter in moral terms or factual terms whether or not one has a right to education? Does it really illuminate moral arguments to talk of rights at all? I am not wondering if various classes of persons (blacks, handicapped, etc.) should, in justice, have the resources which they are claiming. I am simply wondering if talking about a right to education clarifies the issue. I think not. It seems, to me at least, that the very same just distribution of educational resources would be achieved based on Rawls' second principle whether or not the term "rights" was ever mentioned. It may be true that one can state a valid right to education, but can one then lean on that right and demand education? If having a right does not alter the terms of just social interaction, considered in a general moral sense or in a specific legal one, them the having of rights is an illusion, perhaps a socially useful one, but an illusion nonetheless.

There are, I suppose, two plausible arguments from Rawls supporting the importance of according rights. First, it seems as if rights assertions express and organize interest conflicts in such a way as to mark the moment when questions of individual interest become questions of societal justice. When one asserts a right, he is not *asking* for some liberty or commodity in his interest; he is *demanding*, if not the object of the right, then at least a hearing on his claim in the moral arena. He has standing to demand rather than simply ask because he views his claim as protected by widely-held principles. In this sense, a rights assertion in the moral arena is analogous to bringing suit in the legal arena. If *X* sues *Y* over some injustice seeking a certain benefit, *X* is not necessarily assured of that benefit, but at least of a procedurally just hearing which should result in a judgment based on principles of law.

Second, Rawls views rights as critically important in his social scheme because the acknowledgement of rights creates self-respect and enhances self-esteem (pp. 234, 544).[6] A publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights preserves the integrity of the individual and lays the basis for accepting natural duties and obligations. It creates the proper context for moral functioning.

Note that Rawls is talking primarily about political rights' rather than welfare rights' generating self-respect. This raises a question about the validity of talking about what are usually thought of as welfare rights, such as the right to education, in the same way that we talk about political rights. However, we must remember that Rawls clearly ties education to the creation of self-respect *and* that a right to education is not only a welfare right, but one which enables political rights to have some value. This link between issues of social welfare and issues of personal and political liberty raises a whole host of questions about just how Rawls' overall social philosophy understands the relationship between the individual and society, and why or if Rawls understanding should be thought socially and/or morally superior to others.

Rawls appears to be concerned with taking the individual seriously in two separate but related ways. First, he criticizes utilitarians for offering a too stringent morality in which individuals are totally morally determined, and seeks to preserve the moral freedom of the individual by holding rights to embody a minimal conception of justice and allowing for supererogatory behavior. Second, he argues that an adequate theory of justice must take into account the distinction among persons, a distinction which he seems to equate with the difference among persons' interests.

Because of his concern with the individual as moral agent, Rawls sets out in the direction of rights and, not surprisingly, arrives at a position which utilizes the notion of rights to avoid moral determinism and protect individual autonomy. Several questions present themselves. What is the force of this moral determinism of which Rawls is so wary? What is the meaning of individual autonomy in moral action? Is it really necessary to posit rights in order to insure that an individual obtain a hearing in a conflict of interests? Is Rawls' self-respect in a just society besides rights? Is there no other source of self-respect in a society (such as traditional China) which has no notion of rights within its system of justice?

Recall once again that Rawls is primarily referring to fundamental rights rather than to welfare rights in the generation of self-respect. In fact, he never mentions welfare rights per se. Recall, too, that fundamental rights are a function of personal and political liberty to which Rawls gives absolute priority over other kinds of societal benefits. This suggests that fundamental rights and what we normally call welfare rights are qualitatively different kinds of rights--and that the former has absolute priority over the latter. Is there really the clear separation of liberty and other benefits which Rawls tries to suggest in his priority rules? My argument about a right to education as an enabling right, as well as brief hints from Rawls throughout *A Theory of Justice*, indicate that there is not. If a right to education is intimately related to the value of liberty, then aren't other welfare rights enabling rights as well? Aren't social welfare and individual liberty linked in ways that do not allow for a simple priority rule? And if this is correct, do fundamental rights lose importance in an overall schema of justice? Or is it that welfare rights gain importance? Or might it be that the notion of individual rights generally loses impact as a social/moral term in the face of the interconnectedness of the individual and society?

This brings us to the heart of my concern about Rawls and the use of rights talk generally. There seems to be in Rawls a conceptual separation between the individual and society which does not take account fully of recently developed understandings of the relational nature of knowledge and the self. Rawls' theory rests on an epistemology which can be characterized as atomistic or individualistic. This is due in no small part to his method.

Rawls subjects intuitions about justice and rights to rational judgment in order to arrive at principles of justice. This is surely necessary, but not enough. Not just the content of moral intutions, but also their form must be subject to scrutiny. Intuitions which take the form of individual rights will surely yield principles of the same form, unless they are subject to phenomenological scrutiny as well as rational judgment. In point of fact, the meaning of "rational" needs to be unpacked. So do the meanings of liberty, equality, and autonomy--all conditions incorporated into Rawls' original position. It seems to me that Rawls' understanding of all of these notions is based on an epistemological individualism which cannot deliver all that Rawls hopes for his theory of justice.

It is because of this epistemological individualism that Rawls confronts the question of moral determinism in a simplistic manner. Rawls pays little attention to how individual interests come to be developed socially or how social institutions encourage certain kinds of individual behavior. He suggests that the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it (p. 560) but does not explore how the self (and those ends) come to awareness. What we have come to know, from Karl Mannheim, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey and others,[7] about the social nature of knowledge and of the self forces us to re-examine the issue of determinism. It does not seem that Rawls has done this.

Rawls follows in the footsteps of Kant by maintaining that we must act from a desire to express most fully what we are, i.e. free and rational. But he neglects one critical point--that we are also social. This failure leaves occasional gaps in Rawls' program. For example, he states that in justice as fairness, "men agree to share one another's fate" (p. 102), but it is never clear why they would do that. Is it in each individual's own best interest to do so? Or is there some sense of solidarity in human experience which provides the glue which Rawls omits? I wonder if Rawls doesn't pass up a good opportunity to develop an answer when he skims lightly over the notion of fraternity as a component of his just society.

This is not to say that there is not much in Rawls' program to be valued, or even that Rawls' himself is unaware of the difficulties that seem so important to me. That Rawls is concerned with the individual-society relationship is clear from the nature of the task he set for himself. He is concerned to formulate principles for the basic structure of society *before* he formulates those for individuals because he is, to some degree, cognizant of the formative power of social institutions (p. 259). He is concerned to relate his principles to the development of what he calls "community." (p. 520ff) And he arrives at principles which are "natural" precisely because they are "social", i.e. agreed upon in the original position (pp. 4, 107, 218). Still, Rawls' attempt to take the individual seriously in the context of the social falls down partly because the individual and society are not integrally related with regard to knowledge and the development of self.

John Dewey sought to substitute "social purpose" for traditional individualism. For him, "social purpose" meant guidance and control (through education) in the interests of "a more genuine development of individuality for the mass of individuals."[8] These are sentiments with which John Rawls might agree, sentiments which might be incorporated with into a theory of justice if some notion of social intelligence were built into the original position, and understood in relation to rational judgment. I can only imagine how an awareness of the relational nature of knowledge might affect the deliberations about justice and about rights. My suspicion is that individual rights (to education and otherwise) need not occupy the forefront of a theory of justice in which the individual and society have been conceptually understood in relationship to each other. When it is clear that it is the social self who possesses the rights, then rights will become not the major chord of a theory of justice, but simply one note in a movement from need to responsibility, from merit to duty, from right to privilege. Until that time, talk about rights--about a right to education--will carry with it the baggage of exaggerated theoretical individualism. As long as that is so, all talk about one's right to education seems not quite right.

NOTES

1. Israel Scheffler, "Philosophy of Education: Some Recent Contributions," *Harvard Educational Review*, 50 (1980): 402-406.

2. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971). Hereafter cited by page number only.

3. Quoted in *Time* 116, No. 28 (1980), p. 60.

4. Cf. Kenneth Strike, "The Stuff of Iniquitous Justice," *Philosophy of Education 1980*, Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, 1980, pp. 332-335.

5. Rawls states, for example, that education enables an individual to take part in the affairs of his society (p. 101). He also closely links education with the primary goods of self-respect and basic rights (p. 107).

6. In this regard, Rawls' position is similar to that held by Joel Feinberg. Cf. Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights," *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 4 (1970), pp. 243-257.

7. Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936); George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934); John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1920).

8. John Dewey, *Education and the Social Order* (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1934), p. 8.

EDUCATION AND RIGHTS

Bernard Rosen
The Ohio State University

The two papers by Barbara S. Stengel and Timothy Reagan are so different in style and content that I shall have to treat them separately. I shall begin with the neatly done piece of analysis by Reagan.

Mr. Reagan investigates the issue of whether those who speak a non-standard English or a foreign language " . . . are either prevented or at least substantially hindered in the learning process as a consequence of "language barriers' . . . " (Reagan, p. 50. All page references will be to his paper.) He distinguishes three senses of "language barrier" to see whether in any of those there is a language barrier. Those senses, as I reproduce them, are that a speaker a of language L faces (has, etc.,) a language barrier when a natively speaks only L and, additionally:

1. L is inadequate to carry important kinds of discourse, (e.g., science).

or 2. Cognitive sense
  a. L is not the language of instruction, but L' is.
 or
  b. L is a different variety of the language of instruction, which is L'.

or 3. Social/affective
  a. Those who speak L are assigned a lower social status than those who speak L'. (p. 52.)
 or
  b. Those who speak L' use the speaking of L as a way to " . . . portray the importance of language in a society in which racial and social divisions are maintained and defended by, among other things, the exploitation of linguistic diversity." (p. 52.)

Reagan claims that since all languages can express any subject matter, even if this requires borrowing from another language, there is no language barrier in sense (1). He agrees that speaking Spanish but not English does constitute a language barrier. However, those who speak Black English do not face such a barrier when Standard English is the language of instruction. This is because of the same or very similar syntax and semantics of the two. (p. 51.) So, according to Reagan, there is a language barrier in sense (2a) but not in sense (2b).

In sense (3a) Reagan thinks there is a language barrier since people are indeed assigned to a lower social status. However, the use of "language barrier" in this sense is "a racist and dangerous one; in the latter [my 3b], it is one which is potentially both realistic and helpful." (p. 53.)

Reagan indicates there is a language barrier in both sense (3a) and (3b), though he does not explicitly say so. However, he apparently thinks racism is strengthened by suing "language barrier" in sense (3a) and, perhaps, a language barrier to education is thereby created. I'll comment on sense (3b) after some remarks on sense (1) and (2).

In order for Mr. Reagan's comments about (1) to be acceptable, we would need at least the following principle--let me call it teacher omniscience: For any view (claim, theory, etc.) V and for any teacher T if V is false then T rejects V. The reason we need teacher omniscience is that otherwise the teacher who believes the false V, e.g. Black English as represented in sense (1) is deficient, may very well erect a barrier to education for his or her students. While I have confidence in the general competence of teachers, it is true of many pre-service and inservice teachers that they have false beliefs, not only about language but also about many other matters. So, Reagan's claim about sense (1) when used of Black English (" . . . is simply a misunderstanding of the nature of language in general, and of the complexity and the basic inadequacy of a specific language or variety of language in particular" (p.51.)is a non sequitur or it needs an apparently false principle about teachers. (Even this wouldn't be enough; we would still need the premise that "to know the good is to do the good," or its functional equivalent.)

The same point about teacher beliefs applies to sense (2b). The (admittedly) false beliefs of the teacher can and probably frequently do result in a student being hindered. Mr. Reagan seems again to have the option of committing a non sequitur or using a false principle.

Let us return to sense (3b) and speculate on what Reagan has in mind when he mentions its potential usefulness. Standard English is the language used in almost all classrooms and almost exclusively in technical, vocational, and higher education. Since the fruits of our society are not likely to be fully enjoyed by those who do not have such an education, those who fail to gain such an education are likely not to get as much from life, or give as much for that matter. Language is, as Dewey pointed out many times, a tool. The best language tool to accomplish the most sought ends is Standard English. It is, accordingly, to everyone's interest to learn it. Those who know only Black English are using an inferior tool; not one intrinsically inferior, but the damage done is real nevertheless. The advice, in the spirit of Mr. Reagan's paper, to educators might then be to teach students the social and personal utility of Standard English. Knowing only Black English has social and personal lower utility, and perhaps is (positively) disutile.

There are some issues involved in the use of dialect not taken up in Mr. Reagan's paper, though I am sure he is aware of them. One has to consider personal and cultural pride, for example, and the development of interestingly different sub-cultures. Many have wrestled with the issue of how to maintain both cultural diversity and respect for diverse cultures.

Let me end by saying how much easier my task has been because of the clear structure of Mr. Reagan's paper. It is to be hoped that my remarks are clear enough to stimulate further inquiry.

Barbara Stengel, in "Rawls on a Right to Education: Not Quite Right," has written a boldly speculative paper on a difficult and important set of issues. I hope to have joined her in a spirit of creative hypothesizing about rights, persons, and education. It is certainly important to decide if and in what way education is a right. Since Ms. Stengel uses Rawls as a foil for her critical remarks, but neither she nor I wish to defend Rawls, and that author will not benefit from yet another discussion about his work, his work will seldom be an essential part of this discussion.

The issue of stronger or weaker rights claims seems misguided (see, e.g., p. 57. Subsequent page references will be to Ms. Stengel's paper.), for Ms. Stengel's reasons for saying education is a right consist of its being a necessary condition for the realization of one or another of the fundamental rights (see, for example, pages 57 and 58.) The argument implicit in this is as follows:

1. (Suppose) a has an x right.
2. (Suppose further) y is a necessary condition of (securing, appreciating, using, etc.) x.
3. Therefore a has a y right.

This approach permits us to argue for an education-right without concern for the basicness of it, or the naturalness of it either. (Basicness will be discussed later.)

The supposition of education as a necessary condition for both fundamental and welfare rights, however, does not show the two to be intimately connected. "Is there really the clear separation of liberty and other benefits which Rawls tries to suggest in his priority rules? My argument about a right to education as an enabling right, as well as brief hints from Rawls throughout *A Theory of Justice*, indicate that there is not." (p. 59.)

Oxygen is a necessary condition for playing pushpin and reciting poetry, but even Bentham would not conclude they are not clearly different. It is open, of course, for Ms. Stengel to show a different required relation than that of necessary condition.

The concern on p. 58 about "how to clarify how we are to respond to a person's assertion of a right to education, whether moral or legal," is I think, one that can be addressed by available tools of moral philosophy. One need not hold a reduction of rights to obligations or a complete correlativity thesis to agree to the following:

> If a has an x right then (the relevant) b has an obligation to give (permit, etc.) x to a.

If a has a life right then any b has an obligation not to take a's life. If someone justifiably claims to have an education right then the relevant b has an obligation to provide an education to a. (In another context we would want to distinguish positive from negative rights, but that is not at stake here.) a may simply say "b, you have an obligation to give me an education." a may, in addition, demand, beg or do any number of things to get b's attention. The legal and moral relations between rights and obligations (or claims, as Prichard was tempted to call obligations) is the same. The interesting question Ms. Stengel raises involves the nature of b, and this gets us to the central claims of Ms. Stengel's paper. "There seems to be in Rawls a conceptual separation between the individual and society which does not take account fully of recently-developed understandings of the relational nature of knowledge and the self. Rawls' theory rests on an epistemology which can be characterized as atomistic or individualistic." (p. 60.)

These claims require, it seems to me, some preparation before they can be properly evaluated. An atomistic epistemology, given the context of Ms. Stengel's paper would hold, at least, the following:

> I. No evidence or relation that involves any person other than the proposed knower and the "object" of the proposed knowledge need be adduced to justify a knowledge claim.

The clearest example of an epistemological atomist would be Descartes, though Hobbes is better for present purposes because he holds an atomistic view about society. This characterization, though, is not enough to get out the concerns of Ms. Stengel. Perhaps we need a second clause.

> II. The basic subject of moral claims is the individual. All moral claims about collective beings such as societies, countries, corporations and such are derivative, requiring justification via claims about individuals.

But still we do not have enough to pin Rawls down. The Kantian response, made obscure by having to peer through the veil of ignorance, is that we do not have fully individual individuals in the original position, only rational human beings as such. Our individuality is attenuated by lack of knowledge of our particular social and individual characteristics and relations. Furthermore, the Kantian universalizability requirement arguably includes a social element. The only way Ms. Stengel could force agreement with II would be to show that it is as fully individualized individuals that people participate in the original position discussions. Rawls, of course, denies this. (Furthermore, he opts for *continuing persons* and not single individuals in the original position. See Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 146.)

There is, in defense of Ms. Stengel, a tension between the contractarian and Kantian elements of Rawls. However, Rawls is creatively obscure about the nature of his individuals, the original position and rationality. While I agree with Ms. Stengel that Rawls has Hobbesian individuals in mind when he talks about liberty and equality, it is very difficult to force this on Rawls.

However, we have yet to answer the question of who *b* is in the claim "*b* has an obligation to provide an education to *a*." Ms. Stengel would prefer that *b* be the basic moral subject in the complete, correct ethical theory. (In my view, a basic moral subject is the being to whom basic moral predicates apply, and basic moral predicates are the ones whose applications require no further moral justification. Ms. Stengel may have a different view). At least three positions are open to us as to who or what is the basic moral subject:

1. Individual human beings (e.g. Hobbes and Mill)
2. A collective (social) being (e.g. Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx)
3. Sometimes (1) and sometimes (2) depending on the moral predicate

One could hold that rights are held only by collectives, (choice (2)) perhaps through offices and roles. Children tokens have a support-by-parent right in virtue of the type (viz. children) having the parent-support right. Somehow, though, I don't think this is what Ms. Stengel has in mind.

George Herbert Mead and John Dewey did emphasize the social nature of knowledge and the self. This follows C.S. Peirce's view that all knowledge is in the nature of *signs*, and that interpretations are general, not particular, and thus social, and not individual. Individual persons, the self included, are also signs. This is a radical merging of epistemology and metaphysics, one that I endorse but, again, suspect Ms. Stengel does not.

My own suspicion is that Ms. Stengel would be best served by (3), but it is time to stop and allow her to have her own say on this.

PRE-SERVICE TEACHERS AND THE ETHICAL ISSUE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE SCHOOLS*

Eleanor Kallman Roemer
Bowling Green State University

I. Introduction

In the comic strip, *Snuffy Smith*, Jughaid and his mother exchange ideas about the use of punishment. "How would you like a good spanking?" yells Jughaid's mother as he comes in late again for supper. "Thar ain't no sich thing!!" Jughaid responds.[1] Traditional ideas about corporal punishment reflect Mammy's perspective: spare the rod and spoil the child. Physical punishment has long been considered not only the most efficacious method of child discipline but also necessary for the development of good character. The avoidance of such methods has been believed incompatible with a commitment to the education of youth.[2] In America's early schools a whipping post was built into the schoolhouse floor.[3] The post disappeared but not the paddle or the state statutes which legalize the practice. The infliction of pain by a teacher or other educational official upon the body of a student, as a penalty for doing something which has been disapproved by the punisher, is an authorized and accepted educational practice officially sanctioned in all but four of our 50 states.[4] "To the surprise of many, hitting of children in school as a means of discipline is far from extinct. As an institutional practice it is widespread and often encouraged."[5]

Whenever attention is specifically and overtly paid in teacher education programs to the current use of corporal punishment in the schools, the topic is broached academically--by considering when, if ever, a spanking is good.[6] Regardless of where this subject is addressed, the important assumption is that future teachers who are intellectually exposed to the issue of corporal punishment will autonomously come to a decision about whether or not such a method of discipline should be used in their classrooms. The expectation is that addressing the normative issue of corporal punishment will lead to the pre-service teachers' developing a personal stance about its use. It is hoped that, in spite of the official sanctioning in most of our American state educational systems, in spite of the long history and wide-spread use of this ingrained method of discipline, pre-service teachers will have or will develop a disapproving attitude[7] toward corporal punishment. It is assumed that they will react negatively to its use with children in the schools, that they will not be disposed to choose such a method of discipline in their classrooms.

In this paper I shall address the question, When is a spanking ever good?, in relation to pre-service teachers' attitudes toward the use of corporal punishment in the schools. I shall consider on what grounds in what way the pre-service teacher should be encouraged to adopt the normative position that no spanking is good.

Since "we can all agree right away that there is no intrinsic value in inflicting discomfort or pain on a child,"[8] I will first briefly address the question, On what grounds is a spanking ever considered good? If there is no intrinsic goodness in spanking *per se*, then consideration of whether the use of corporal punishment has instrumental value when applied in the classroom is opposite to, and even necessary for, justifying a moral stance toward corporal punishment.[9] If the instrumental grounds used to justify corporal punishment can be challenged, its use would be at least ethically problematic, if not wrong--in the sense that one ought not to inflict pain, to punish, without justification.[10] In the second part of the paper I will address a set of questions relating to the teacher's attitude toward the use of corporal punishment. Is normative analysis of the reasons which support this practice sufficient assurance that the teacher will autonomously decide not to use corporal punishment? Should the teachers of pre-service teachers attempt to determine their attitude toward corporal punishment and to "weed out" those who would favor its use?

II. Is there such a thing as a good spanking?

The use of corporal punishment is supported on two traditional as well as instrumental grounds: 1) its usefulness in correcting misbehavior and inducing desirable behaviors in children; and 2) its necessity in preserving an orderly climate or atmosphere for learning in the schools.[11] To what extent is it the case that there is "nothing (no misbehavior) a good spanking won't cure" and that "a good spanking is necessary to preserve an orderly learning environment"?

To spank, to inflict pain has no intrinsic value in itself; rather, the use of corporal punishment can only be instrumentally justified. So examining whether or not there is such a thing as a good spanking involves evaluating the use of corporal punishment in terms of promoting desirable behavior, lessening undesirable behavior, and facilitating an orderly learning environment. If those outcomes are unlikely, then the employment of corporal punishment is unjustified.

The efficacy of punishment in promoting desirable behavior and eliminating undesirable behavior under conditions encountered in the public schools is doubtful. Its effects in a social context are problematic, and in a sense, unpredictable. In the light of contemporary psychological understanding, its use is highly problematic. It teaches people only very specifically what not to do and does not teach them how to behave effectively; it actually serves to reinforce the undesirable behavior, and its effect is usually temporary, especially when it has been used to block strongly desired behavior. The possibility of eliminating undesired behavior, along with the latter's replacement by desired behavior, occurs only under carefully controlled circumstances which school personnel would not be likely to approximate.[12] To the extent that teachers might accomplish this, they would need to establish condtions similar to those mentioned by Bongiovanni:

1. The individual administering the punishment should arrange the environment in such a manner as to prevent the student from escaping.
2. The individual administering the punishment should use as intense a blow as possible.
3. The same form of punishment should be applied each and every time the undesired behavior occurs.
4. The punishment should be delivered immediately, preferably during the preparatory stages of the undesired behavior.
5. The punishment should not be introduced gradually, but quickly and with the element of surprise.
6. Extended periods of punishment should be avoided, so as to curtail any compensatory recovery.
7. The punishment should not be associated with any forthcoming pleasure or reinforcement in order to avoid the punishment becoming a discriminative stimulus for reinforcement.
8. Strict control over sources of reinforcement of the undesired behavior should be exercised at all times.
9. Alternative behaviors which are capable of earning the same reinforcement as the undesired behavior should be made available.[13]

Using corporal punishment to eliminate undesirable behavior or to induce desirable behavior would be both impractical and inappropriate in a school setting where the important enphasis is supposed to be the creation of a learning environment for school-age children.

Furthermore the potential for a number of negative side effects, including an increase in the undesired behavior after punishment, is inherent in the use of corporal punishment. Punishment is experienced by the recipient as a threat which generates negative responses, such as fear, anxiety, aggressiveness and deception.[14] Under such conditions it is doubtful that any good thing is likely to be learned. Forcing the self to be defensive produces learning effects which are directly contrary to the objective of promoting desirable behavior. The stress of punishment is correlated with tardiness, truancy, and dropping out of school, as well as lower achievement.[15]

Also to be noted is the ease with which the child mistakes badness in self for badness of the act being punished. Even when undertaken with the best of intentions, punishment directed at stopping particular behavior may be easily translated by the student into a personal evaluation of the self.[16]

In addition, rather than inducing desirable behavior in children, the use of corporal punishment provides children with a model of aggressive behavior which is imitated by them.[17] The punisher is actually modelling a very aggressive interpersonal strategy to a child who learns that it is permissible to aggress towards those of lesser power, status, and prestige.[18] Children will tend to employ those aggressive behaviors when faced with frustration in their own lives. Thus corporal punishment does not encourage the desired behavior: self-control, a positive attitude towards learning, and respect for others.

Joseph Mercurio, who studied the practice of caning in New Zealand, makes the following comment:

> A system of corporal punishment in association with an authoritarian model of education engenders in pupils neither self-discipline nor a positive responsible attitude toward one's societal obligations. Rather it appears to have the opposite effect--namely the creation of attitudes of over-dependency and unquestioning submission to one's superiors in the latter's presence as against defiance and disrespect for authority in their absence . . . Rather than inculcating qualities of self-discipline, critical judgment, and independence of thought, the use of corporal punishment appears to create attitudes of over-dependency, hostility, aggressiveness, and unquestioning, unreflective submissiveness.[19]

There is no denying that everyone has to learn to submit to some form of authority; and one could maintain that it is desirable in the preparation of the young for participation in adult society that they be inculcated with a strong respect for authority. But if we aspire to be a democratic social order, and if we truly respect each individual, we must aim at developing within each individual the capacity for self-regulation and self-direction of his or her conduct. Discipline then is not a matter of submissive obedience to authority but rather encouraging voluntary self-discipline which guides the individual and directs his conduct.

The other main claim which supports the use of corporal punishment is that it is necessary to preserve an orderly climate or atmosphere in the schools. Such a claim may reflect society's broader concern for physical security and protection against violence.[20] It is important to note here that, for the general public, the issue of greatest concern in the past five years has been "discipline."[21] Without corporal punishment, the public, along with principals and teachers, believes it would be robbed of a useful and traditional tool which is necessary to enforce school discipline and maintain order in the classroom. What is odd about the argument that corporal punishment is necessary in the face of the pervasive rise of violence and disorder in the schools is that corporal punishment is used more frequently in grades 1-8 than in senior high school.[22] What makes "horrible" sense about the argument is that the incidence of corporal punishment is much greater in schools which serve inner city populations.[23]

Since school systems (in New Jersey and elsewhere) which have outlawed its use are continuing to function within an orderly atmosphere, this argument is *prima facie* problematic. And, since there are effective alternatives which can be used, the necessity of this punishment strategy is doubtful. Further the use of corporal punishment provides a model of violence; and, rather than promoting order and respect for others (and their property, etc.), such a practice breeds tension, frustration and violence. Such a practice is also in direct contrast with the respect for the fundamental human dignity of the child which is a cornerstone ideal of our democratic society and our schools!

III. Normative Analysis and Teacher Attitudes

In the preceding section the prevailing reasons which justify punishment as a method of discipline have been examined. Since the reasons given in support of this practice can be seriously challenged, the use of corporal punishment becomes ethically problematic. Inflicting pain for no justifiable reason is immoral.[24] Such spanking cannot be considered good.

As a pedagogical technique, such normative analysis is believed to facilitate the pre-service teacher's individual assessment of corporal punishment. Two fundamental claims support this educational enterprise: 1) that with the aid of such normative exercises, the pre-service teacher would develop a greater ability to examine the justification for corporal punishment; and 2) that the knowledge that corporal punishment cannot be morally justified, and therefore is not a good action, would result in the pre-service teacher's having a negative attitude towards corporal punishment and thus consciously trying to avoid its use in the classroom.

The link between theoretical morality and the way an individual acts in a situation in which he or she is actually being called upon to make moral decisions is always problematic. As many have pointed out, cognitive activity may or may not lead to insight and the latter may or may not be related to action.[25] The crucial question for the teachers of teachers is: should we limit our interest at that point and avoid determining further the individual teacher's disposition toward corporal punishment?

While colleges of education do not certify teachers directly, they do recommend that the person who has successfully completed the teacher preparation program be certified. Not only is "good character" a criteria for certification, but also most program objectives include what should be known, as well as what attitudes should be held and what skills applied. Since certification involves a statement of moral character, one could argue that a particular stance is already required. Why not include in the specific criteria for "good character," the future teacher's attitude towards corporal punishment.

We do not hesitate to require that the future teacher have certain competencies in relation to instruction, promotion of the child's self-concept, evaluation techniques, etc., so why not insist on including certain attitudes about the treatment of children in the school context. Suppose a person in a teacher preparation program is introduced to three reading methods which have been found to be effective with elementary school children. The teacher's decision to use one of these, or, instead, a decision to employ a method found to be less effective, or decision not to teach reading at all, would be relevant to a judgment about that teacher's competence. Also, although there is not much discussion about the prospective teacher's attitude toward reading and especially the teaching of reading, judgments are made about this. If a teacher expressed hatred toward reading and/or hatred toward the teaching of reading, this would not go unnoticed.[26] Why should colleges of education not require their students to demonstrate a certain attitude regarding corporal punishment, just as the institution requires its students to demonstrate a positive disposition to apply appropriate reading methods in particular classroom settings?

If there is the possibility of great harm which would result from the continued use of corporal punishment, are we, as teachers of teachers, not justified in requiring a certain stance toward corporal punishment on the part of the individual pre-service teacher? The argument here is that the greater harm resulting from the continued use of corporal punishment should override the value of individual choice about spanking in the schools. The elimination of physical abuse should not be a matter of debate; it should not be allowed and thus no pre-service teacher should be certified if he or she shows any indication of an attitude of approval toward corporal punishment.

It is undeniable that the pre-service teacher should be encouraged to develop a positive attitude of respect and regard for children, an attitude which would include being disinclined to use corporal punishment in the classroom. However, to *require* the future teacher to be negatively disposed toward corporal punishment is very problematic, from several perspectives. There are, for example, problems with determining what would count as an indication of the proper attitude. There are few who would openly defend the use of corporal punishment "in print." Like racism one hesitates (in colleges of education, at least) to admit such a trait. Further, to require a particular attitude without requiring any understanding of why that attitude is desirable is authoritarian. The implicit message to future teachers would be that they should adopt the values established by those people who status and power are greater and with whom they desire to associate.[27] Placed in another context, with other "powers" requiring another set of attitudes, the prospective teacher could very well switch allegiance. After all, that would have been the main lesson: do as the people with power over you, those who control the process of certification, say! One of the main grounds for disvaluing corporal punishment is the judgment that such treatment denies the child basic respect and human dignity. To insist that one not worry about why that treatment of children is wrong, but only that it is wrong, would be akin to "might it right" and would not be that far from the arbitrary use of the rod or paddle.

My position is that we should attend much more overtly and explicitly to the use of corporal punishment and the allied issues of discipline and control in teacher education programs. The lack of explicit attention often reflects a latent consensus that "the use of corporal punishment in the schools is either not a problem or a problem of such low priority that it is not worth considering."[28] Part of the pre-service teachers' program should serve to facilitate their normative examination of whether the *individual teacher* is ever justified in using corporal punishment. In addition we should promote the evaluation of corporal punishment as a social practice which reflects certain general attitudes and beliefs about children. This would not replace the use of normative analysis but would encourage greater insight into our socio-psychological and collective roots regarding children and punishment. My point here is that the continued use of corporal punishment is not so much a matter of the individual pre-service teacher's having the wrong attitude, but that the use of corporal punishment reflects a serious collective problem: fear and hostility towards children.

Children as objects of fear and loathing[29] is a theme which is related to our Puritan past as well as our current uncertainty about the world and our place in it. "What seems most strikingly novel in our present attitude towards children is not hostility but the accompanying fear that the child is something too dangerous or threatening for adults to handle."[30] The present climate of fear and loathing of the young is expressed in the spate of novels and movies about the demon-child,[31] in the child mortality statistics which list child abuse as the major cause of children's deaths,[32] as well as in the widespread continuation of corporal punishment.[33]

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A double phenomenon seems to be operating. First, as Robert Coles has pointed out, when those people who have had little power and status, people like the young, seem to be getting more, and those people who had more, or believed they should have more, feel they are rapidly losing what they believe they deserve, the result is conflict and hostility.[34] Second, the young are in a vulnerable position today in relation to attaining a meaningful place in our complex society. Not only are children more dependent upon their elders for developmental assistance, but they must wait a longer time for meaningful work a status.[35] Since the schools are the most important social instrument for defining the present and future status of the young and for controlling them,[36] it is not surprising this conflict and hostility is reflected in our school practices and policies.

My point in introducing this provocative set of comments, which could provide material for more than one paper, in the closing section of the present paper, is that the attitudes which teachers have about corporal punishment reflect a larger social problem. Exploring openly and in depth this social phenomenon and its implications for the way we treat children in the schools (and everywhere else) seems to me a better strategy for promoting the elimination of corporal punishment than to stress "hunting" procedures for those individual pre-service teachers who are bold and foolish enough to exhibit overtly in their pre-service days, that they favor a "good spanking."

NOTES

*This paper is an expanded version of part of a panel presentation delivered at AESA, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Fall, 1980.

1. H. Laswell, *Snuffy Smith, The Toledo Blade*, April 24, 1979, p. 40.

2. Joseph Kett, *Rites of Passage, Adolescence in America 1790 to Present* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. 47.

3. J. Manning, "Discipline in the Gold Old Days," in *Corporal Punishment in American Education: Readings in History, Practice, and Alternatives*, ed. by Irwin A. Hyman and James H. Wise (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1979), p. 41-50.

4. Robert H. Friedman and Irwin A. Hyman, "An Analysis of State Legislation Regarding Corporal Punishment in the Schools," *Proceedings: Conference on Corporal Punishment in the Schools: A National Debate*, ed. by James H. Wise (National Institute of Education, Hawaii, 1977), p. 15-18. (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C. 20208)

5. Anthony F. Bangiovanni, "A Review of Research on the Effects of Punishment: Implications for Corporal Punishment in the Schools," *Proceedings: Conference on Corporal Punishment in the Schools: A National Debate.*

6. Such as in "foundation" courses: philosophy of education, educational psychology, sociology of education, foundations of education, ethical issues of education.

7. The meaning of "attitude" is debatable, but for the purposes of this paper upon which the resolution of this conceptual issue does not depend, I will stipulate that an attitude is a disposition to respond favorably or disfavorably in relation to a person, activity, event, course of action, or practice.

8. This claim can be made about inflicting pain in general, but this specific statement was made by Frank A. Howard, Jr., lawyer for the defense in the case, Ingraham v. Wright, 1977. "A Legal Defense for Corporal Punishment in the Schools," in *Proceedings: Conference on Corporal Punishment in the Schools: A National Debate*, p. 25-28.

9. R. S. Peters in *Ethics and Education* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), and R. M. Hare in *The Language of Morals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) make this claim about prescriptions in general. J. P. Marshall in "Punishment and Education," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Spring, 1975) makes this point about punishment in the school.

10. Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, *Punishment: Selected Readings* (Belmont, Cal.: Belmont Pub. Co., 1975), p. 1-2.

11. Frank A. Howard, "Legal Defense for Corporal Punishment in the Schools." Similar reasons are provided by the respondents in the study done by F. J. Reardon and R. N. Reynolds, "Corporal Punishment in Pennsylvania," Dept. of Education, Div. of Research, Bureau of Information Systems, Nov. 1975: It will cause changes in behavior. Students learn self-discipline from it. It can be less harmful than some other forms of humiliation. There are situations where it is the most appropriate technique. It is the only thing that will work with some students. There is no harmful effect on student attitudes. Its elimination could seriously affect the learning atmosphere in the schools." See also: "Some myths regarding the use of corporal punishment in the schools," a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, April 2, 1975, and quoted in Irwin A. Hyman, Eileen McDowell and Barbara Raines, "Corporal Punishment and Alternatives in the Schools: An Overview of Theoretical and Practical Issues," *AERA Proceedings*, p. 1-14.

12. Bongiovanni, "Effects of Punishment," p. 38-39.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

14. B. Rosenshine and N. Furst, "Research in teacher performance criteria," in *Research in Teacher Education*, ed. B. O. Smith (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971).

15. *Ibid.*, p. 39, and J. M. Johnston, "Punishment of Human Behavior," *American Psychologist*, 27 (New York: 1972), pp. 1033-1054.

16. *Ibid.*

17. A. Bandura and R. J. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1963). A. Bandura, D. Ross and S. A. Ross, "Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Aggressive Models," *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology*, 63 (1961), pp. 575-582.

18. A. Bandura and Anthony F. Bongiovanni.

19. Joseph A. Mercurio, *Caning: Educational Rite and Tradition* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972), p. 156.

20. Alan Reitman, "Corporal Punishment in the Schools: The Civil Liberties Objections," *AERA Proceedings*, p. 19.

21. Gallup Poll, 1980, 1979, 1978, 1977, 1976.

22. Irwin A. Hyman, McDowell and Raines, *AERA Proceedings*, p. 6-8.

23. J. W. Polier, L. Alvarez, V. Broderick, P. Karrison-Ross and R. Weaver, *Corporal Punishment and School Suspensions: A Case Study* (New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, 1974). J. Ducette, S. Wolk and E. Soucar, "A Typical Pattern in Locu of Control and Non-

adaptive Behavior," *Journal of Personality*, 40(2), (1972), pp. 287-297. Children's Defense Fund, *School Suspensions, Are They Helping Children?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975).

24. Unless there are other reasons than the ones denoted in this paper. But they would also have to be examined from a normative perspective. The point is that one should not inflict pain on a person for no justifiable reason.

25. Such as Aristotle.

26. As a matter of fact, there is concern that the tendency for elementary teachers to have a negative attitude toward math may affect students' math achievement, especially female students. However, the remedies are not specifically individual. Students are required to take more math courses so that they will feel comfortable and perhaps like math more. "Schools" are asking about interest in math during interviews, etc.

27. T. W. Adorno, I. Frenkel-Brunsik, D. Levinson and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950).

28. Hyman, McDowell and Raines, *AERA Proceedings*, p. 1.

29. Edgar Z. Friedenberg, "Children as Objects of Fear and Loathing," *Educational Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 63-84.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

31. *The Bad Seed, Rosemary's Baby, The Exorcist.*

32. I. Hyman and K. Schreiber, "Selected Concepts and Practices of Child Advocacy in School Psychology," *Psychology in the Schools*, 2, 1 (1975) pp. 50-58. "Child abuse is recognized as a tragic national problem with an estimated 2,000 children dying each year as a result of abuse and neglect; and . . . in Ohio 13, 982 incidents of child abuse and neglect were reported; however it is estimated that 75,000 incidents of abuse and neglect probably occurred, because only a small percentage may be actually reported." Gov. Rhodes (Ohio) proclamation, May 21, 1980. *Children's Protective Services Newsletter*, (Summer 1980).

33. Hyman, McDowell, and Raines, *AERA Proceedings*.

34. Quoted in Friedenberg, *Educational Studies*, (Spring, 1979), p. 66.

35. Robert J. Havighurst and Daniel U. Levine, *Society and Education* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1975), p. 8.

36. Friedenberg, *Educational Studies*, (Spring, 1979), p. 66.

ETHICAL COMPETENCE IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Kurt Varga
The Ohio State University

There is currently a renewed interest in professional ethics. Many professions are undergoing a critical self-appraisal to determine the ethical status of their policies and procedures. This is evinced in professional journals and manuals, and in the redesign of professional training programs. We are today experiencing interest in professional ethics in education. Professional ethics is becoming more a part of training in education. What will be done in the name of professional ethics and why it will be done is unclear. There is a great deal of confusion about the need for professional ethics, the policies to be adopted to meet this "need", and the goals to be attained. I wish to speak to this confusion by offering clarification and by making some suggestions about what may be done.

Perhaps the first thing to notice in a discussion of professional ethics is that to speak of a need for professional ethics is to assume that something is wrong with the profession. What is perceived to be wrong differs among advocates of professional ethics. Some are alarmed by what they see as unethical practices which must be sanctioned. They seek to remedy the situation. Others are not so much concerned to eradicate "wrong doing" as to provide guidance to members of the profession while they carry out their professional duties.

I. Codes of Ethics

Whatever the intent of interested parties, the discussion of professional ethics frequently gets translated into a discussion of ethical codes. Such discussions do not get very far without some mention of an organization and a committee appointed to administer the code. Ethical Codes have been used to deter or punish unethical behavior within professions and they have been used merely to provide guidance on issues of morality to members of the profession.

The use of codes as a deterrence or as a vehicle for punishment requires that the code be administered under the auspices of some authority. Usually this occurs within a professional organization which can censure and even expel members. Of interest here is that using codes in this way may not promote ethical practices within a profession in the sense of promoting moral action. In the first place, ethical codes do not limit their jurisdiction to moral considerations. What is ethical within a profession frequently is stipulated by ethical codes, and what is stipulated may both include some non-moral practices and exclude mention of some practices in need of moral consideration. Secondly, the use of codes by an administrative body may stop some practices which are morally wrong without promoting moral action within the profession. For example, they may deter some practices by making then unprofitable or by making members of the profession fearful of getting censured.

The use of ethical codes in education has more commonly been for the purpose of providing guidance to members of the profession. This has been the primary intent of the National Education Association since they first published a code in 1929.[1] Precisely how ethical codes may provide guidance is unclear. Let us consider how they might be used by educators.

Educators might think that closely adhering to the NEA Code of Ethics will solve moral problems which arise in education. Although codes may be useful, they cannot be used in this manner. Whereas codes are often useful for solving moral problems, we should not make the mistake of assuming that ethical principles expressed in a code of ethics can be applied in some automatic fashion We must, in any area where principles are applicable, pay careful attention to detail in using those principles. Consider two non-moral examples of how this is true.

A principle of baseball is that when there are two outs, bases are loaded and the count is full, all runners should go on the pitch. This complicated principle can be applied only when we are aware of the circumstances to which it applies. The application of the principle requires that we know about "base runners," "full bases," a "full count," and so on. The principle makes sense only when we know relevant details about the world--in this case, the world of baseball. Even in less complicated instances we need to know something about the world in order to use principles. In some parts of the country one should plant tomatoes only after May 15. This requires that we know what tomato plants are, that we can read the calendar, and so on.

Although the use of principles requires that we know other things, principles are nonetheless useful. They help us to use our part knowledge to determine when a particular kind of action is appropriate. What action is appropriate, of course, will depend on what we intend to do and what problems arise when we try to do what we intend. In baseball we intend to get more runs, in gardening we wish to grow tomatoes. In morality we want to do what is morally right in situations permitting choice.

Some principles of ethical codes are not intended as principles for resolving moral issues, rather, they function more as reminders of sound educational practice. For example, Principle I of the current NEA Code of Ethics includes that the educator "shall not unreasonably deny the student access to varying points of view."[2] For us to use this principle we would have to make clear what is to count as reasonable denial of varying points of view. The current debate about teaching human origins highlights creates issues crucial to teaching biological and social sciences. What detail of theoretical issues can be reasonably withheld when teaching students is a point at the heart of the recent controversy. The above principle from the NEA code serves to remind us of problems such as that current in human studies, but it does not provide any solutions.

Principles that are intended for application in solving problems, nevertheless, cannot be applied without qualification. That is to say, we must be cognizant of possible exceptions to principles of ethics. For example, the NEA code stipulates that educators should not intentionally expose a student to embarrassment. Although we would agree that we should not make a practice of this, we would not say that every act of embarrassing students is morally wrong. On the contrary, we might find circumstances in which it is morally right to embarrass students. For example, perhaps we would require a timid student to give a speech in a class comprised mostly of self-confident over-achievers, even though the student will be embarrassed.

Since ethical codes do not provide us with categorical rules we may best use them as we use summary rules, rules which give us some insight into what we should do as a rule. Treating principles as summary rules and becoming adept in their application requires of us some degree of sophistication in handling moral problems.

II. Applied Ethics

Part of a more recent interest in professional ethics has been to make educators more sophisticated in solving moral problems. This is what is advocated by proponents of applied ethics. By introducing educators to moral problems and by bringing to these problems the critical eye of theoretical ethics, it is believed that educators will be more able to give adequate solutions to moral problems. But there is disagreement as to what should be done in courses of applied ethics.

Part of the disagreement involves a debate over the level of sophistication necessary for any one adequately to solve moral problems. How much moral theory is needed in courses of applied ethics? Applied ethics is generally contrasted with theoretical ethics.[3] Theoretical ethics focuses on questions about the meaning of moral statements and the nature of moral justification. A course in theoretically ethics would involve entering into various historical debates about these questions. Applied ethics focuses on problems particular to professional life. In education this would include discussion of problems which arise for teachers, administrators, counselors, etc., in their various professional relationships. The intent of a course would be to analyze and solve problems which arise for the profession, and to provide educators with the skills necessary to solve future problems. The resolution of moral problems includes arriving at justified moral judgments. It is unclear to what extent one must be to be able to justify judgments made. Must this lead to the debates of theoretical ethics? If ethical codes do not provide a stopping place for justification, as summary rules do not, where do we stop? If we admit that principles of ethical codes can be waived from time to time, how do we determine when waiver of principles is justified?

The question of how far we expect a person to take moral justification to give adequate solution to moral problems is a problem for moral education. Kurt Baier has addressed this question.[4] Baier writes that determining what a person ought to do in a particular situation calls for reasoning of "great complexity involving the use of various types of propositions as 'premises' from which to move to the judgment of what to do." It also includes "various procedures for 'testing' the soundess of these premises."[5] Baier has in mind something in the form of a practical syllogism. For example, a teacher may find it necessary to determine whether or not he should fail a student. The concluding judgment of what to do will be either that the student should be failed or that the student should not be failed. For Baier, arriving at the conclusion involves "various types of proposition," each of which will require testing.

Baier describes four types of moral propositions, two of which, he argues, every adult should master. Type one moral propositions are those which are used to determine what is morally acceptable for a person to do in a particular situation. For example: Jones ought to pay Smith for use of the car; Williams should vote today, even though it is raining and he has a cold; Adams should not take the day off. Type two moral propositions are those used to arrive at judgments of type one propositions. These are more general statements of moral value. For example: we ought to compensate for use of things borrowed; citizens ought to vote; we ought not take days off unless we are sick. Baier claims that type two judgments are necessary for type one judgments.

Type three moral propositions are the most general principles and are used to test type two propositions. In this category Baier includes principles such as the Golden Rule, the principle of utility, and the Categorical Imperative. These are the kind of rules described elsewhere as meta-rules.[6] As meta-rules they permit us to pick out other rules, i.e., they allow us to determine the adequacy of rules which we use directly to determine actual moral situations. The meta-rules that Baier suggests, though, appear to serve as the rules of last appeal. This is to say, they are the ones which provide a stopping place for moral adjudication. We should notice, however, that we may assume that there are meta-rules without assuming that they provide a stopping place for moral justification.

Type four propositions are those "about the nature, function, and rationale of the institution of morality. They are used to explain and justify a person's reliance on the general moral principles or the supreme principle of morality that he in face relies on."[7] Baier gives no example of this fourth type of proposition. We may think of such notions as consistency and moral objectivity as filling the bill of type four propositions. Perhaps Baier has in mind assumptions which underlie our moral claims. For example, underlying the claim that we ought to do that which increases the amount of good in the world are the assumptions that good ought to be pursued, that there are some things which can be identified as having the value of good, and that we can identify those things.

Whereas we may find Baier's hierarchy for moral propositions debatable, keep in mind his point that in moral education we expect people to master moral arguments which make use of type on and type two propositions. Baier claims that professional philosophers agree on little when it comes to type three and four propositions. We may point out that some would even disagree about the hierarchy he presents and the function of moral propositions he describes. He has a good point, though. If we expect educators to become proficient at making moral judgments when particular moral problems arise, and if doing requires that making use of more general moral propositions (Baier's type two), then educators should come at least to master moral argumentation that involves propositions of type one and two. But is this far enough? It seems to go no further than the use of summary rules.

Moral justification that stops at Baier's type two propositions is unsatisfactory because arguments that stop there do not allow us to distinguish between those arguments which use general rules as if they categorically applied and those which use principles as summary rules. We could accept Baier's account, if we kept in mind our intent for educators in applied ethics. But this does not help us solve the problem of how far we expect educators to carry justification. That is to say, while we may expect educators to go only as far as type two propositions and may be willing to say that they can make adequate moral judgments, we must distinguish between one who gives type two arguments which misunderstand moral judgments and one who reflects and understands the function of rules. For example, one may follow rules categorically without reflection. Here we may find Israel Scheffler's discussion of 'knowledge' helpful.[8] Whereas his point focuses on the areas of science, history, etc., we can apply it in order to bring clarity to moral argumentation.

Scheffler makes the point that we do not and should not expect students to learn subjects to the point that a specialist knows a subject. For example, we expect students to come to know certain historical facts. For them to know these things, the students must, in addition to their believing them, be able to give evidence for what they believe. A distinction which we should make between the student and the historian is the degree to which we expect the student to be able to justify what he believes and the degree to which we expect the historian to justify what he believes. The extent to which there is a difference will depend on the capabilities of the student. Capabilities depend on such things as age, maturity, and practice. The same holds for moral justification. We should expect educators to give justifications but not to the extent that a professional philosopher gives justifications. Again, we are at the point of having to distinguish the person who just follows rules and the person who understands the rules. This can be likened to the difference between the person who merely utters reasons, memorizing them just as he does the fact supported by those reason, and the person who actually gives reasons which he understands as reasons. This provides us with a characterization of how far we can expect educators to be able to give justification. But, more precisely, what do we expect of educators?

Preparing educators to resolve moral problems requires that they arrive at moral judgments which Baier calls type one. They may judge, for example, that a student should be punished, lockers should not be searched, and teachers should go on strike. Baier argues that these judgments require appeal to the judgments he calls type two and that these rely on other moral principles. We may grant him that moral judgments, require as do all judgments, appeal to something. What is appealed to, though, may not be in the nature of moral principles as he describes it. Baier intimates that there must be a stopping place in the justification of moral judgments, and that stopping place is a moral principle. Such a principle, we may suppose, would permit us to determine when another principle, such as, "Teachers should not deceive students," should be waived. After all, we would be required to justify our waiving of a principle that usually applies. But Baier fails to provide us with such principles.

Furthermore, Baier argues that moral education, at the very least, must train persons to become adept at giving type two propositions for justifying their moral judgments.[9] This would not be sufficient, were we to treat principles of ethical codes as summary rules. Suppose a teacher judges that a student should be told he did well in class even though he made several serious mistakes. To arrive at this judgment would require that the teacher waive the principle that teachers should not deceive students. If this principle is a type two proposition, then the teacher needs to present at least type three propositions to justify waiving the principle against deception.

If we are interested in preparing educators adequately to resolve moral problems, codes of ethics should be viewed as guides and not the final justification of moral problems. If codes are viewed as providing summary rules, we must engage educators in the justification of these rules. Otherwise, they may not know when a summary rule applies and when it does not. Baier would seem to argue that educators, if they go beyond type two propositions, must give propositions of type three. But there is an alternative to this suggestion.[10]

Instead of engaging educators in the discussion of metaprinciples, a discussion which would take us into many theoretical labyrinths, we could engage educators in the critical discussion of principles. This would include introducing educators to the use of counter-examples for testing principles. We could show them how empirical evidence plays a part in solving moral problems. We could discuss the weighing of relevant factors in making moral choices. We can do this without engaging in long-standing theoretical disputes, and we can do this without assuming that there are principles of ultimate appeal, let alone saying what those principles are. We must assume that there is an objective side to moral judgments. This does not require that educators become well versed in theoretical ethics. Educators will best be prepared for making ethical decisions if they are provided the skills used in theoretical ethics.

There is a sense in which saying that solving moral problems requires a certain level of sophistication invites the notion that there are moral experts and that we want people to become adept in moral philosophy. We should avoid this conclusion. The point which needs to be made is that, although adequate resolution of many of our moral problems does require a certain degree of awareness of the logic and language of justification, this does not mean that we must entertain the same kinds of problems to the degree characteristic of the work of professional philosophers. Furthermore, we can characterize a critical use of ethical codes and principles which does not rely on the kind of hierarchy suggested by Baier. As educators we can use the same skills used by professional philosophers to help us in solving our more immediate moral problems.

NOTES

1. "Final Report of The Committee on Ethics of the Profession, Abstract," *The National Education Association, Addresses and Proceedings* (Atlanta, 1929), p. 182.

2. "Code of Ethics of The Education Professions," *NEA Handbook, 1976-77* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1976), p. 255-7.

3. For example, see Bernard Rosen and Arthur L. Caplan, *Ethics in the Undergraduate Curriculum* (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Hastings Center, 1980), p. 12.

4. Kurt Baier, "Moral Autonomy as an Aim of Moral Education," in *New Essays in the Philosophy of Education*, ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1973).

5. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

6. Bernard Rosen, *Strategies of Ethics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978), pp. 17-18.

7. Baier, "Moral Autonomy," p. 111.

8. Israel Scheffler, *Conditions of Knowledge* (Chicago: Scott Foresman and Company, 1965), pp. 56-8.

9. Baier, "Moral Autonomy," p. 111-12.

10. One alternative has been expressed in some detail elsewhere. Through a project at The Ohio State University, College of Education, under the direction of Gerald Reagan, materials have been developed for training educators to solve ethical problems. This material utilizes skills common to clarifying problems in language and logic. It also uses a method for solving moral disputes developed by Bernard Rosen.

ARE MORAL ARGUMENTS ENOUGH?
A REPLY TO VARGA AND ROEMER

William C. Russell
University of Louisville

We are fortunate to have a pair of papers by Kurt Varga and Eleanor Roemer which are not only skillfully written and well thought out, but which also complement one another quite nicely. It is interesting to notice how, in considering our efforts at moral education with pre-service teachers, they both insist upon avoiding an over-reliance on the use of ethical codes to promote more moral behavior among educators. Instead, they both urge us to teach the skills of argumentation, justification, and critical analysis, so as to avoid dogmatism and authoritarianism. I am also pleased to see their mutual emphasis on an analysis of significant issues which are problematic for teachers as professionals and for the larger school system as well. And I certainly join with Roemer's sentiment that we, in teacher education programs, should take an advocacy position on key issues, providing our most persuasive arguments against various defects (like corporal punishment) which persist in the schools. As advocates of a particular position, we can both demonstrate the model of critical analysis we hope our students will use and (perhaps) influence them toward doing the right thing.

Kurt Varga's paper clearly lays out the parameters of the discussion concerning the appropriate level of moral analysis necessary to foster "ethical competence" in teachers. He makes a strong case that mere summary rules are insufficient to deal with the type of problems confronting teachers, and he rightly demands further justification to fill in the "details" which surround the general moral principles. I am most intrigued with his suggestion that, when working with teachers on applied ethics, this further justification need not necessarily be an appeal to a higher level moral proposition. He would have us look instead to counter-examples, empirical evidence, and other relevant (through possibly non-moral) factors, in arriving at a knowledgeable, non-arbitrary application of general rules. I am convinced that this is probably a good teaching strategy as well as an appropriate methodology for solving problems in applied ethics. Unfortunately, Varga gives us only a sketchy indication of how he thinks non-moral factors could be introduced as a further justification for general moral rules. I would like to give this issue further consideration, through a discussion of Eleanor Roemer's treatment of the issue of corporal punishment.

While I am in complete agreement with Roemer's opposition to corporal punishment and, in my classes, try to argue consistently against its use, I think we need to approach the issue from a somewhat different tack. I am uncomfortable about resting my opposition to corporal punishment on the ground that it is not instrumental in correcting misbehavior and preserving order in the classroom. Roemer makes a string case that corporal punishment, as it is currently employed in the schools, does not consistently produce the promised results. It would seem, however, that her instrumental argument is still open to the counter of the behaviorist who chides the schools for their weakness of will and reliance upon outmoded techniques. All we need to do to make its use justifiable, the behaviorist argues, is to apply more rigor in our teacher training, to facilitate a more effective use of corporal punishment (together with the whole arsenal of other behavior modification techniques available).

Indeed, looking at the list of conditions which Roemer says would have to be met for an effective use of corporal punishment, it is not hard to imagine a variety of settings where they might be obtained. The tried and true method of a sharp rap on the knuckles with a ruler, dished out by a hawk-eyed teacher patrolling the aisles, would seem to satisfy a number of her criteria, including: an intense blow, consistency, immediacy, surprise, brevity, and disassociation form any forthcoming reinforcement. Escape is easily prevented these days through the use of motion detectors and cameras in the halls, personal alarm transmittors for teachers, and uniformed and undercover security personnel roaming the building. An elaborate token economy can be instituted to provide alternative sources of reinforcement for desired behaviors. Other tools which are available and in widespread use include psychoactive drugs and material incentives ranging from lemon drops to dinner at the principal's home.

In short, if we consider corporal punishment as merely one of a number of techniques for achieving control and order through behavior modification, we are forced to concede the possibility that, with careful attention to training and the proper blend of positive and negative reinforcements, corporal punishment could be a useful tool in achieving the desired behaviors. And if this latter claim is accepted, it would seem to satisfy Roemer's demand for instrumental justification and thus would undercut part of her normative argument against its use in the schools. This counter-argument is, I think, particularly seductive for teachers who, groping for some way to maintain control over their classrooms, see the use of corporal punishment as not morally wrong but merely as unscientifically applied.

If Roemer's instrumental argument is insufficient, then we need to appeal to some other grounds to show that corporal punishment is unjustified. Roemer rightly argues that corporal punishment has unpredictable, negative side effects such as anxiety, fear, aggressiveness, deception, and defensiveness. Appealing to higher moral principles, she argues that if we truly respect the dignity and individual autonomy of each child, and if we aspire to a democratic social order and school system, then a practice which has such negative effects is clearly inappropriate.

This argument is telling against the behaviorist (who is no respecter of freedom and dignity), but it leaves the prospective teacher perplexed. If dignity, autonomy, and democracy are our highest educational and moral values, then why does corporal punishment persist as the discipline method of choice in the schools, sanctioned by both law and tradition? Should we view teachers, administrators, and Supreme Court Justices as immoral, or perhaps as irrationally unable to see the negative consequences of their actions? These questions, which are provoked by Roemer's normative argument, are troublesome to most pre-service teachers; they usually demand more explanation than her normative argument can give.

This is the point at which we need to move beyond the framework defined by the moral argument and its appeal to more universal ethical principles. If we examine the history and sociology of the school system, a sharp descontinuity between Roemer's democratic educational ideals and the actual functions of schools in the 20th century is revealed. The structure and practice of schooling has tended to reflect the social relations of the larger society, often at the expense of democracy and autonomy. In particular, the school system has helped to reproduce the hierarchical division of labor, its accompanying class stratification and racial inequality. Schools have taken on the task of channeling labor power into the marketplace and equipping students with attitudes, skills, and behaviors appropriate to their particular place within the class system. In the process, the 19th century values of individual autonomy has been replaced by schooling for social control. The promise of social mobility has been reduced to a sorting process; the goal of self-dicipline has given way to a demand for submission to hierarchical authority. The moral ideals to which Roemer appeals are simply no longer embodied in the schools.

Given the logic of this sort of schooling, the use of corporal punishment (especially the very high degree of use against poor, working class, and minority youths), makes excellent sense. It initiates these children into the hierarchy of control and authority, which is supported by force and is given legitimacy by the school. Submissiveness, repressed emotions, over-dependency, and a lowered self-concept are, in this context, desirable attributes for those at the bottom of the class and race structure. Indeed, the socio-economic system maintains its equilibrium, in part, because the schools can successfully inculcate these attitudes and behaviors amongst those who are denied the privileges accorded to wealth and power.

This kind of analysis forces prospective teachers to examine their judgements concerning the use of corporal punishment (or any other ethical problem) in the light of socio-economic, political, and ideological factors in addition to considerations of moral justification. This is, I think, as it should be, for no educational judgement, whether it governs a policy decision or a teacher's day to day practice, is made solely on moral criteria. Nor, I might add, should we lead teachers to see themselves as morally autonomous agents, who choose and act in a context which is independent of the institutionalized practices and functions of the system as a whole. If they had such autonomy, moral arguments to guide, individual action might be enough. Since they do not, it would seen that collective action and systemic changes might be required to rid our schools of dehumanizing practices like corporal punishment.

JOHN DEWEY AND MORAL EDUCATION: MUDDLED MEANINGS AND MISCONCEPTIONS

Jo Ann Freiberg
The Ohio State University

I. Introduction

How can the moral education of our young be best (efficiently, morally, adequately, etc.) accomplished? There are individuals as well as social groups who hold polar views on this matter. John Dewey did, as do contemporary theorists and creators of moral education programs, seek to answer this very question, or one very similar to it. Before Dewey's answer to this question can be provided however, it is important to recognize that the question is complex in at least two distinct ways. First, it is complex because the very asking of it assumes that it *is* possible to educate children morally. Second, it is complex because a critical prior question lurks behind it. The questions "What is morally conceived education?" and "What is the nature of the enterprise of moral education?" must be answered before any meaningful response to the initial question can be given. Additionally, it is not clear that the senses in which education is considered moral include or suggest that intentional programs in moral education be created.

Of those who claim to have an acceptable response to the issue as initially presented here, there are many knowledgable educators who *are* committed to implementing programs in moral education. It is an accepted challenge by such educators to inform and educate those who are skeptical that, as well as why, the moral education of students should not be neglected. Some of the skepticism stems, in part, from the fact that "moral education" is an unfortunate label. Many shy away from the term because it connotes everything from sex education to religious education to the inculcation of specific codes of ethics or modes of behavior to indoctrination and beyond. Others merely believe that the term is both vague and ambiguous and thus descriptive of next to nothing. And even those who are committed to moral education are often confused about what moral education represents. But it is evident that whether or not moral education ought to be supported, which programs are most adequate, and whether or not these issues can be adequately addressed, all hinge upon exactly what "moral education" and "morally conceived education" mean. This also holds true for understanding Dewey's version of moral education.

What would a Deweyan program in moral education actually look like? What would the curriculum entail? What methodology would be appropriate? Dewey's lack of specific directives in any single one of his works has allowed contemporary theorists to make diverse claims and counterclaims about what Dewey would *really* have endorsed had he been clear and had he comprehensively outlined the practicable details of adequate moral education programs. Consequently, many contemporary theorists have sought to fill in the gaps for Dewey. In so doing, many co-existing rival and contradictory approaches claim to be founded upon Deweyan theory. The two most popular approaches (Kohlberg's Cognitive-Developmental model and Values Clarification) have made this patently evident in many theoretical writings.[1]

The plethora of such claims, whether formed by scholars, practitioners, or laymen supports diverse theoretical positions, yet it is the same John Dewey who supposedly justifies them all. That Kohlberg, Values Clarification, and others have all claimed to be arguing from a Deweyan perspective is interesting at best and dangerously contradictory at worst.

In order to gain even some insight into Dewey's actual views on moral education, it is antecedently necessary to confront and analyze the previously stated question of the senses in which education is moral. The remainder of this paper is devoted to the twofold purpose, one, of providing an answer to this important conceptual question and, two, of gaining some understanding into how Dewey's views fit into this conceptual picture. After sketching out four distinct interpretations which have been suggested in the name of morally conceived education, some of the forgotten distinctions will surface. These distinctions figure heavily into comprehending Dewey's substantive views on moral education and the ways in which his views have been misinterpreted by those currently claiming to be within the Deweyan tradition. It will be suggested that Deweyan moral education cannot be adequatcly captured within any of the four interpretations of moral education outlined.

II. Morally Conceived Education and the Principles of Procedure

Sometimes what is meant by morally conceived education is that the enterprise of education is *moral* rather than *immoral*. It is not clear exactly what is involved by stating that education is "moral," but a major point which is implied is that education is morally rather than immorally *conducted*. This interpretation emphasizes that the principles of procedure and restrictions on manner (process goals) satisfy certain moral standards, however formulated. On this view, indoctrinative teaching techniques would be excluded, as would be other methods such as threatening, coercing, embarrassing, or physically abusing students. Even though it might improve the efficiency of obtaining certain desired educational product goals to employ any of the above methods, it would be immoral to do so and thus not open to "moral" educators as possible teaching methodology. Efficiency of learning must be sacrificed in order to have education which is moral.

III. Morally Conceived Education as a Normative Enterprise

Closely related to the above interpretation is the view that education, morally conceived, means that education is a normative enterprise. "Moral" and "normative" are essentially equated. Understood in this way, the focus no longer rests with the process goals, but with predetermined and outlined product goals. R.S. Peters and Israel Scheffler have described the views expressed in this interpretation. Not just any goals are posited as those which should govern the enterprise of education. Rather, goals chosen as being "worthwhile" or "respectful of persons" are those which are identified. The process of making choices about which goals satisfy the criteria as a normative venture. To say that education is *not* a normative enterprise is to render the accepted meaning of the concept 'education' almost meaningless. Schooling, seen as one form of education, carries with it the same kind of normative choice making process. Choices are continually made regarding the goals, subject matter and procedures involved in schooling as education. To say that choices are not involved is to say something odd about education or schooling.

This second interpretation renders the phrase "morally conceived education" trivial. What would it mean to say that intentionally designed educational programs, including schooling, were not normative? In effect, without choice making, the enterprise becomes arbitrary. Any subject matter, product goals or principles of procedure would have equal merit. Students could learn to cheat, deal drugs or steal as justifiability they could become acquainted with good literature, learn geometry or study the organization of government. Since no norms would be used to determine the scope and content of a student's education, anything would be fair or "moral" game.

IV. Moral Education as the Hidden Curriculum

A third distinct meaning focuses on yet another aspect of education/schooling. Kevin Ryan has argued at length that "moral education comes with the territory."[2] What Ryan may mean in addition to or apart from either of the first two meanings is that there are some aspects of the schooling enterprise (process goals, product goals, as well as subject matter) which are transferred uncontrollably. Although Ryan holds that such uncontrolled aspects ought to be minimized, he would have to admit that to obliterate it all is next to impossible. That remainder of items not capable of being entirely controlled and deliberately tought or suppressed is what might be termed the "hidden curriculum." Moral education understood in this way would mean that subject matter dealing with value issues transferred unintentionally is moral education. This interpretation is different from either of the previous two. Examples of this form of "moral education" might be teacher mannerisms, voice inflection or other verbal or nonverbal forms of communication used in the activity of teaching. Also associated with the hidden curriculum would be societal/cultural values, which are deeply imbedded in the curriculum, texts and the school administration's procedures and policies.

V. Moral Education as Separate Subject Matter

A fourth way of understanding moral education is the way in which the contemporary popular approaches use the term. Kohlberg, Values Clarification, Philosophy for Children and other approaches clearly see moral education as being in some way overtly designed subject matter, as that which sould be called a "program," "unit," or "package." Moral education, on this interpretation, could be likened to *science* education or *music* education. What is implied in all of these three phrases is that there is a particular subject matter (cirriculum) which adequately meets the goals of the outline interprise. In other words, there is scientific subject matter which will allow students to learn to reason about scientific matters; there is music subject matter which will allow students to appreciate and participate in music, and similarly there is *moral* subject matter which will help students become better able to confront, and reason about moral questions intelligently.

Of the four interpretations presented thus far, this view is the most widely meant at present when claims about "moral education" are made. Viewing moral education as separate or overt subject matter has a long history. In the past, other terms have been substituted for part or all of what moral education may currently mean. "Values Education, "Character Education," "Civic Education," "Religious Education," "Sex Education," and other lesser known phrases have at one time or another been used for what now, in part or all, falls under the slogan, "moral education." To find out how and where there has been overlap among any of the above titles would mean uncovering their parent doctrines and historical contexts. This kind of research is not necessary to demonstrate that what all of these terms do have in common is the acceptance of a specific subject matter which can be taught using the same kinds of methods as would be used for other distinct subject matters. Thus, once the subject matter called *morals* is determined, it remains to choose the methodology which will most adequately facilitate reaching the goals of making students better moral reasoners or morally autonomous agents. The contemporary approaches to moral education disagree not only on the subject matter of morals and the most appropriate methodology, but also upon the goals toward which moral education is aimed. Is it possible that Dewey's position can justifiably fuel all of these different fires simultaneously?

In sum, there are four distinct senses in which education is considered to be moral: First, it has been suggested that morally conceived education has meant paying heed to the principles of procedure and restrictions on manner of schooling. Second, it has meant that schooling is a normative enterprise. Third, moral education has been equated with what is termed the hidden curriculum. Finally, the slogan, "moral education," has meant that there is a separate teachable subject matter of morals. When discussion about morally conceived education takes place, any one or combination of these four things may be meant.

VI. Confusions about Deweyan Moral Education

Values Clarification creators claim that their work "comes directly from John Dewey..."[3] They imply that Dewey's *Theory of Valuation* provides both the theoretical description which underlies their methodology and the justification for their approach.

Kohlberg argues that

> The theory of moral psychology we shall use in presenting the facts is basically that of John Dewey, more recently elaborated by Jean Piaget and myself. The moral philosophy of education is also basically that of Dewey...[4]

Evidently, Kohlberg's theory of moral development and of classroom methodology designed to stimulate moral development is an extension of Dewey's moral psychology and philosophy of education.

Both the Values Clarificationists and the Kohlbergians proceed as if Dewey's *Theory of Valuation*, psychology and philosophy can all be translated into classroom practice, without any assistance from his explicit statements on the enterprise of moral education. It is puzzling that both approaches fail to cite or encorporate Dewey's views on moral education. If either Kohlbergians or Values Clarification advocates has studied Dewey more carefully, they might have recognized that Dewey describes moral education as morally conceived education as well as the education of morals. They might also have realized that their own practical approaches to moral education are significantly different from that advocated by Dewey.

What needs to be recognized is that Dewey cannot legitimately be aligned with any of the supposedly "Deweyan based" approaches to moral education presently employed in schools. To assume otherwise is to ignore relevant and critical aspects of Dewey's expressed views on moral education. But the contemporary approaches are not entirely to blame. Dewey often spoke ambiguously about moral education, making it impossible to decide whether he meant morally conceived education or the education of morals.

Dewey's voluminous body of writings on education/schooling is infused with prescriptive statements about theoretical and practical aspects of moral education. On his view, moral education permeates school life. It cannot be eliminated and it ought not be neglected. Thus, Dewey's "meaning" of moral education does not fit neatly into any of the four senses previously outlined. Let us turn now to a brief presentation of Dewey's version of moral education in order to dispell any remaining beliefs that Values Clarification or the Cognitive-Developmental approach to moral education is Deweyan.

VII. Deweyan Moral Education

Dewey believed that "The development of character through all the agencies, instrumentalities, and materials of school life,"[5] is the only viable way to view moral education. He clearly states, in *Moral Principles in Education*, that to establish a separate "moral" subject matter or to teach morals as a separate unit is ill-conceived. Dewey carefully distinguishes between "moral ideas" and "ideas about morality," and he claimed that "the influence of direct moral instruction, even at it's best, is *comparatively* small in amount and slight in influence...."[6]

Dewey's "moral education" is not conducted in specific time slots as "packages" or "units." The moral education of persons begins the day they are born and proceeds positively or negatively depending upon the interaction of the individual with environmental conditions. Dewey recognized that infants are at the mercy of those around them, those who have more knowledge/experience in all matters. Thus, by the time a child arrives at school, much of his/her moral character is already formed. He/she has been immersed in the values of his/her family, friends, and community. Schooling is but *one* way that children acquire habits of moral significance.

Dewey is fully cognizant of the fact that education is a normative enterprise, and he makes no mistake in laying out the norms against which education should be evaluated and toward which education (which includes moral education) ought to be aimed:

> Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social intelligence --the power of observing and comprehending social situations, --and social power --trained capacities of control --at work in the service of social interest and aims.[7]

Dewey also says that "moral education...is universally recognized as the ultimate and final end of the educative process."[8] It must be understood that this final end is not just *any* end. Dewey sees this aim in the context of a "true" democracy:

> In conception, at least, democracy approaches most nearly the ideal of all social organization; that in which the individual and society are organic to each other.[9]
>
> ...democracy is an ethical idea, the idea of a personality, with truly infinite capacities, incorporate with every man. Democracy and the one, the ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity are to my mind synonymous.[10]

The often cited claim, "Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end or aim"[11] must be understood in light of the above comments. Also note that the "social" and the "moral" are essentially equated.

The goal of moral education for Dewey is the same as that for education and more broadly, for life: Growth and successful living as an individual in a necessarily social world. Dewey believed that an unavoidable premise upon which concerns of moral education rest is that an individual is part of a larger socially organized group. Values arise out of and are determined by common socially determined interests. Moral education ought to be directed toward acquainting students with these relationships. Students ought to be given opportunities to engage in and reconstruct these social situations in the classroom. The classroom environment itself should be conducive to engaging in actual social activities as they naturally arise. To maximize the chances of this all important social intercourse, the physical classroom environment should be appropriately arranged. For instance, bolted desks and chairs should be replaced by movable furniture.

The individual student is never sacrificed or lost in the process of reaching this moral goal of socialization. Repeatedly, Dewey, as well as teachers in his Laboratory School, proclaim the social ideal and its relationship to individual student growth:

> The school's ultimate social/ideal was the transformation of society through a new, socially minded individualism.... To those who taught and those who learned, what was social came to mean that which was ethical or moral.[12]

It should be noticed that it is not entirely clear whether these ideals are strictly product goals, process goals or both. Obviously the ends-in-view are conceived to be moral because the aim is to obtain an enlightened democratic community. But for Dewey, the methods of instruction must also be morally conceived.

> The principle of the social character of the school as the basic factor in the moral education given may be also applied to the question of methods of instruction, ---not in their details, but their general spirit. The emphasis then falls upon construction and giving out, rather than upon absorption and mere learning.[13]

This quote is typically Deweyan. No specifics are described which would shed some light into the details of daily teaching methodology. Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards suggest that at the University of Chicago,

> The school did aim to indoctrinate the child with experimental method and social motive so that he himself might form his attitudes, cultivate his tasts and initiate the process of inquiry that leads to discovery and invention or creative expression of any sort.[14]

Evidently in this context, "indoctrination" means that students learn by investigating and discovering that there is a need to master the tools necessary for progressive and enlightened social living. For instance, in the Laboratory School, teachers asked leading questions and provided careful guidance and encouragement as students worked at finding solutions to social problems. Teaching and learning was a cooperative venture in which both students and teachers gave out and received. Drill, rote memorization and non-social activities were kept to a minimum. These kinds of activities were seen to be "so rigid and formal as not to parallel anything outside the school, external order and decorum may be secured, but there is no guarantee of right growth in directions demanded by the ordinary walks of life."[15] Dewey believed that children have four native impulses: "to communicate, to construct, to inquire, and to express in finer form."[16] Dewey held these to be "the child's natural springs for action. His growth depends upon their use and exercise."[17] Thus, any methodology which violates these impulses is inappropriate or "immoral" as a process goal and is a restriction on the manner of teaching.

There is no need to contrive moral subject matter. By studying history, literature, science, art and so on, students do become acquainted with problems and situations which are "pregnant" with moral potential. To contrive moral dilemmas or create moral problems which children cannot comprehend as legitimate or real is to force unnaturally the process of moral learning. Problems and dilemmas that arise in normal social configurations in the classroom and out of the curriculum are the starting points for moral education in school. The rest is up to school personnel. They are the ones who can capitalize upon situations, both in the classroom and in curricular material, which have moral potential.

Unlike contemporary theorists of moral education, Dewey opposes using a special methodology for handling moral problems. Only *special* problems need special methodology. Dewey maintained that moral problems, be they personal or historical, are no different in kind from other problems (scientific, historical, sociological, psychological, etc.) and consequently ought to be treated in a like manner. The scientific method of investigation adequately serves to help solve all kinds of problems.

From individual problem situations which students solve come principles or summary rules to guide further decisions and action. But since existential features change and each context is necessarily different, even in some small way, these rules are never constitutive. Everything a child encounters (the overt curriculum as well as classroom social arrangements) is "pregnant" with opportunities for moral education. It is the teacher's job to provide situations and subject matter which allows students to participate genuinely in social living.

Dewey also speaks to what we have previously categorized as the hidden curriculum. In fact, the most "vital"form of moral education is indirect.[18] If this is in fact the case, why have schools at all? What positive influence could formalized instruction have for moral education if there ought not be separate moral subject matter and if, no matter how we avoid it, children imitate and pick up the culture in which they are embedded? Dewey answers this clearly and positively.

> ...the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of the environment. Whether we permit chance environments to do the work, or whether we design environments for the purpose makes a great difference....But schools remain, of course, the typical instance of environments framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members.[19]

VII. Conclusion

According to Dewey, adequate moral education is simultaneously a simple and a complex activity. It is both easy and extremely difficult to implement properly. Dewey holds an almost religious conviction in

> ...the moral trinity of the school. The demand is for social intelligence, social power, and social interests. Our resources are (1) the life of the school as a social institution in itself; (2) methods of learning and of doing work; and (3) the school studies or curriculum.[20]

This religiosity is felt as well in his closing remarks of *Moral Principles in Education*. "What we need in education is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application."[21]

> If we can secure a genuine faith in this fact, we shall have secured the condition which alone is necessary to get from our educational system all the effectiveness there is in it. The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life pregnant with moral possibility.[22]

Theorists and program designers have taken Dewey at his word and attempted to "operate in this faith." But it is only a *leap* of faith which can demonstrate that these approaches are in fact within the Deweyan tradition. Dewey's meaning and substance of moral education is both the education of morals as well as morally conceived education. They are one and the same. His theory and practice of moral education can be nothing more or less than this. That contemporary approaches to moral education are judged to be adequate is one thing. To claim that they are also *Deweyan* moral education is quite another. A comprehension of this distinction is long overdue.

NOTES

1. See for example, Merrill Harmin, Louis E. Raths and Sidney Simon, *Values and Teaching* (Columbus, OH: C.E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1978) and articles by Lawrence Kohlberg and his colleagues.

2. Kevin Ryan and David Purpel, *Moral Education...It comes With The Territory* (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1976), p. 7.

3. Raths, *et al.*, *Values and Teaching*, p. 296.

4. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Acognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," reprinted in *Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education* (Spring 1973), p. 13.

5. John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975), p. 4.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

8. John Dewey, "Moral Education/The Individual Aspect," in *John Dewey Lectures in China 1919-1920* (Honolulu, HI: The University Press of Hawaii, 1973), p. 286.

9. John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy," in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., *The Early Works, 1882-1898, Vol. 1*, ed. JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), p. 237.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

11. Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 11.

12. Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards,*The Dewey School* (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), pp. 436-437.

13. Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 11.

14. Mayhew and Edwards, p. 438.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

17. *Ibid.*,

18. Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 4.

19. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 18-19.

20. Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 43.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

JOHN DEWEY AND LAWRENCE KOHLBERG:
BIRDS OF A DIFFERENT FEATHER

Tom Altepeter
Indiana University

In recent years considerable attention has been devoted to Lawrence Kohlberg's research into human moral development, both from the psychological and the moral-philosophical points of view. In studying his work I have encountered several philosophical difficulties which I will attempt to highlight in this paper. This does not constitute a discussion of the psychological validity of his research but rather an examination of the philosophic assumptions which underpin it.

Kohlberg's theory has been termed "cognitive-developmental," and Kohlberg himself suggests that the proper point of departure for his theory of moral development is the writings of two predecessors: Jean Piaget and John Dewey. In at least one instance he makes the relationship explicit. In the introduction of "Development as the Aim of Education" Kohlberg states, "the present paper essentially recapitulates the progressive position first formulated by John Dewey. This position has been clarified psychologically by the work of Piaget and his followers."[1] In several other instances Kohlberg refers to his own work as "Dewey warmed-over." I will compare Kohlberg's writing with one of his predecessors, John Dewey, and attempt to show that Kohlberg departs radically from the perspective of his mentor. Some may argue that Kohlberg has merely developed and extended Dewey's ideas; however, it will be made clear that, at least in several foundational concepts, Kohlberg has removed himself from the perspective known as Deweyean.

Kohlberg has outlined his theory in several works.[2] In brief, he conceptualizes human moral development as moving through a sequence of six stages. Each stage represents a qualitative difference in one's mode of thinking. Two individuals who are at different stages may agree to a similar value (e.g. honesty) but may interpret situations and make practical applications of their value in distinctly different (perhaps opposite) ways. Further, Kohlberg's stages form an *invariant sequence:* each stage must *necessarily* follow upon the previous stages. "Both logic and empirical study indicate there is no stage six without a previous stage five."[3] Finally, the stage development follows a pattern of hierarchical integration: as a person's thinking moves from one stage to the next, he does not merely discard the lower-level mode of thinking. Rather, the movement involves a reintegration and restructuring of the lower stages. This partly explains why there is a qualitative shift in one's mode of thinking, as pointed out above. Kohlberg defends this restructuring process by stating that he "has been led to accept this . . . developmental interpretation by evidence . . . suggesting that use of a more advanced stage of thought depends upon earlier attainment of each preceding stage and that each involves a restructuring and displacement of previous stages."[4]

This implies a specific conceptualization of human growth and development. In effect, growth is very structured and closed-ended: each person's develoment *must* progress in the same step-wise pattern. Variance will happen in one's rate of growth and the cessation of growth (fixation). But if individuals are to continue growing, they must *de facto* progress in the same pattern toward the identical fixed end. Kohlberg is very clear in stating this: " . . . each child must go step by step through each of the kinds of moral judgment outlined. It is of course possible for a child to move at varying speeds and to stop (become 'fixated') at any level of development, but if he continues to move upward he must move in this step-wise fashion."[5]

Furthermore, for Kohlberg, the goal of development is to rise to the highest possible stage (stage six), which is superior or more adequate psychologically than the previous five stages. This implies the possibility of "arriving" at the pinnacle of human development and ceasing further growth. He states explicitly that less developed stages are less adequate than more advanced stages. "Implied in the term 'development' is the notion that a more developed psychological state is more valuable or adequate than a less developed state."[6]

In consulting John Dewey's writing, one finds a very different understanding of human growth and development. In fact, Dewey's ideas are almost polar-opposite of Kohlberg's. Whereas Kohlberg offers an essentially closed-ended interpretation of growth, as having a goal and pattern defined 'a priori,' Dewey posits that growth is essentially open-ended and continually evolving. There is no possibility of reaching the pinnacle of growth for Dewey, but such a pinnacle is the goal for Kohlberg. A few examples from Dewey's writing will make this clear. While discussing intellectual development in education, Dewey identifies growth with life and makes the point that development continues as long as life continues: "Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means 1) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that 2) the educational process is one of continual reorganization, reconstructing, transforming."[7] In another context, when addressing the moral growth of man, Dewey speaks out against fixing some end-state, such as Kohlberg's stage six. He expresses his belief that fixing such an end-state tends to arrest growth rather than enhance it:

> Except as the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing as a fixed, ready-made finished self. Every living self causes acts and is itself caused in return by what it does. All voluntary action is a remaking of the self since it creates new desires, instigates new modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions which institute new ends. Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous development which binds together these changes. In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and becoming for the better or worse. Its in the *quality* of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but *the* end is growth itself. To make an end a final goal is but to arrest growth. Many a person gets morally discouraged because he has not attained the object upon which he set his resolution; but in fact his moral status is determined by his movement in that direction, not by his possession. If such a person would set his thought and desire upon the *process* of evolution instead of upon some ulterior goal, he would find anew freedom and happiness. It is the next step which lies within our power.[8]

In yet another place, Dewey makes a comment, directed toward Froebel, which can be applied almost verbatum to Kohlberg. This dramatically points out one of the philosophical discrepancies between the two thinkers:

> But his formulation of the notion of development and his organization of devices for promoting it were badly hampered by the fact that he conceived development to be the unfolding of a ready-made latent principle. He failed to see that growing is growth, developing is development, and consequently placed the emphasis upon the completed product. Thus he set up a goal which meant the arrest of growth.[9]

By using these comments of Dewey I am not attempting to align Kohlberg's work with Froebel's. There do exist some similarities, however, and I think we can interpret Dewey's comments in the light of Kohlberg's writing. If we inset Kohlberg's "invariant sequential stages" for Froebel's "ready-made principle" and Kohlberg's "stage six" for Froebel's "completed product" Dewey's comments point out Kohlberg's variance from Dewey.

Other glaring discrepancies between the two positions are the relative emphasis placed upon actual behavior, or moral conduct, and the consequent emphasis upon human will (conatus). As indicated earlier, Kohlberg's theory has been termed "cognitive-developmental." His research has focused exclusively upon the developmental patterns elaborated by Piaget. Specifically, using "moral dilemmas" (which are contrived, hypothetical situations rather than real-life experiences) he has tried to map out the development of moral judgment in a manner similar to the development of cognitive abilities. Although he has termed this "moral judgment," it is nothing more that judgment *about* moral issues (as opposed to judgment about non-moral issues). He has associated moral development, which others have construed as "character development," with cognitive structures and styles as they apply to moral situations. As he states it, "moral development in terms of these stages is a progressive movement toward basing moral judgment on concepts of justice,"10 toward what is, on his theory, stage six (the pinnacle stage). Kohlberg addresses *reasoning* in hypothetical situations rather than *action* in real-life experiences. Moral education, or "character formation," is depicted as a matter of developing one's reasoning abilities. He assumes that the students will apply their "moral judgments," without further assistance or training, in appropriate life situations: "moral character, the general consistency in moral conduct, is to a large extent a product of maturity factors in decision making . . . a more mature judgment is a more moral judgment."11 Kohlberg gives insufficient attention to actual conduct in concrete situations, or what we might call the real-life application of moral judgments. Moral conduct is assumed to flow from moral judgment.

Kohlberg's theory is woefully inadequate in this regard, and I am not the first to criticize him for it. However, I would like, by elaborating Dewey's views and again pointing out the fundamental differences, to give John Dewey a chance to "critique" Kohlberg. In so doing I will quote Dewey extensively in an effort to represent him adequately. Please bear with my seeming overindulgence in quotations; I believe they are useful at this point.

To begin Dewey's "critique" of Kohlberg, I quote from the introduction of *Moral Principles in Education:* "Those who know best the powers and limitations of instruction as an instrument have repeatedly pointed out the futility of assuming that knowledge of right constitutes a guarantee of right doing."12 Dewey is saying, quite simply, that knowing the correct thing and being capable of mature moral judgments do not provide for or assure moral conduct. He is highlighting the fact that there is a broad expanse between judgment and action, and that any adequate moral theory must deal with this realm. Some may argue that Dewey is in error in this regard, and that Kohlberg is merely extending and interpolating his thoughts. I will not enter into a discussion about which is the more adequate formulation (to do so is beyond the scope of the present paper), but I will further explore Dewey's writings in an attempt to point out the incompatabilities of the two thinkers.

In the same text cited above, Dewey goes on to differentiate "moral ideas" from "ideas about morality," claiming that such a distinction is "fundamental to the discussion of moral education."13 "Moral ideas" are "ideas of any sort which take effect in conduct and improve it, make it better than it would be; non-moral ideas, one may say, are such ideas and pieces of information as leave conduct uninfluenced for either the better or the worse."14 The cutting edge, according to Dewey, between "moral ideas" and "non-moral ideas" is the *effects* in ones conduct: "moral ideas" impact behavior favorably whereas "non-moral ideas" do not have morally significant effects in conduct. Furthermore, "ideas about morality" may or may not have behavioral effects; consequently, the effect is accidental rather than essential. Because of this, Dewey would classify "ideas about morality" as "non-moral." "There is nothing in the nature of ideas *about* morality, of information *about* honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct."15

Kohlberg's theory is most accurately depicted as "ideas about morality" rather than "moral ideas," as indicated above. But this may not be clear, and further specification is in order. Dewey goes on to delineate what he means by the term "character." This speaks to the issue at hand, for examining Dewey's concept of "character" might give us a further clue as to how Kohlberg deviates from Dewey. Dewey distinguishes three elements of "character": 1) force; 2) judgment; 3) emotional responsiveness.

"Force" involves moving beyond good intentions into action or behavior. "The individual must have the power to stand up and count for something in the actual conflicts of life. He must have initiative, insistence, persistence, courage and industry. He must, in a word, have all that goes under the name *'force of character'*!"[16] "Judgment" moves beyond the element of "force" or initiative and concerns itself with the organization and efficiency of action. "Judgment" is not abstract speculation concerning hypothetical situations or circumstances, but *definite*, specific consciousness of ends and means in unique situations. "Mere knowledge of what is right, in the abstract, mere intentions of following the right in general, however praiseworthy in themselves, are never a substitute for this power of trained judgment. Action is always in the concrete. It is definite and individualized."[17] Finally, "emotional responsiveness" is needed for "force" and "judgment" are not enough. An individual must have an emotional sensitivity to the people that are in his environment who will be affected by his actions. Dewey associates this with being "sympathetic, flexible and open," and he admits that it is difficult to verbalize adequately the quality of "emotional responsiveness."

In limiting himself to considerations of "moral judgment" Kohlberg clearly does not address Dewey's "force" and "emotional responsiveness." In effect, Kohlberg totally omits the greater portion of what Dewey understands as human character. It appears, at first glance, that Kohlberg's theory does approximate Dewey's component of "judgment," but upon closer examination we see that it does not. Dewey intimately connects "judgment" with action or behavior, and Kohlberg fails to specify the connection. As indicated above, Dewey's "judgment" is not an abstract speculation of hypothetical circumstances; but Kohlberg's research and theory are based upon such hypothetical situations. Dewey goes on to discuss the relationship between "judgment" and action: "the child cannot get power of judgment excepting as he is continually exercised in forming and testing judgments. He must have an opportunity to select for himself, and to attempt to put his selection into execution, that he may submit them to the final test, that of action."[18] So, although the two men use the same word, i.e., "judgment," they do so with differing meanings and purposes.

A final point worth mentioning is that Dewey centers his discussion of morality in the larger framework of human habits, for, as he points out, "character is the interpenetration of habits."[19] Space does not permit a detailed exposition of Dewey's use of "habit"; suffice it to say that moral conduct has to do with those actions over which one has control--primarily, one's own habits. Behavior which is out of one's control is not properly "moral conduct" but "non-moral" or "amoral." But "moral conduct" is largely influenced and mediated by one's habits.

> Our ideas truly depend upon experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon which they both depend is the operations of habits. Thus our purposes and commands regarding actions (whether physical or moral) come to us through the refracting medium of bodily and moral habits . . . only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is.[20]

Dewey goes on to discuss the interrelatedness of "habits" and "will" and concludes that "in any intelligible sense of the word will, they (i.e., habits) *are* will."[21] The upshot of these brief comments is that Dewey considers the "will" as an essential component of any worthwhile discussion of moral conduct or of any legitimate theory of moral education. Interestingly, Kohlberg does not include a discussion of the "will" in his theory, and he does not address the broader concept of human habits.

Kohlberg deviates from Dewey in this regard, and in no way can his theory of moral development be viewed as a "recapitulation" of Dewey's views, as Kohlberg claims. Dewey focuses primarily upon the movement behind moral conduct (i.e., the "conatus" or motive-force), whereas Kohlberg deals exclusively with reasoning about moral issues, never addressing himself to the concept of action, conduct or "will."

A third and final discrepancy between Kohlberg and Dewey to be discussed can be considered trite, so it will be given minimal attention. It is included, however, to make further the point that Kohlberg's theory differs in many respects from that of his predecessor.

Kohlberg, in discussing virtues, echoes the Socratic formulation by maintaining that "virtue is not many but one, and that its name is justice."[22] In essence, he says that all of the "virtues" are rules and as such can be reduced to an ultimate moral principle--namely, justice.

> There are exceptions to rules, then, but not exceptions to principles. A moral obligation is an obligation to respect the rights or claims of another person. A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims, you versus me, you versus a third person. There is only one principled basis for resolving claims, justice or equality.[23]

Dewey, on the other hand, takes a view that is more in line with the Aristotelean formulation. In *Ethics* Dewey argues that virtues are numberless and that it is undesirable or even impossible to catalogue a list of virtues. He indicates that if one insisted upon stating traits which are necessary for all morality, he would favor the four "cardinal virtues": justice, courage, temperance and wisdom; however, he maintains his position that they cannot be classified in any meaningful sense:

> Bearing in mind that we are not attempting to classify various acts or habits, but only to state traits essential to all morality, we have the "cardinal virtues" of moral theory. As whole-hearted, as complete interest, any habit or attitude of character involves justice and love; as persistently active, it is courage, fortitude or vigor; as unmixed and single, it is temperance--in its classic sense. And no habitual interest can be integral, enduring, or sincere, save it is reasonable, save that it is, as it is rooted in the deliberate habit of viewing the part in light of the whole, the present in the light of the past and the future, interest in the good is also wisdom or conscientiousness--interest in the discovery of the true good of the situation.[24]

Again, with respect to their views on the nature of virtue, we see Kohlberg departing from Dewey. Some may argue, and I think rightfully, that this particular departure is not of great significance. Nevertheless, this is another indication or sample of Kohlberg's inconsistency with Dewey, whom Kohlberg claims merely to be recapitulating.

I set out to show that Kohlberg, while claiming to reiterate the ideas of John Dewey, has in fact made radical departures from them. I drew extensively from the writings of both men and focused upon three distinct issues. The first area receiving attention was both men's use within their respective theories of the concept of "development": Kohlberg presents a relatively closed, 'a priori' system; Dewey posits an open-ended, evolving view of development. The second area I addressed was the emphasis each placed in his respective ethical theory on behavior and/or the "will." Kohlberg does not address it, dealing only with moral reasoning (or, more properly, reasoning about moral situations); Dewey gives the "will" prominence in his theory. Finally, I pointed out that each takes a different point of departure in discussing virtue: Kohlberg claims that virtue is essentially one (justice); Dewey maintains that virtue is many and cannot be catalogued.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer, "Development as the Aim of Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1974), p. 493.

2. Kohlberg has yet to publish a text which explains his theory and all of its unique nuances. The interested reader must consult a variety of journal articles or chapters in other texts.

3. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View" in *Moral Education Five Lectures*, eds. Nancy F. Sizer and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 77.

4. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology" in *Review of Child Development Research, Vol. 1*, eds., Lois W. Hoffman and Martin L. Hoffman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 404.

5. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education in the Public Schools," in *Religion in Public Education*, ed. David E. Engel (New York: Paulist Press, 1974), p. 233.

6. Kohlberg and Mayer, "Aim of Education," p. 477.

7. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), p. 59.

8. John Dewey in *The Moral Writings of John Dewey*, ed. James Bouinlock (New York: Hafner Press, 1976) p 98.

9. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 67-68.

10. Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious Education," p. 239.

11. Kohlberg, "Development of Moral Character," pp. 405-409.

12. John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education* (Cambridge, Ma.: The Riverside Press, 1907), p. viii.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

19. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922), p. 38.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

22. Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 69.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

24. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1909), pp. 402-403.

COMMENTS ON FREIBERG/ALTPETER

William Bruening
Indiana University, Purdue University at Fort Wayne

Ms. Freiberg argues that, although there are at least four distinct meanings of "moral education," proponents of moral education based on differing meanings of this term all claim to have a "theoretical reliance" on and a "claimed affiliation to" John Dewey. She further claims that Dewey's own view "cannot be adequately captured within any of the four interpretations of moral education outlined."

The four meanings of moral education are: moral education and the principle of procedure; moral education as a normative enterprise; moral education as the hidden curriculum; and moral education as separate subject matter. The fifth (and presumably best) meaning of moral education is John Dewey's. Dewey's notion is not packageable, is geared toward growth, is social in nature, and doesn't allow for bolted desks and chairs.

In the Chicago Lab School weekly assemblies were held. There was no need for a separate, contrived subject matter, nor any special methodology. Students could arrive at principles/or summary rules but the rules were never constitutive. What Freiberg apparently is referring to is Dewey's reluctance to accept ethical absolutes.

The last major section of Freiberg's paper argues that all of the four notions of moral education are included in Dewey's view. His view is prescriptive. Kohlberg, inter alia, is goody-goody. The end of education is moral education in the context of "true" democracy. It is only by a "*leap* of faith" that one can claim that any of the four meanings of moral education are "within the Deweyan tradition."

Let me make several critical comments. First, it is not clear *from the paper* that any of the four views actually claim to be in the Deweyan tradition: this should not be read to mean that none is. Second, Freiberg admits that Dewey's view includes all four of them, and that seems to lead to the conclusion that they are at least compatible with Dewey's thought, even if not identical with it.

The difficulty with Freiberg's position is that it is not clear just what she is claiming. She could be claiming: (1) that none of the four is in the Deweyan tradition; (2) that none of the four is identical with that tradition; (3) that the Deweyan tradition is a synthesis of the four with no additional unique characteristics; or (4) that the Deweyan tradition includes all four and also has unique characteristics.

The first claim is clearly not what she is claiming since Dewey's view includes all four of them. The second might be true, but there is no argument that any of the four claims are identical with Dewey's. The third claim does not appear to be made, and she would likely claim that Dewey's view is more than just the sum of the four. Thus she seems to be committed to making the fourth view.

What is problematic about claiming that Dewey's view includes all four is that a logical contradiction is involved. The last of the four views argues that moral education is an "overtly designed subject matter," with a "program," "unit," or package. Dewey's notion of moral education does not include "packages" and "units." How Dewey's view can also include this fourth view is not clear.

It should be noted that Freiberg is not claiming either that Dewey's view is adequate or that any of the four views is inadequate. She is claiming that they are not Deweyan--presumably meaning that they are not identical with his view. However, it is easy enough to see how Dewey "can justifiably fuel all of these different fires simultaneously "

Mr. Altepeter addresses a somewhat related issue but focuses his attention specifically on a comparison of Kohlberg and Dewey. Kohlberg has claimed that his view is a recapitulation of Dewey or even "Dewey warmed over." Altepeter objects to this claim and claims that Kohlberg has removed himself from the perspective known as Deweyan. Altepeter cites three areas of disagreement between Kohlberg and Dewey: (1) the notion of development; (2) the emphasis on behavior, and (3) the virtues, especially justice. He admits that the last may be trivial.

Kohlberg's notion of development is characterized as "relatively-closed" and "a priori"; Dewey's is characterized as "open-ended" and "evolving." Kohlberg claims that the stages must be gone through in sequence. He claims that both logic and empirical study verify this claim. It is not clear that such a claim is "a priori"; in fact, it is not clear what Altepeter means by "a priori." Kant claimed that "a priori" meant universally and necessarily true; and I suspect that Kohlberg is claiming that his view is true, but it is not clear that he is claiming that it is universally and necessarily so. In the context, "a priori" is clearly a con-word. But without any attempt to define it, the claim lacks meaning. Kohlberg's claims are at least in part synthetic, in Kant's sense of the term. Kohlberg has been publishing *empirical* research since at least 1963.

It should also be pointed out that the stages of development are not based on the content of the moral claims made but on their form. It is not the specific substantive moral claim that is definitive of the stages but the manner in which such a claim is justified. Although the content of such substantive claims may be culturally relative, the forms of reasoning for the six stages are not culturally relative. The six stages are also not marked by sharp boundaries except perhaps in theory. Typically, a child is 50% in his/her "major stage," partly in the previous stage, and partly in the subsequent stage. Kohlberg even leaves open the possibility of a seventh stage.[1]

Does Dewey have a stage view? And if so, how fixed are the stages? The answer to the first question is a definite yes. In *A Common Faith*, Dewey claims:

> History seems to exhibit three stages of growth. In the first stage, human relationships were thought to be so infected with the evils of corrupt human nature as to require redemption from external and supernatural sources. In the next stage, what is significant in these relations is found to be alien to values esteemed distinctively religious. This is the point now reached by liberal theologians. The third stage would realize that in fact the values prized in those religions--are idealizations of things characteristic of natural association . . . . The values of natural human intercourse and mutual dependence are open, and public, capable of verification by the methods through which all natural facts are established.[2]

In Dewey's *Ethics*, written with Tufts, a discussion of stages can also be found. The first stage is purely instinctive action and is "unmoral." The second stage is the transition from impulse through desire to will. The third stage is the goal, well-organized character.[3]

Dewey also distinguishes the form and content of moral claims, the "how" and the "what." The "what" includes the natural beginning, the appetites and instincts, and the natural in Aristotle's sense as the development of man's full nature. The "what" also includes justice, kindness, the Golden Rule. Injustice, cruelty and selfishness are ruled out. The "how" has to do with reasons, the "why" or attitude. Although it is not completely clear that Dewey's stages are identical with Kohlberg's stages, it is clear that both argue for development in stages and that some of Dewey's stages are not antithetical to Kohlberg's, and vice versa. Dewey's unmoral stage is similar to Kohlberg's pre-conventional level.

The real question is not whether both have stages, but whether they are fixed stages. Given the distinction between form and content, it is clear that Kohlberg's stages are form-fixed, although not necessarily content-fixed. For Dewey, there is also a form-fixity--there is a highest stage (e.g., the religious attitude). In *Ethics*, Dewey even gives content-fixity, although his examples seem closer to what Kohlberg gives as examples of form-fixity.

Are Dewey's stages invariant as are Kohlberg's, by his own admission? I suspect Dewey would be more inclined to call them natural. Is it possible to skip a stage? For Kohlberg, the empirical evidence says not, but the sample is quite small. For Dewey, the stages in *A Common Faith* do seem to be variant, in that these are stages of history and not necessarily of every individual. The stages in *Ethics* are more likely to be invariant, and the context in which the stages are discussed inclines me to say they are invariant in the sense of natural. It is clear in the context that Dewey is talking of individual development.

Altepeter's second reason for distinguishing Kohlberg from Dewey is the different emphasis Dewey puts on behavior or will. Kohlberg's views are cognitive, focusing on moral reasoning about hypothetical situations. Dewey's views are about "moral ideas" and Kohlberg's are "ideas about morality." Dewey is concerned with behavior and action, while Kohlberg is concerned with judgment.

There is no doubt that the word "will" is not often, if at all, found in Kohlberg's work--at least not in the several works I have checked. Kohlberg's stresses that his view is cognitive and owes allegiance to Piaget, among others. But what does Kohlberg mean by "cognitive"?

> I have used the term "cognitive-development" to refer to a set of assumptions common to the moral theories of Dewey (1909), G.H. Mead (1934), J.M. Baldwin (1906), Piaget (1932) and myself. (The Dewey reference is to *Moral Principles in Education*.)
>
> All have postulated stages of moral development representing cognitive-structural transformation in the conception of self and society. All have assumed that these stages represent successive modes of "taking the role of others" in social situations, and hence that the social-environment determinants of development are its opportunities for role-taking. More generally, all have assumed an active child who structures his perceived environment, and hence they have assumed that moral stages and their development represent the interaction of the child's structuring tendencies and the structural features of the environment.[4]

In claiming the above commonality of views, does Kohlberg nonetheless forget about non-cognitive elements? Kohlberg says:

> Discussions of cognition and affect usually are based on the assumption that cognitions and affects are different mental states, leading to the questions, "Which is quantitatively more influential in moral judgment, states of cognition or states of affect?" In contrast, the cognitive-developmental view holds that "cognition" and "affect" are different aspects of, or perspectives on, the same mental events both cognitive and affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions reflects structural chances recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives. It is evident that moral judgments often involve strong emotional components. It is also evident that the presence of strong emotion in no way reduces the cognitive component of moral judgment, although it may imply a somewhat different functioning of the cognitive component than is implied in more neutral areas.[5]

Thus cognitive is a fairly broad term for Kohlberg. Also it is clear that Kohlberg does use hypothetical cases to elicit moral judgment. This use of hypotheticals seems to be connected with the notion that ethics is a distinct subject matter. But what is the problems with hypotheticals? Dewey is concerned, and rightly so, with ideas of morality being substituted for "moral ideas." But Dewey himself co-authored a book on *Ethics*--a "text" book no less!! The Preface says, "The significance of this text in Ethics lies in its effort to awaken a vital connection of the genuine reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with them." He even proposes using the historical method. *Ethics* is thus "ideas of morality"!

The key here is "reflective thought." If you expect young children to exercise reflective thought before they are capable of doing so, then ethics becomes ideas of morality. When a child is capable of reflective thought about moral ideas is a crucial question--the answer to which rational people can disagree on. Kohlberg is trying to develop reflective thought about moral issues by using hypothetical cases. This educational methodology takes place in a schooling situation subsequent to the children's already having some moral values.

Altepeter's last point of comparison is that Dewey's view of virtue is that virtues are numberless, whereas Kohlberg's view is that virtue is one and its name is justice.

Altepeter quotes Dewey (and Tufts) in *Ethics* concerning the cardinal virtues as evidence of Dewey's view. But only a few pages later Dewey discusses justice specifically. In reviewing literature, Dewey says that justice has at least three senses: (1) justice is not a virtue, but it is virtue; (2) justice as fairness, equity, impartiality, honesty; and (3) justice as vindication of right through law.[6] He then refers to Aristotle's distributive and corrective (retributive) justice. The first meaning is the very meaning that Kohlberg himself gives to justice. Dewey does not object to this first meaning. In fact, in discussing the three meanings he claims that "justice is the preeminently social virture." Although this does not prove that Dewey and Kohlberg agree on the virtues, it does strongly suggest that their apparent disagreement is questionable.

I close with a general comment about both papers. Both strike me as being incompatible with a Deweyan notion of inquiry. Both Dewey and Kohlberg present theories of moral education to be tested by "scientific" methods. As Dewey himself says of the "rival" theories he and Tufts present:

> Theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems which must be accepted or rejected *en bloc*, but as more or less adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct. This mode of approach facilitates the *scientific* estimation and determination of the part played by various factors in the complexity of moral life.[7]

This mode of approach to Dewey and Kohlberg will not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that they are saying the same thing or that they are radically different. Each is after all an individual, and individuals are neither totally alike nor totally different. Surely this individuality is one of the goals of moral education.

NOTES

[1] James Fowlers, "Moral Stages and the Development of Faith," in *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*, ed. by Brenda Munsey (Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1980), pp. 130-160.

[2] John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1934), pp. 72-73.

[3] John Dewey and James Tufts, *Ethics* (New York: Henry Holt, 1910), p. 10.

[4] Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Development as a Basis for Education," in Munsey, p. 38.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

[6] Dewey and Tufts, p. 414.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. iv.

DEWEY'S AESTHETIC THEORY:
ART AS A SPECIAL KIND OF PRACTICE

Marilyn G. Stewart
The Ohio State University

I. Introduction

John Dewey's View or art is regarded as non-helpful by some educators because it appears that 'art' is equated with 'worthwhile experience.' This view has led some to the conclusion that a Deweyan curriculum might eliminate art education, or at best, incorporate art in such a way that the "fine arts" would receive no special attention. Others have concluded that in a Deweyan curriculum, traditional art education would be included as basic or central. I will attempt to show that these disparate views result from a failure to note two different senses of 'art' employed by Dewey in both *Experience and Nature*[1] and *Art as Experience*[2]; and that his two uses of the term do not commit Dewey to two different aesthetic theories.[3] I will claim, to the contrary, that Dewey presents a theory of experience, one part of which is his theory of art.

II. Experience and Nature

In *Experience and Nature* we find Dewey seemingly failing to make a distinction between art and anything else worthwhile. It has been said that in this work Dewey denies art its "special character."[4] This criticism is understandable when we consider that, indeed, Dewey even refers to knowledge as a work of art:

> Thinking is pre-eminently an art; knowledge and propositions which are the products of thinking are works of art, as much so as statuary and symphonies.[5]

The notion that something like knowledge is a work of art runs counter to claims in traditional aesthetic theory, and it is no surprise that, in this respect, Dewey's analysis can be seen to be less than satisfactory as an aethetic theory.

However, Dewey's claim that knowledge is a work of art must be seen in the context of this work, *Experience and Nature*, which is not an attempt to define art, to lay out the necessary and sufficient conditions for art, or to give the "essence" of art, in a way traditional aesthetic theories have done. It is primarily an attempt to lay out a theory of experience and in the process show the commonality between art and science as experience. Dewey is concerned to destroy the Greek notion that knowledge is only afforded through contemplation and that practical experience is not knowledge producing, as well as the modern view that art is removed from the ordinary practical affairs of men. He holds that what is traditionally called "fine" art is practical experience, no different in *form* than other sorts of experience.[6] Art and science, as affairs of practice, are experiences which afford meaning, which have unity, and which reach closure rather than mere cessation. Unfortunately (because it has led to some confusion), he refers to any such experience as art.

However, we need to recognize that this use of 'art' is only one of Dewey's uses. 'Art' is here used in the sense of techne or practice and not in the post-Renaissance or traditional sense with which most of us are familiar. Dewey reminds us that for the Greeks, "...experience is emplified in the discrimination and skill of the good carpenter, pilot, physician, captain-at-arms; experience is equivalent to art."[7] Plato, especially, talked about art or techne in this sense. For Plato, the notion of techne carried with it the ideas of excellence, skill, beauty, and goodness. When Dewey talks of thinking as art and its product knowledge as a work of art, he is using the term "art" in a way that incorporates his own version of what counts as excellence or craft in practical experience.

Dewey devotes most of chapter 9 in *Experience and Nature* to prescribing what must be involved in experience of this sort. For experience to be "art," in his broad sense of the term, it must have meaning. To have meaning, it must be a union of the "precarious, novel, irregular, with the settled, assured and uniform."[8] Any experience which is simultaneously both means and consequence, process and product, instrumental and consummatory and which provides new meaning, pointing to further possibilities, is art.[9] Experiences in the sciences as well as in traditionally accepted art modes can ultimately count as art if they are of the sort described.

Yet for Dewey the experiences which count as art in this broad sense can be distinguished from one another and discussed separately as various arts. Arts differ from one another, not in their form, but in their respective materials and consequences. He states that "...the cermonial, literary, and poetic arts have quite other ways of working and other consequences than industrial and scientific arts."[10] Further, he claims that:

> In short, the history of human experience is a history of the development of arts. The history of science in its distinct emergence from religious, ceremonial and poetic arts is the record of differentiation of arts, not a record of separation from art.[11]

In *Experience and Nature*, Dewey does not deal specifically with the differentiated arts. His account is an account of experience. He admits to this when he states toward the end of the chapter that "The chief significance of the account just given, lies, for our present purpose, in its bearing upon the theory of experience and nature."[12] He adds, however, that its importance for traditional art criticism is that it points to the need to view art (in the traditional sense) not simply as consummatory, but as both consummatory and instrumental, thereby avoiding a solely esoteric view of art.[13]

Obviously, much more could and should be said of Dewey's theory of experience. It is not my intent here to explicate this theory, except to say that what counts as worthwhile experience in general is referred to by Dewey as art. Further, this use of 'art' is not his only use; he does indeed use the term in a more limited sense to refer to that which is more closely akin to the way we ordinarily use the term. In *Experience and Nature*, his talk of art in this limited sense is in the context of viewing it as one of many kinds of art in the broad or techne sense. It is in his later work, *Art as Experience*, that Dewey more directly deals with what we ordinarily refer to as art and provides a theory of art in a more traditional sense. Yet, understanding of his theory of experience is basic to an understanding of his theory of art, because his theory of art must be seen as a *part of* his theory of experience.

III. Art as Experience

In *Art as Experience*, Dewey extends and elaborates the analysis of experience given in *Experience and Nature*. Crucial to this more complete account, for our purposes, is his inclusion of the notion of esthetic quality. It is in this work, too, that Dewey provides an explanation of experience which is distinctively aesthetic, and explains how this distinctively aesthetic experience is most often had in conjunction with objects that most of us would ordinarily refer to as works of art. What follows is a summary of these views.

Experience and esthetic quality. Dewey's elaboration of his earlier analysis of experience is found in the analysis of what he calls "an" experience. He begins by discussing experience in general and maintains that: "Experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living."[14] From this sort of general experience, upon meeting with "conditions of resistance and conflict", the experience is qualified by emotions and ideas through which "conscious intent emerges."[15] The individual, that is, becomes consciously aware of the interaction between self and environment. The ensuing experience can, at this point, follow one of two directions. It may become "inchoate" experience which is characterized by stoppings, startings, interruptions, and distractions, having little continuity or unity. Experience may also take another form, that which occurs "when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment."[16] The emphasis here is on unity, closure, and satisfaction. The experience had is what Dewey refers to as *an* experience. Dewey claims that:

> In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same time there is no sacrafice of the self-identity of the parts.[17]

The parts become one with the whole, the process becomes one with the product, yet each part has meaning. He makes this point when he discusses the experience of thinking where a conclusion is reached, not by mechanically providing premises from which the conclusion is drawn, but by the integration of both premises and conclusion.

> In fact, in an experience of thinking, premises emerge only as a conclusion becomes manifest... If a conclusion is reached, it is that of a movement of anticipation and cumulation, one that finally comes to completion. A "conclusion" is no separate and independent thing; it is the consummation of a movement.[18]

In every experience which is "an" experience, there is what Dewey refers to as "esthetic quality."[19] This quality is evidenced by emotional satisfaction in noting the integration of the parts with the while. In inchaote experience, due to lack of continuity or unity, there is no such satisfaction. Further, because "mechanical" or "automatic" activity is performed routinely or out of habit and therefore unreflectively, there also is no conscious satisfaction in performing the action. Dewey states:

> Between the poles of aimlessness and mechanical efficiency, there lie those courses of action in which through successive deeds there runs a sense of growing meaning conserved and accumulating toward an end that is felt as accomplishment of a process.[20]

It is the continuity in experience and the satisfaction accompanying it which Dewey refers to as esthetic quality. Any experience which is *an* experience, which is a worthwhile experience, has this esthetic quality. Such experience is by no means limited to experiences with the arts; this sort of experience can occur in any area of endeavor. This sort of experience is what Dewey refers to in *Experience and Nature* as art, in the broad sense of techne or practice.

Distinctively aesthetic experience. While every experience has esthetic quality, some experiences may be what Dewey calls "distinctively esthetic." Dewey discusses three "phases" of all experience: The intellectual, the practical, and the emotional phase. These phases are not to be taken as indicating temporal succession, or even as totally separable parts; they are bound together. Dewey discusses each:

> The emotional phase binds parts together in a single whole; "intellectual" simply means the fact that the experience has meaning; "practical" indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it.[21]

An experience can be dominantly practical or intellectual or dominantly or distinctively aesthetic by virtue or the interest or purpose which initiates and controls it. Dewey states that:

> In a distinctively esthetic experience, characteristics that are subdued in other experiences are dominant; those that are subordinate are controlling --namely, the characteristics in virtue of which integrated complete experience on its own account.[22]
>
> An object is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic, yielding the enjoyment characteristic of esthetic perception, when the factors that determine anything which can be called an experience are lifted high above the threshold of perception and are made manifest for their own sake.[23]

Esthetic quality is that which is dominant in aesthetic experience. It is that sense of unity which is "felt," which is "emotionally intuited,"[24] that becomes the interest or purpose which initiates and controls distinctively aesthetic experiences. While in intellectual or practical experience, conclusions can have value as truth or formula and can be used independently "as factor and guide in other inquiries,"[25] the distinguishing feature of aesthetic experience is the sole attention to the integration of parts. Distinctively aesthetic experiences have the same form as all experience or practice, but what is dominant is the esthetic quality found in all such practice. The scientist who finds a solution to a problem may have an aesthetic experience in doing so. It is such when the various parts are viewed as an integral whole and satisfaction with this aspect *alone* is immediately felt. It is a worthwhile *intellectual* experience when there is this immediately felt satisfaction, but when the truth component, the guide to further inquiry, is dominant and satisfaction with the integration of parts is subordinate.

The artist, the work of art, and esthetic quality. In two important chapters in this later work, Dewey discusses the common and varied "substance" of all the arts.[26] In these chapters Dewey explicitly discusses traditional "fine" arts such as sculpture, painting, architecture, literature, poetry, and the like. He holds that one thing which is common to all these arts is that the esthetic quality found in all worthwhile experiences is expressed in the productive mode of the artist through some medium. The actual materials used by the artist; that is, paint, clay, are the means through which the artist expresses what Dewey variously calls the "undefined pervasive quality of an experience,"[27] the "permeating,"[28] or "penetrating"[29] or "esthetic"[30] quality of experience. He says:

> Every work of art has a particular medium by which among other things the qualitative pervasive whole is carried. In every experience we touch the world through some particular tenacle; we carry on our intercourse with it, it comes home to us, through some specialized organ...The fine arts lay hold of this fact and push it to its maximum significance.[31]

The work of art intensifies esthetic quality found in experience. This is in part the result of the special ability of the artist. Dewey says:

> For the artist has the power to seize upon a special kind of material and convert it to an authentic medium of expression. The rest of us require many channels and a mass of material to give expression to what we should like to say....The artist sticks to his chosen organ and its corresponding material, and thus the idea singly and concentratedly felt in terms of the medium comes through pure and clear. He plays the game intensly, because strictly.[32]

Because a work of art embodies or expresses esthetic quality, it allows the percipient of it a more intensified means of attending to esthetic quality; it becomes a ready material for a distinctively aesthetic experience. While distinctively aesthetic experiences may be had with objects of experience other than works of art, they are more easily had when the objects of experience are works of art. Dewey says, "...the work of art operates to deepen, and to raise to great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole that accompanies every normal experience."[33] Also, he claims, "This sense of the including whole implicit in ordinary experiences is rendered intense within the frame of a painting or poem."[34]

For our purposes, then, the significant points in *Art as Experience* are as follows: Dewey explicates further what it means to have worthwhile experience, noting that all such experiences have esthetic quality by virtue of their being an immediately felt emotional satisfaction with the unity of the experience. When this satisfaction is dominant in any experience, the experience is distinctively aesthetic. Distinctively aesthetic experiences are not different in their form from other experiences. The difference rests with the difference in materials and consequences of the experience. In a distinctively aesthetic experience, the material is the esthetic quality and the consequence is attention to this quality as the dominant feature of the experience. In this work, Dewey allows art a "special character." He explicitly discusses the kinds of things we ordinarily refer to as art and presents what he takes to be the distinguishing features of art in this sense. This is not to deny what he has claimed in *Experience and Nature,* that art in the limited sense is but one of the many differentiated arts in the broad sense. Works of art, as we know them, are experience, alike in form to all experiences. But they are instances of esthetic quality intensively expressed through a particular medium by an artist expecially sensitive to such quality and skilled in expression. Works of art are characterized by an intensified aesthetic quality and serve as means, materials, by which percipients may more readily have distinctively aesthetic experiences, given the appropriate intent or purpose of these percipients.

It may be helpful to add that while works of art are more readily materials for aesthetic experience, they do not automatically afford such experience. Works of art can become objects of dominantly practical or intellectual experience. Again, the intent or purpose of the percipient comes into play here, as well as the skill and sensitivity of the artist. "Good" art, or art which intensely expresses esthetic quality, is only one condition for an individual's having a distinctively aesthetic experience with works of art.

IV. Educational Implications

The view that a Deweyan cirriculum need not include the making of and responding to traditional art forms because, for Dewey, any personally significant experience is art, and this kind of experience may take place in any area of endeavor, is a misguided view. It is misguided because it fails to note that Dewey has yet another use of the terms "art"and "theory of art," which, when properly inderstood in conjunction with his theory of experience, calls for an important role for an art education program. The view that traditional art takes a central position in any Deweyan curriculum, because all personally significant experience is art, is also a misguided view. This view is misguided because it fails to note that in saying that any worthwhile experience is art, Dewey is using the term "art" in a simple sense of practice. Given Dewey's "theory of art" (in a traditional sense), it can be held that, although an art education program would have an important role in a Deweyan curriculum, it would not be a central role.

Certainly, a Deweyan curriculum would provide for personally significant experiences in many areas of endeavor; but when experiences are of that sort, they contain esthetic quality. Because the artist has an ability to represent intensively the esthetic quality found in ordinary experiences, exposure to works of art can sensitize percipients to such qualities in their own experience. This sensitivity can then play a major role in the individual's having an increased amount of personally significant, worthwhile, experiences. Dewey states that:

> ...fine art *consciously undertaken* as such is peculiarly instrumental in quality. It is a device in experimentation carried on for the sake of education. It exists for the sake of a specialized use, use being a new training of modes of perception.[35]

When one important goal of education is to promote an increased awareness of the meaning of things, and these meanings are encountered in rich, fulfilling experience, then inclusion of studio production and appreciation of works of art in the curriculum is crucial, given Dewey's view. It is neither to be the central focus, nor is it to be attended to only occasionally. An art education program which especially promotes the criticism of and response to works of art, which attempts to relate the esthetic quality found in the work to the esthetic quality found in ordinary life experience, must play an important part in a Deweyan cirriculum, given Dewey's view of art and experience and their connection.

NOTES

1. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover publications, Inc., 1958).

2. John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1934).

3. E. A. Shearer, "Dewey's Esthetic Theory I," *The Journal of Philosophy*, November 7, 1935, and "Dewey's Esthetic Theory II," November 21, 1935. Both in *Dewey and His Critics*, ed. S. Morgenhesser (Lancaster: Journal of Philosophy, Inc., 1977). Shearer was correct, I will argue, in noting the two uses and incorrect in her argument that Dewey had two theories of art.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 405.

5. Dewey, *Experience and Nature.*

6. *Ibid*, p. 355.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 387.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 388-389.

14. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 35.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, p.57.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-244.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 195

32. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

35. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 392.

TOWARD THE EXPERIENCE OF AESTHETIC QUALITY: A RESPONSE TO STEWART

Ronald Lee Zigler
Maharishi International University

The significance of Ms. Stewart's essay, I believe, lies in her analysis of Dewey's concept of "esthetic quality." While I find Ms. Stewart's examination of Dewey's concept of aesthetic quality to be accurate --as far as it goes --I do not feel that the educational implications she draws from that concept are stated with sufficient precision. Indeed, I personally wonder whether anyone, Dewey included, has clearly understood the pedagogical implications of his theory of aesthetic quality and aesthetic experience. This, I believe, stems from several anomalies, not simply in Dewey's theory, but, rather, in the very nature of that which Dewey seeks to describe as "esthetic quality." Dewey's thesis only reflects these anomalies.

Dewey's concept of aesthetic quality has been of special interest to me, and so in this response I would first like to reiterate briefly the main features of Dewey's concept of aesthetic quality as Ms. Stewart has clearly outlined them. Following this, I will not only consider the special, albeit neglected, significance that I feel this aspect of Dewey's thinking holds for his philosophy, but I will also consider the source of the anomalies in Dewey's concept of aesthetic quality. In concluding, I will suggest a new angle of inquiry which may prove relevant to resolving these anomalies and to a more accurate appraisal of Dewey's concept of aestnetic quality and its relation to philosophy and education.

As Ms. Stewart has made fairly clear, what is especially noteworthy in Dewey's theory of aesthetic quality, is that aesthetic quality is seen to be present in "ordinary life." Thus the purpose of aesthetic or art education is not simply to expose the student to "works of art," but to sensitize him or her to "the esthetic quality found in ordinary life experience" i.e., in *all* activities. It is apparently for this reason that, as Ms. Stewart observes, Dewey maintains that "all intelligent activities" (e.g., science, even "thinking") may be considered "art." Not surprisingly, Dewey also noted that "esthetic quality is implicit in every experience", although he wondered why it generally "fails to become explicit."[1] In any event, aesthetic quality is the common denominator to Dewey's various uses of the term "art;" and, in addition, it is the attribute by virtue of which *something is said to have value.*

Ms. Stewart also indicates (I correctly feel,) that for Dewey, aesthetic quality serves the same function, phenomenologically speaking, regardless of the context in which we are experiencing it --whether in an art museum or not. That is, as Ms. Stewart writes, aesthetic quality is seen to be present wherever the various parts of our experience are viewed as an integral whole, giving meaning as well as intrinsic and instrumental value to our activity (whatever it may be). For this reason Dewey wrote that "no experience of whatever sort is a unity unless it has esthetic quality."[2] What we find in Dewey, then, is a rather curious, maybe unusual thesis which Ms. Stewart has touched upon: namely, that the experience of aesthetic quality is not only similar, in certain respects, for *all* individuals, but that this quality is also implicit in *every* experience, in *all* activities. When this quality is *explicit*, we recognize our experience as significant, meaningful and, hence, aesthetic. For Dewey, it would appear that aesthetic quality, although implicit in every ordinary experience, is paradigmatic of all significant experience. Thus it would also appear that aesthetic quality is fundamental to the understanding, appreciating or *valuing* of any activity or experience.

It is not too surprising, then, to find Dewey recommending that it is "to esthetic experience that the philosopher must go to understand what experience is."[3]

What Dewey appears to be suggesting, then, is that, although aesthetic quality is experienced subjectively, it is nonetheless a non-variable element, potentially common to all experiencers at all times (during every activity) and thus crucial to any inquiry into values. That is, by analogy, Dewey appears to suggest that aesthetic quality is to value (and philosophical) inquiry what scientific method is to empirical inquiry. Allow me to explain.

A chief function of scientific method is to provide knowledge or factual data which is, to whatever extent possible, *the same for all observers*, independent of subjective bias or variability. In this way science seeks to approximate non-variable, universal knowledge. In this same manner, from Dewey's perspective, aesthetic quality is central to value inquiry since in certain important respects it represents a non-variable, albeit subjective, factor in human experience, a factor which performs the same integrative or unifying function for all experiencers (in every activity). In this way it represents a factor which can reduce the subjective variability that creates descrepancies in aesthetics and ethics, in the same way that scientific method eliminates or reduces subjective variability and bias in empirical inquiry, thereby providing a means consensually to validate empirical information.

That Dewey himself saw this as the function of art and aesthetic quality is quite clear. It was for this reason that he wrote that "experience in the form of art when reflected upon....solves more problems which have troubled philosophers and resolves more hard and fast dualisms than any other sphere of thought."[4] In other words, if more philosophers had more a personal experience of aesthetic quality as Dewey conceived it, then, presumably, the variability and dissention which often characterizes ethical or aesthetic inquiry would be significantly reduced; and, in consequence, philosophical "progress" would be made --at least insofar as philosophers would be provided a means of building a more formidable consensus than is currently present.

In view of the above discussion, then, the central question which naturally arises is whether we can really derive from Dewey's theory specific educational measures which are relevent to aesthetic or art education. That is, given the significance Dewey accords to aesthetic quality, how do we make this quality which he found *implicit* in every experience *explicit* or tangible in every experience? As already suggested, Dewey was, himself, puzzled by this situation. The reason for this, I feel, is not unrelated to the very nature of aesthetic quality. Afterall, if all contexts have aesthetic quality which gives than value, then how do we determine which have "more" value and thus are most relevant to promoting our appreciation of aesthetic quality? Certainly, as Ms. Stewart has clearly stated, encountering the traditional "fine arts" is a likely candidate for an activity with "more" value and thus an important componint to aesthetic education. Yet this would hardly seem sufficient. As Ms. Stewart also observes: while it may be that works of art more readily serve as materials for aesthetic experience, "they do not automatically afford such experiences." Dewey, I maintain, provides no solution to this problem. We may be inclined to dismiss Dewey's thesis as obscure, thus making educational implications difficult to explicate. However, Dewey actually accused philosophers of neglecting the aesthetic quality in ordinary experience and thereby *creating* philosophical problems. By neglecting aesthetic quality, Dewey indicated that philosophers have multiplied their problems and obscured "the potentialities of daily experience for joy and for self-regulation."[5] Philosophers, Dewey suggests, have denied everyday "common" experience can provide a basis for developing standards of judgment and value, since they have failed to cultivate an appreciation for the aesthetic quality implicit in everyday ordinary experience. The result, Dewey lamented, had been the cynicism and pessimism that has made it "a sign of lack of sophistication to imagine that life is or can be a fountain of cheer and happiness."[6] Presumably, this is what life could be when the aesthetic quality in life is always explicit and appreciated.

Yet, again, I do not feel that there is very much (if anything) in Dewey's writings which actually suggests any educational practice as a consequence of his concept of aesthetic quality and aesthetic experience. In other words, he suggests no sure-fire way of making the aesthetic quality he found *implicit* in every experience *explicit* in every experience. As already indicated, this situation puzzled Dewey. In my estimate, the confusion stems from the peculiar nature of aesthetic quality.

One would think that *Experience and Education* would have dealt with these questions more clearly and more directly; but, in that volume, Dewey confesses that what we need is a "coherent theory of experience" a "new philosophy of experience." He made it clear that his own principles of educational experience do not solve any of the problems concerning the actual or practical conduct of schooling. Rather, as Dewey wrote in *Experience and Education* with regard to his "principles of experience:" "they set up new problems" to be worked out on the bases of a "new philosophy of experience."[7] The only clue Dewey leaves regarding this endeavor is that it is "to esthetic experience that the philosopher must go to understand what experience is." But, again, how does one "get to" or cultivate aesthetic experience and aesthetic quality? There is, perhaps, a certain Deweyan irony to the puzzle we find implicit in this discussion: if we want to experience aesthetic quality, and thereby (as Dewey maintains) solve philosophical problems, we must have an aesthetic experience; we have no practical or reliable measure for cultivating aesthetic experience because we do not (according to Dewey) have a "coherent theory of experience;" if we want to know how to develop such educational measures, we must develop a "coherent theory of experience," a "new philosophy of experience;" to develop such a theory it is "to esthetic experience that the philosopher must go to understand what experience is." But how can we reliably "get to" aesthetic quality or have an aesthetic experience? Unfortunately, we are led back to the treadmill outlined above.

Is this then the end to our inquiry into Dewey's concept of aesthetic quality? I think not. Before concluding, I would like to suggest that a deeper insight into Dewey's philosophy in general and his aesthetics in particular may come from a different angle of inquiry. Over twenty years ago, Victor Kobayashi of the University of Hawaii observed a distinct parallel between Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience and the concept of *satori*, which stems from Zen philosophy.[8] Similar parallels may be observed between Dewey's concept of aesthetic quality and the concept of *samadhi*, which originates from the Vedic tradition of ancient India. Like aesthetic quality, the experience of *samadhi* is seen to perform a unifying or integrative function in our life. Unlike Dewey, however, the Vedic tradition prescribes the philosophy of yoga as the methodology for experiencing *samadhi* on a regular basis so as to cultivate *nitya-samadhi*. *Nitya-samadhi* appears to be described as a state where, as Dewey might say, aesthetic quality is *always explicit in all of our activities*. In essence, yoga philosophy not only suggests that we can isolate *experientially* that which Dewey appears to have referred to as aesthetic quality, but it also insists that it is necessary to have such an experience in order to stabilize *samadhi* in activity - i.e., so that it is always appreciated. That is, one must experience aesthetic quality or *samadhi* in an isolated condition, independent or activity, if one is to integrate that quality into all activities. The problem, of course, is that following Dewey's theory, one would hardly expect it to be possible to isolate something like aesthetic quality. After all, it is the unifying and integrative character of aesthetic quality which appears to defy isolation --especually since it is, as Dewey writes, implicit in every activity. For this reason, however, yoga philosophy indicates that one must first *reduce* all activity, physical and mental activity, and thereby experience *samadhi*. This is the chief function of the practice of meditation.

Significantly, in recent years a modern form of meditation has emerged from the Vedic tradition of knowledge which apparantly provides a reliable method for experiencing *samadhi*. Commonly known as the Transcendental Meditation (TM) technique, formulated by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, this form of meditation has been the subject of extensive physiological and psychological research.[9] This research is opening a new area of inquiry which may be relevant to our understanding of what Dewey called "esthetic quality" and hence relevant to educational, aesthetic, and ethical problems. Dewey seems to have anticipated this new area of research when he wrote that "one would be bold to the point of rashness who asserts that intimate personal experience will never come within the ken of natural knowledge."[10] With the advent of scientific research on the Transcendental Meditation techniques, intimate, personal experience *is* coming within the "ken of natural knowledge; "thereby providing a heuristic for studying aesthetic quality." The implications may not only involve a step toward the development of a "coherent theory of experience," but also a description of the precise pedagogical means of cultivating aesthetic quality in our everyday, ordinary life experience.

Now we may be able to take Dewey seriously and not simply read or go to philosophy conferences in our attempt to resolve the problems of educational philosophy. Rather, we may now have an obligation to heed Dewey's advice and to go to aesthetic experience, so that we can "understand what experience is" and, perhaps, solve many of the problems which have troubled philosophers and educators in every generation.

NOTES

1. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934), p. 12.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

4. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Norton, 1929), pp. 392-393.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

7. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 22 and 30.

8. Victor Kobayashi, "The Quest for Experience: Zen, Dewey and Education," *Comparative Education Review* (February 1962), pp. 217-222.

9. Michael C. Dillbeck, Arthur Aron, and Susan Levin Dillbeck, "The Transcendental Meditation Program as an Educational Technology: Research and Applications," *Educational Technology* Vol. 19, No. 11 (November 1979), pp. 7-13.

10. John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 35.

PHOTOGRAPHS IN TEACHING:
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS

Terry Barrett
Ohio State University

Introduction

This paper raises epistemological questions about what educators are claiming about the uses of photographs as part of what are variously called "educational media," "instructional media," or "audio-visual-aids." I examined seven typical books, ranging in publication dates from 1955 to 1980, on educational media, looking for what these authors were saying about photography, how they think about photographs, what they do with photographs, and especially what they claim photographs can do.

The paper is in four sections: the first deals with these selected authors' general misconceptions about the nature of meaning; the second section points out contradictions and examines epistemological confusions in their claims; the third presents information about photographs which is ignored by these authors; and the final section offers some thoughts on how we might better think about photographs.

I. Confusion about the meaning of "meaning

In these sampled media texts there is a cluster of statements claiming various relationships between words, pictures and meaning: "Pictures can translate word symbols,"[1] "pictures can clarify vague ideas,"[2] "pictures make verbal descriptions clearer,"[3] "verbal abstractions (are) translated (by pictures) into sharply defined visual images,"[4] "abstractions are intrinsically nonpictorial, but pictures can help to represent them and prevent the development of inaccurate generalizations,"[5] and finally, pictures "concretize verbalisms."[6]

Of these the weakest claim is that "pictures make verbal descriptions clearer,"[7] while the strongest claim is that "pictures can translate word symbols."[8] That pictures can make *some* verbal descriptions clearer seems reasonable; for instance, a picture of a crankshaft would help to clarify a definition which states that a crankshaft is "a shaft having one or more cranks, usually formed as integral parts."[9] But how shall we clarify with photographs the word "epistemology?"

The stronger claim, that pictures translate words, is more problematic. In Klasek's writing this claim is part of a lengthy list of stated "advantages" of pictures: other advantages are that pictures "explain processes," "make comparisons" and "develop critical judgment."[10] These claimed advantages are simply asserted with no explanations or qualifications: immediately following such bold statements of advantages, Klasek tells us only how to mount and store pictures; and we are given no hint, by Klasek or others who claim that pictures translate words, what they might mean by translate. As some talk of translating, and others also talk of "reading pictures"[11] it seems that they are assuming pictures to be a language, but there is no indication by any of them that they are adherring to any particular theory of pictorial semiotics; and if they are assuming that pictures are a language, it seems to be in a naive sense.

Whatever they may mean by "translate," it is hard to imagine pictures that might translate such words as "and," "but," "yet;" "if," "unless," "nevertheless;" "however," "likewise," "moreover." Certainly not all words can be translated by pictures. While Klasek implicitly claims that all words can be translated by pictures, he gives no examples of any words that may be translated; but others amidst their related claims about translation, suggest such examples as "titmouse," "doormouse," "dinosaur," "crankshaft," "pyramid," and "Medieval city."[12]

What is apparent about their examples is that they are all nouns denoting or naming things and places. Among the nouns cited we do not even have mention of nouns that denote qualities or acts. It seems that words are being regarded as fundamentally the same as proper names, and that a simplistic version of a referential theory of meaning is being employed, namely, that the meaning of the word is that to which it refers. The authors do not even seem cognizant of words referring to classes of items. If the claim that "pictures translate words" at least included a notion of words designating classes, the claim would be much more reasonable. But the word as name as reference to particulars is further reinforced by the warning of the authors that too many pictures will confuse students.

When we add to the translation claim related claims that "pictures can clarify hazy or incorrect ideas,"[13] and that "pictures can clarify vague ideas,"[14] we have a version of an ideational theory of meaning added to the referential theory. There seems to be an implicit assumption that the meaning of a word is the picture that it produces in us, and that if we can match the right picture to a word or expression we have its meaning. Not only are they implying that all words function as proper names, but they are adding the further assumption that there can legitimately be made a word-to-thing-to-picture-to-idea substitution.

It is obvious that some words, again such as "however" and "epistemology" do not have corresponding mental images and cannot be visually depicted. It should also be obvious that every meaningful linguistic expression, or that every distinguishable sense of every expression, cannot have an idea, or an image regularily associated with the expression.[15] The claim simply cannot hold up. I'd like to quote William Alston's criticism of the ideational theory of meaning here because it succinctly and severely qualifies, if not dismisses, the pictures as ideas notion:

> There are difficulties even for those words that are most closely linked to sensory imagery. Even here there is no one-to-one correspondence between associated image and meaning. The same image can be associated with words of different meaning, and the same word (in the same sense) can have widely different images associated with it. The image of a sleeping beagle might well accompany the utterance of "beagle," "sleep," "home," "quiet," "peace," "hound," "dog," "spirit," or "animal," to mention only a few of the possibilities. The word "dog"-accompanied by collie, terrier, dog sitting, dog standing, etc. ...Ideas are not distributed in the way required by the ideational theory.[16]

The various claims about words, expressions and ideas carry no indication that any of these authors are adherring to, or knowledgeable about, the Meaning as Use theory. Rather they consistently advocate that meaning be found in the extralinguistic world rather than in usages in language communities. While neglecting the diversity of uses of language, they are advocating the oversimplifications that all language conveys information; that every word and expression functions as a sign of something or some mental image; and, further, that all words, expressions, and ideas can accurately be matched and made meaningful by corresponding pictures. Their claims are grossly overstated, and those who follow their directives are being mislead and, in turn, may be misleading their students about pictures, language and meaning.

II. Contradictions in the Claims

In this section I should like to look at some contradictions evident in the sampled literature. Some authors contradict themselves, while several contradict each other. One author claims that an advantage of using pictures is that they "assist in the prevention of, and correction of, misconceptions."[17] But eight lines later he tells us to "avoid pictures which might distort size and distance."[18] These same "advantages" and "limitations" are echoed by a pair of co-authors.[19] It is evident that all pictures, except those that are painstakenly scientific, distort sizes, particularily pictures of dinosaurs, pyramids, and Medieval cities. We are encouraged to use photographs, particularily because they prevent misconceptions; but at the same time are cautioned not to use photographs which distort, presumably because distortions lead to misconceptions. But in fact all photographs distort in that they are depictions and not the thing depicted, and most photographs distort size.

Or we can match the claims that "Pictures help to prevent and correct misconceptions,"[20] and that "Visual evidence is a powerful tool"[21] with the limitation that "Students do not always know how to "read" pictures."[22] Or we can pair the statement that "Pictures can translate word symbols, record events, explain processes, extend experiences, make comparisons, show contrasts, show continuity, focus attention, and develop critical judgment"[23] with the advice to "avoid pictures which are not easily interpreted by students."[24] In the first statements we are given a mechanistic notion of the grandiose things pictures can automatically do to students, and in the latter statements we discover that students might have to do something to pictures to benefit from these advantages.

The various claims and cautions about how many photographs to use, or not to use, are also troubling. One author claims that large groups of pictures are capable of developing complex ideas,[25] while another asserts that too many photographs confuse.[26] No one indicates how many photographs might be necessary or sufficient to illustrate adequately a word, phrase or idea, but the typical advice is to use fewer rather than more. At the same time we have claims that photographs are able to "correct misconceptions"[27] and "Prevent the development of inaccurate generalizations."[28] Given these recommendations to use fewer photographs, perhaps even "one well selected picture,"[29] it is hard to conceive how inaccurate generalizations and misconceptions are not being taught with photographs. Again, the implicit assumption seems to be the mistaken, oversimplified notion that each meaningful item can be fixed through association with a proper picture. That things do not work so tidily is being overlooked.

Some of the authors offer criteria for selecting or using pictures, while others do not bother. Those who do offer criteria frequently talk about the need for "authenticity," "reliability," "truthfulness,"[30] and talk of the power of visual evidence. But what is most disturbing is that all of the authors, including those who stress the reliability-type criteria, direct us to gather photographs from all possible sources, including magazines such as *Vogue* and *Mademoiselle*, leaflets, borchures, and so forth; and all specify photographs used in advertising as a bountiful and beneficial source. Oh what a wonderful world is presented in photographic advertisements, but how reliable, authentic, or truthful is that world?

The diverse, plentiful, and compelling images created by the advertising industry certainly perform an instructional function in our society and ought to be critically analyzed with children. But what these pictures may be teaching is being overlooked by these authors.

Considerations about the authenticity, reliability and truthfulness of using photographs from *Mademoiselle*, *Vogue*, and other magazines also need to be raised, particularily regarding the relationship between their advertisements and editorial content. In the two magazines specifically mentioned, there is by intent a very close match between editorial and advertising content, with both sorts of content highly value-laden toward a particular life-style and world-view. Regarding selection, the writers on educational uses of photography seem to forget their reliability criterion and instead fall into the assumption that photographs are mechanical representations which are value-neutral. This is a dangerous assumption under which to be operating.

Other troubling conflicts arise among other criteria statements. Some authors couple their truthfulness criteria with aesthetic criteria. Some samples of aesthetic criteria are: "Simplicity. To be most effective pictures should be simple and uncluttered. Not only are simple pictures more aesthetic, but their teaching value is superior."[31] Another criterion by the same author is: "Artistry. Artistry in the arrangement of objects, camera angles, color values, and in naturalness is an important factor in every picture."[32] This criterion is preceeded by the statement that "posed pictures of people are of little use unless their purpose is to bring out a detail such as hair style or facial expression."[33] All of these criteria follow his number one criterion of "Authenticity. Pictures should be truthful."[34] We can understand the authors to be using common sense notions of truth, reliability, and authenticity, but how are we to understand their use of "artistry?" They mean more than competent craft or good photographic technique, because they distinguish between a picture being good "techniqually" and "artistically," or having good "artistry" and "mechanical quality."[35] If artistry in their sense is more than good photographic technique, what might be meant by "artistic" and how are we to join "artistic" to "truthfulness?"

If artists are to be truthful are they going to be truthful in depicting the external world, or rather will they be truthful in expressing their feelings about the world? We more often hear of artists being "true to themselves," than being true to the world. Are we to assume that the artist with a camera will offer "visual evidence" of the same quality as a social scientist with a camera? It seems likely to me that the photographer who photographs people, objects, or events for *Scientific American* may have quite different intents and limitations than the photographer who is photographing for an art exhibition or for Estee Lauder cosmetic advertisements. But no distinctions are offered by these authors.

III. Some things we know about photographs

There are some things we know about photographs, and some of those things are being overlooked by these authors; and as a result we are given some misconceptions primarily due to oversimplifications. These oversimplifications, evident in the claims they make about photographs, are likely to lead to miseducation through their suggested uses of media.

Selectivity is the major problem for photographers. Given sufficient light, the universe is available to them: outerspace, underwater, the wilderness, the city, the suburbs, the body, the face. Using commonly available lenses, the close-up and the telephoto, the photographer can frame inches or miles; and by adapting the camera to a telescope or microscope, worlds previously closed to the unaided eye also become acessible to the photographer. The diversity of the resulting pictures can begin to be appreciated by multiplying potentially infinite subject matters by the number of idiosyncratic human beings with cameras.

If most things are possible, what should be chosen? And what should be expressed about what is chosen? Some photographers are interested only in documentation while others are only content with transformation. For several a primary motivation has been their ability to present the otherwise inaccessible, to bring people to places they had not reached by other means. If photographers are not recognizing photographable significance in the world, they are inventing it with their imaginations. Several, discontent with searching the outer world, have forcefully turned to imagined experience, and by selecting and directing as many variables in time and space as possible, have created compelling fictitious photographs.

No matter what their predilictions toward presenting their views of life and art in photographs, photographers are constantly involved in choosing. Once having made the major choice regarding the world-view they are to inscribe on film, they are then confronted with several options, confronting them through their viewfinders. Before making the exposure the photographer chooses film, deciding between black and white and color; selects among cameras, considering advantages and limitations of different film formats; selects among lenses which determine degree of encompassment; selects aperture and shutter speed, which determine depth of focus and degree of sharpness; chooses what distance and what angle to photograph from, which, most importantly, determines what will be included and what will be excluded from the frame. The decision about when to release the shutter determines the instant of time that will be preserved.

In the act of photographing, the photographer reacts to things and situations as they are changing. The photographer must see not only the visual forms in front of the lens, and how they are interacting, but must also simultaneously evaluate the implications for the meaning those interactions provide. Unlike the artist's paper or canvas, which are initially blank, the photographer's viewfinder is never empty. Given the impossibility of the lens ever encompassing the totality of reality, or even of a given situation, and given that the subject matter and photographer are moving to greater or lesser extents, a photograph is always literally out of context. Even the most scientific photograph gives us a still, silent, temporally limited, and spatially specific view which is of the photographer's own choosing.

Having made the exposure, another litany of choices is presented to the photographer in the darkroom. These must be considered in relation to decisions regarding whether these images are to be presented in print or mounted on walls, discretely or in sequence. Out of the darkroom the photographer will select the most effective from the least. These will be further distilled by editors, curators, or advertisers. Advertisers in particular, and textbook publishers, have no lack of compunction in freely altering these pictures by cropping and enlarging, and by adding text material of their choosing.

These highly abbreviated considerations about photography are offered in contrast to the media authors' implied notion that photographs are simple, objective recordings of reality. On the contrary, photographs are highly selected images that are excised from the flux of time and the infinity of space, by photographers with idiosyncratic sensibilities and interests ranging from science to fiction.

IV. A suggested framework for considering photographs

To account for dissimilarities among photographs it seems to me to make sense to think about them as analogous to language statements, and to approach them with the meaning-as-use theory, by considering their potential meanings through looking at how photographers might be using imagery or how photographs might be functioning as expressive images. Following is a six part, overlapping category system which I have devised to aid viewers in understanding potential meanings of photographs.

While by the nature of the photographic medium all photographs describe, since the photograph is a recording of light reflected from objects to light sensitive materials, some photographs function primarily as *descriptions*. Paradigm cases are identification photographs, medical x-rays, photomicrographs, and NASA space exploration photographs. These photographs are analogous to statements of fact in language; are visual recordings of empirical qualities; and are meant to be interpretively and evaluatively neutral. They attempt no more than to be an accurate visual recording on a photographic surface.

Other photographs attempt to go beyond description by offering falsifiable explanations or non-falsifiable interpretations. Paradigm cases of the first type, *explanations*, are Bill Owens' book, *Suburbia*,[36] a sociological type of collection of photographs documenting Californian suburbanites; and the nineteenth century sequential photographs of people and animals in motion by Eadweard Muybridge, the most celebrated of which is the galloping horse study which corrected centuries-old misconceptions of the positioning of horses' hooves in trotting and galloping. Many photographs in magazines such as *National Geographic* and *Life*, and news photographs in our daily papers would also be placed here. These photographs posit claims about the empirical world, imply causal relationships among recorded phenomena, and attempt objectivity. They are falsifiable in that they could potentially be empirically demonstrated to be true or false, accurate or inaccurate.

The other type of explanatory photographs are non-falsifiable *interpretations*. They are analogous to methphysical claims in language, in that they purport to give information about the universe but are asserted independently of empirical evidence. Clear examples are several photographic sequences by comtemporary photographer Duane Michals,[37] one of which, through multiple exposures, depicts his conception of death as spirits leaving bodies. Photographs in this category depict intentionally subjective understandings of phenomena, often are photographic fiction, and generally yield information about the world-views of the photographers who make them. They are non-falsifiable in the sense that in cases of dispute they cannot be confirmed or denied empirically.

Another large body of photographs can be understood as judgments of two types, ethically evaluative and aesthetically evaluative. Photographs which are *ethically evaluative* imply moral valuations, pronounce moral judgments, or generally depict how things ought or ought not to be. Most photographic advertisements present us with aspects of the advertiser's conception of the good life, or what should be desirable. The majority of the photographs of the late W. Eugene Smith may also serve as clear examples, particularily his last book, *Minamata*,[38] which portrays the suffering of poisoned Japanese village fidhermen as a consequence of willful industrial polluting.

Aesthetically evaluative photographs may be accepted as visual notification by the photographer of people, places, or things which are seen as intrinsically valuable for apprehension, due to a harmonious formal relationship of visual elements. There are large numbers of these in the history of photography, most obviously exemplified by the landscapes of Edward Weston or Ansel Adams, or Sierra Club nature photography.

The last category accounts for *theoretical photographs*, or those which address issues about art and photography, functioning as visual commentaries on art, or as visual art criticism. There are increasing numbers of these in contemporary photographic art. These need not concern us here: because of their esoteric nature, these will most likely not be used as visual aids by the general educator.

These categories (descriptive, explanatory, interpretive, ethically evaluative, aesthetically evaluative, and theoretical) are overlapping in that any given image may be placed in one or more categories. The photographs in *Playboy* and *Penthouse*, for example, seem to function both ethically and aesthetically, promoting moral valuations as well as a particular aesthetic of the body. The overlapping nature of the system also encourages viewers to engage in substantive questions about how photographs are to be interpreted or understood; to question, for example, whether Bill Owens' portrayal in *Suburbia* is cynically slanted or objectively neutral. My intent is not to end discussion of photographs through pigeonholing, but on the contrary, to open directed discussion about photographic meaning, to increase understanding both of the variety of photographic statements being made and of how they are being used. Through context changes, for example, meaning shifts. The NASA photograph of the earth seen from the moon takes on considerably more than descriptive information when it is shown with the Mobil corporation's logo. I hope to have shown it important for the media people to think over some of these considerations about photographs: photographs are more than "flat pictures."

NOTES

1. Charles B. Klasek, *Instructional Media in the Modern School* (Lincoln, Nebraska: Professional Educators Publications, Inc., 1972), p. 52.

2. James S. Kinder, *Using Audio-Visual Materials in Education* (New York, N.Y.; American Book Co., 1965), p. 29.

3. John Harrell, *Basic Media in Education* (Winona, Minn.: St. Mary's College Press, 1974), p. 15.

4. Edgar Dale, *Audiovisual Methods in Teaching*, 3rd Edition (New York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 440.

5. *Ibid*, p. 441.

6. *Ibid*, p. 447

7. John Harrell, *Basic Media*, p. 15.

8. Charles B. Klasek, *Instructional Media*, p. 52.

9. *The Random House Dictionary*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978).

10. Charles B. Klasek, *Instructional Media*, p. 52.

11. Vernon S. Gerlach, Donald P. Ely, *Teaching and Media: A Systematic Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980), p. 277; and Edgar Dale, *Audiovisual Methods*, p. 433.

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13. James S. Kinder, *Using A. V.*, p. 29.

14. *Ibid.*

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25. John Harrell, *Basic Media*, p. 16.

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28. *Ibid.*

29. James S. Kinder, *Using A. V.*, p. 30.

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DISCIPLINE: WHO NEEDS IT?
A CRITIQUE OF ASSERTIVE DISCIPLINE

Joseph Watras
University of Dayton

The schools in my area recently bought a system of behavior management that promises to end all classroom difficulties. It is called Assertive Discipline because it tells teachers to assert their right to teach. The author, Lee Canter, says the program can make any classroom a peaceful, pleasant place to be. Many of the teachers I spoke to approve of the plan. They seem to feel a need for something to take care of the troublemakers in their classes. They look to these programs to enlist the cooperation of the teachers, the parents, and the school administration in searching for an answer to their problems.

Unfortunately the program may cause the teachers to face new and somewhat worse problems. First, the Assertive Discipline package will not reduce discipline problems but may actually increase them, by encouraging the teachers to overlook the underlying problems that cause the child to misbehave. Second, discipline problems may increase because the teachers become too attentive to trivial behavior. Third and most importantly, this approach construes discipline as externally imposed and separate from learning. As a result, Assertive Discipline makes lessons less attractive or less powerful.

The program is simple. Its aim is to get every teacher and building principal to agree on a plan to handle misbehavior. This plan is drawn up before school begins. The rules are clearly stated and the punishments are described. These plans may vary from school to school or from district to district. They have certain characteristics in common.

The plans describe what behavior is intolerable. They tell how each offender's name will be posted, usually on the blackboard. They note that after a certain number of the offenses, the child will be punished. He or she may do extra work or stay after school or lose some privilege. If the child continues to misbehave, the plans usually say that he or she will then be sent to the principal's office. The principal will then assign the punishment for which the plan calls.

In one school district, the principal's punishment consisted of what the superintendent called "in-school suspension." The superintendent was concerned that his principals were suspending more students than they should. As a result, he asked each principal to make Saturday school a part of the program. In answer to his request at the beginning of the year, the principals sent to each child's parents a letter explaining that students who continually misbehaved would be made to come to school on Saturdays. They would spend three hours in a bare, unattractive room. If they failed to attend, the letter went on, their punishment would lead to prosecution through juvenile courts where parents could be held liable and fined. If all this failed to curb misbehavior, the child would ultimately be suspended or expelled.

The superintendent boasted that this program reduced school suspensions in the first year it was tried. On this information, he judged the program a success. Sadly, the superintendent overlooked the fact that the number of suspensions rose as the offenders proceeded through the steps of punishment. It may be that such programs only defer suspension. Of course, this could still be a benefit to the school and the potential dropout.

An important point is that all Assertive Discipline plans are supposed to do more than consistently punish those who disturb the class. Canter and his supporters say that any plan should include some way consistently to recognize and reward good behavior. All children, supporters of this approach say, should be recognized for the good they do. They ask the teacher to notice and reward those good things in everybody. As a result, the workbook that

Canter and his associates distribute at their in-service workshops not only has examples of plans to control misbehavior, it has examples of awards and letters to parents in praise of their child.

Those who use the program defend it by saying that it eliminates confusion. Students, they say, know what they are supposed to do. Supporters often add that the program reduces classroom rules. This occurs, they say, because teachers are encouraged to make a short list of infractions. These must be clearly stated and objectively applied. Supporters of the program add that it makes punishment uniform. No longer can Suzy Creamcheese be allowed to do what Carl Cut-up is punished for doing.

An interesting twist is that, in a program before the National Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Canter acknowledged that an interesting curriculum is the best way to reduce discipline problems. The trouble, he said, is that the teacher has to get the "child's butt in a chair" before the child can recognize the interesting parts of the curriculum. Canter said his program would do that.

A colleague of mine who is opposed to the program argues that Canter's ideas will make the classroom more authoritarian than it already is. He fears this change because he believes that this will make the students more aggressive, less cooperative, and generally less tolerant of others. The problem with Canter's ideas, he say, is that they ask the teacher to plan in advance what he or she wants and then consistently to go after it. He says that if this is what is called being assertive, then it is better than being hostile or wishy-washy, and the children should be taught to be assertive. My colleague feels this can be easily done. He suggests that teachers should ask their students to help set up the rules. He believes that when the students have a voice in composing classroom rules and in deciding on the appropriate punishments, they will learn how to follow and how to change rules. He says this is an essential part of learning how to function in a democratic society. He adds that such a change will help any classroom: a spirit of cooperation will become pervasive and learning will increase. But my friend notes that Canter and those who advocate his methods do not ask for such democratic actions. Since the plans are written before classes are in session and before parents and students are informed of their existence, they can not help make or change these rules.

My friend believes that the central flaw of these programs is that they are imposed from above, as if only the teacher's needs have to be considered. He notes that the programs encourage teachers to overlook many complex problems. For example, they do not help the teacher to recognize the reasons for a child's misbehavior. Instead, they ask the teacher merely to try to squelch the inappropriate actions. My colleague feels, as John Dewey used to say, that force is the most ineffective way to correct misbehavior. Dewey used to counsel teachers not to admonish disruptive activity but to figure out what motive or force was behind the action and to seek a way to divert it. He feared that if a teacher tried to squelch a child's misbehavior without allowing the child some release for the drive behind it, the child would learn to circumvent authority.

While I agree with my colleague's criticism of Assertive Discipline, I find it hard to believe that asking the students to help set up the rules for the class will make a difference. Where I have asked students to decide what the rules of conduct should be or what an appropriate punishment was, they have always prescribed a more severe set of rules or administered a worse punishment than I wanted. The problem is deeper than asking who makes the rules. This is revealed when we ask what the nature of discipline is.

The authoritarianism implicit in Canter's approach to discipline leads teachers away from thinking of discipline as the power to do something. Mathematics, language study, history are all disciplines because they enable their possessors to do things. Once discipline is seen as the ability to do something, it will be clear that Canter's program and my colleague's suggestions are misleading. If a class draws up the rules of conduct before they engage in an activity, they are putting the last part of the work at the beginning. That is, it is after we do something that we think about how we should have approached it. This is a necessary reflection. It helps us draw our resources together for another task. If a teacher tries to prepare the students for an activity by spelling out the methods of work or by asking the students to decide what those methods should be, the proposed rules are likely to be arbitrary and excessively formal. On the other hand, if the rules come out of an effort to achieve a common end, the rules will be rational and necessary.

Care is needed here, or our discussion will sound like hucksterism for progressive education. If the teacher thinks of discipline as the ability to do something, this thought alone will not help him or her reduce the discipline problems in their classroom. What it will do is to put those problems in a different perspective. That is, it will help the teacher see a child's rejection of a lesson not as an obstacle to be overcome, but as a challenge to capture the child's interest and direct it to new areas of application.

The difference this perception makes is important. Two examples will clarify. Substitute teachers see misbehavior as an obstacle to overcome. They take this view because they are constantly tested. When substitutes enter a classroom, the students usually want to play rather than to proceed with their lessons, no matter how captivating or challenging their regular teacher is. As a result, the substitutes have to develop a bag of tricks to keep order. This is the only way they can survive the day.

A regular teacher does not have this problem. He or she has the opportunity to introduce materials or activities that capture the student's interest and lead them to other lessons that they would never have suspected they would like doing. When teachers take advantage of these opportunites, they may not have smooth running, successful classes. But they may see their subject matter in a new light. That is, by having to communicate in a different way, they may combine ideas they never realized were related.

Seeing the child's rejection of a lesson as a challenge will not lead to marvelous learning for all. It is the only way that can lead to this. But to hold that children will automatically appreciate good or open teaching is romantic. Some will and some will not. The same is true of a authoritarian teacher. Some students will appreciate the order and predictability that arises. On the other hand, other students will be bored or even offended by the teacher's constantly asserting his or her control. Since both approaches succeed and both fail, they cannot be judged by their effectiveness.

Assertive discipline leads to the reinforcement of submissive personalities. In this regard, the person who asserts his or her will is the same as the person who submits, although both are opposite. The teacher who sees discipline as the power to do something and tries to engage the child's interest in activities that both want to pursue, reinforces a different sort of personality. It is a cooperative personality. It is the type of person who tries to get what he or she wants and to help others achieve their ends at the same time. This personality is better than one that is assertive. It is open to suggestions and new evidence. It can change and grow, while the assertive personality can only succeed in his singular mission, no matter how limited it is.

This does not mean that an assertive personality must come from an authoritarian classroom. Nor must a cooperative, intelligent one come from an open communal classroom. Teachers are not that effective. These are the directions we can see within each approach. Since the open or communal approach is much more humane, it is the better one. It will not succeed. But as Albert Camus showed us, all people are condemned to failure or frustration. The aim of life, Camus said, is to live within that failure and keep possibilities alive.

Those people in schools near me that want to bring in a discipline package are losing more than the enormous sums of money Canter charges them.

They are losing a hope or chance. Perhaps it is understandable that they should turn this way. Our nation was swept by a tide of meanness in the last presidential election. Nonetheless, it is sad to see school people give up.

Yet, I do not worry. Assertive Discipline will wear out its welcome. Teachers will not follow the directions as they are supposed to. Everyone will tire of the artificial punishments and rewards. At this point, real learning may occur. Not because the teacher finally got "the kid's butt in a chair." It will occur because both the teacher and students forgot about this fight and lost themselves in some activity that came out of the subject matter.

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RESPONSE TO WATRAS/BARRETT

Richard A. Brosio
Ball State University

Assertive Discipline, as packaged by Lee Canter, can be described as a technique which is closely related to the broad field of applied behavior analysis; especially the component termed "classroom management." Mr. Watras argues that the Assertive Discipline package will not reduce discipline problems; furthermore, he claims, the problems may increase because teachers will overlook underlying problems of misbehavior. One could question Watras's predictive powers but agree with his indictment of Canter's too simple paradigm.

One wonders who Watras's mysterious friend may be; however, it is clear that this person believes that Canter is not democratic. Watras has his friend claim that Lee Canter could learn a bit from John Dewey concerning discipline. Watras seems to think that the problem of misbehavior is deeper than a question of who makes the rules: "The authoritarianism implicit in Canter's approach to discipline, leads teachers away from thinking as the power to do something." Rules should emerge from an effort to reach a common goal. Watras cautions us so that we will not accuse him of simplistic progressivism; still, he insists that a cooperative, rather than assertive, personality should be the goal of education.

Joseph Watras is convinced that Lee Canter's panacea will prove to be ineffective; therefore, school teachers and administrators will go back to understanding that discipline means the mastering of important subject matter. One can only hope that Professor Watras is correct; however, there are some facts which are not dealt with in his paper which cause doubt concerning the emergence (or re-emergence) of discipline being understood as inherent to the pursuit of mastery.

Watras is correct to accuse Canter of stressing the squelching of misbehavior rather than getting at deeper causes of misbehavior. But Canter does make it clear that a good curriculum is most important. Lee Canter maintains that the teacher must first create an environment before he/she is able to do what is most important, viz., to teach kids. It is not difficult to understand why harassed, miseducated, poorly prepared, and underpaid teachers would rightfully demand a place of work that is orderly. Even though the deeper causes of misbehavior lie outside of the classroom, teachers are correct in asking for help so that their small arena is a safe and sane place. Watras tells us that discipline is the power to do something, but perhaps even Dewey might ask for help if he were forced to teach in some schools today. In the long-run teachers need more: intellectual training, professional autonomy, salary, and over-all better conditions; but in the short-run they may learn something of value from the Lee Canters of the world.

I believe that Watras erroneously assumes that the choices are between (1) Canter's Assertive Discipline, which he has condemned as authoritarian, and (2) liberal progressivism, of which he approves. Watras writes, "Since the plans are written before classes are in session and parents and students are informed of their existence, they can not help make or change these rules." Liberals may still think that student government and parent teacher organizations are progressive, but many radicals do not. Is it progressive for kids to help make rules in institutions which are fundamentally beholden to an industrial order that is neither democratic nor authentically in the young person's long-range welfare? Many students will find themselves unemployed after graduation; others will be working at non-gratifying dead-end jobs; while some may be conventionally successful, but still discover that modern capitalism systematically attempts to build intelligence into the machine and/or process, so that workers are deprived of the need for initiation, creativity, and autonomy.

If the school system's major function is to sort, reward, and fail, then there is good reason for student non-cooperation, misbehavior, and resistance. Willis's, *Learning to Labour: How Working-Class Kids Get Working-Class Jobs* is representative of a whole literature that describes schools which are not in the best interest of all students. Neither the liberal progressive school, nor Canter's control tactics get at the root cause of misbehavior which are, in fact, institutional, constitutive, and systemic. Not all kids and their parents believe in schools--and for good reasons. A radical analysis, one that goes deeper and more broadly than Canter's does, may lead us to conclude that only a profoundly different political, social, economic, and educational solution can stave off the emergence of brutal authoritarianism within a discredited, decadent liberal order. This decadent liberalism cannot solve the problems within the context of its own assumptions; moreover, the power of monopoly and state capitalism will not allow the going beyond to a new analysis, strategy, and action.

I shall limit my response to Barrett to: (1) commenting upon what Mr. Barrett has said, and (2) briefly suggesting some issues and ideas of which he could have written. Because it is Barrett's paper, it would be unfair to respond in terms of what he should have written and said.

Barrett's paper argues that educational media promoters make claims about photographs that do not hold up under close investigation. In fact, photographs cannot translate words very easily because a culture's language is too complex for such translation; furthermore, pictures themselves are too varied and subjective to enable them to accomplish direct and accurate translation. Reality itself is too complex for it to be easily captured by language.

We live in a historical period, and in a civilization which has not been able to agree upon what reality is comprised of, let alone to agree upon concepts and language for describing reality. The modern West has been plagued by ontological and epistemological confusion. Barrett suggests that perhaps educational media advocates believe that "meaning (can) be found in the extralinguistic world rather than in usages in language communities." We photographers know that the "reality" that we saw through the lense at picture-taking time is not always the same as what finally emerges through the liquid chemicals in the darkroom. Furthermore, the resemblance between the original insight and the finished (mounted and/or framed) photograph is not always obvious. A further lack of correspondence occurs when the photograph is viewed by persons whose frame of reference is substantially different from that of the photographer. Perhaps it is because I am an amateur photographer, but I often rely upon *words* to help viewers understand my photographs. Barrett writes that students do not always know how to read the pictures.

Barrett correctly points out that photographers are constantly needing to choose because "the universe" is available to them . . ." Barrett goes on to say that photographers make a "choice regarding the world-view they are to inscribe on film . . . ." When one considers the ubiquity of photograph-taking in the industrialized world, it is difficult to ascribe, or credit, most photographers with having a world view with which to sort out scenes to shoot from scenes not worthy of being captured on film. The fact of the matter may be that modern technology makes false promises to people, i.e., many camera owners are fooled into thinking that everyone who has a Canon can be an artist. One can hardly analyze or understand the penetrative omnipresence of cameras within the rich societies without having studied how Renaissance theories of perspective in drawing and painting allowed a concentration on the self and gave the self a window out into the world. The egalitarian forces inherent within Protestantism, industrialism, capitalism, and modernism have all contributed to the emergence of individuals who think that their perspective is worthy of communicating to others; when in fact the truth may be that many individual perspectives (recorded on film in this case) simply add to the cacophony of modern society. Does Christopher Lasch's narcissist really have a world view as he/she stalks the world of people and things with high tech, 35 mm, single reflex camera?

Barrett tells us that "photographs are highly selected images that are excised from the flux of time and . . . space . . . ." He is right. His categorization of photography into: description, explanation, interpretation, etc. is both correct and useful. However there is one dimension which he does not probe deeply enough into--a probe which could have been made.

Photography is an art form when done by persons who are artists. Great art has always pointed out the discrepancy between (1) the descriptive *is* of the status quo, and (2) the normative *ought*, which speaks of what could, and what should, be. Barrett informs us that photographs are not mechanical representations which are value-neutral; and, indeed, that is the case. Had Barrett discussed the works of: Stieglitz, Steichen, Riis, Eisenstadt, Bourke-White, Cartier-Bresson, or Capa it would have been less easy for him to have exposed the weaknesses of photography. The educational media persons constitute a straw man that is easier to refute than is the work of the great photographer-artists. The artists who use cameras have, as have Bertold Brecht's plays, spoken of what is unfortunately absent. This kind of art, along with rational theory and human action provide for a radical and transformative triad.

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Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978).

PART IV

RECORDS AND REPORTS

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

FRANGIPANI ROOM
INDIANA MEMORIAL STUDENT UNION
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA
DECEMBER 5, 1981

1. The meeting was called to order by John Carter, President of the society at 11:00 a.m. December 5, 1981. The minutes of the 1980 meeting as published in the *Proceedings* were approved. An interim treasurer's report was presented by William McKenney, Treasurer.

2. Dennis Senchuk gave an editor's report about the *Proceedings*. He requested that an appropriate letter of gratitude be sent to Mr. Angelo and to his Dean. Robert Skovira will succeed Mr. Angelo as Associate Editor.

   Mr Senchuk reported that the typing of the manuscript for the *Proceedings* is very expensive. Several suggestions for sharing the work and expense were discussed. Mr. LaBrecque suggested that a number of institutions could copy one manuscript each. It was suggested that several institutions might bear the expense for typing one manuscript.

   President Carter congratulated Mr. Senchuk for a job well done.

3. The nominating committee composed of David Engle, Chairman, Walden Crabtree, Richard LaBrecque and Gerald Reagan presented the following report:

Eleanor Roemer	President Elect
William McKenney	Secretary-Treasurer
Dennis Senchuk	Editor of Proceedings
Robert Skovira	Associate Editor
Jerome Popp	Executive Board Member(To 1982)
Keith Raitz	Executive Board Member(To 1982)
Richard Angelo	Executive Board Member(To 1984)

   Mr. Engle moved the nomination of these persons. It was seconded and they were elected unanimously.

4. It was moved, seconded and passed that letters of appreciation be sent to the sponsoring institutions. These were Indiana University; Indiana - Purdue University; Indianapolis; Indiana - Purdue University, Ft. Wayne; Indiana University, Kokomo; Ball State University; and Indiana State University.

   It was moved, seconded and passed that letters of appreciation be sent to Everett Jarboe, Hospitality Chairman; the Program Committee, Keith Raitz, Chairman, Karen Hanson, and Richard Pratte.

   It was moved, seconded and passed that a letter of appreciation be sent to David Denton and to the Dean of the College of Education at the University of Kentucky for the generous gift toward the printing of the *Proceedings*.

5. Philip Smith expressed appreciation to the association for the honor shown to him during the meeting. President Carter responded graciously to Mr. Smith.

6. President Carter announced that the meetings in 1982 would return to Cincinnati. Several suggestions were made about places and plans for the meeting. Ron Zigler volunteered to negotiate hotel location and was accepted as Coordinator for 1982. It was agreed that Mr. Zigler should be allowed to negotiate for the best possible hotel rates. The date was left to the discretion of Mr. Zigler.

7. President Carter discussed his efforts to develop a membership committee. He thanked Mr. McKenney, Mr. Raitz and Mr. Jarboe for making his term in office so pleasant.

8. President Carter turned the meeting over to President-Elect Walden Crabtree. He expressed the thanks of the Association to Mr. Carter.

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

FINANCIAL STATEMENT - 1981

Income:

Balance carried over	$ 1,139.20
Interest on deposits	65.17
Indiana/Purdue - Ft. Wayne	100.00
Ball State	50.00
Indiana University/Kokomo	35.00
Indiana/Purdue - Indianapolis	75.00
Indiana State	250.00
Phil Smith Dinner	451.36
Subscriptions/Proceedings	84.50
Income from Conference	622.50
Registration and Dues	280.05
Advance Dues & Miscellaneous	$ 3,152.78

Disbursements:

Postage	99.80
Office Supplies	37.32
Proceedings (Printing)	820.56
Laboratory for Educational Development	100.78
Dennis Senchuk (Proceedings postage and Misc. Office expenses)	26.58
Indiana Memorial Union	817.42
	$ 1,902.46

Balance	$ 1,250.32

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
LIST OF MEMBERS

Abraham Abaroni
Dept. of Ed. Psychology
201 McGuffey
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio 45056

Richard J. Altenbaugh
5801 Forbes Quad.
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Richard Angelo
143-B Taylor Ed.
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Richard L. Antes
1305 School of Ed.
Indiana State University
Terre Hayte, IN 47809

Terry Barrett
Art ETNC
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43206

James Biddle
Cedarville College
Cedarville, Ohio 45314

Steve Broidy
Dept. of Sec. and Found.
Southwest Mo. St. Univ.
Springfield, MO 65804

Richard Brosio
Teachers College 806
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Bill Bruening
2317 Leroy
Fort Wayne, IN 46805

Dr. Charles M.Dye
2999 Chamberlain Road
Akron, Ohio 44313

David E. Engel
5 801 Forbes Quad.
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Jo Ann Frieberg
121 Ramseyer Hall
29 W. Woodruff Ave.
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Ronald Burnside
Sinclair Community College
Dayton, Ohio 45402

Laurette Byars
1928 Cottonwood Drive
Lexington, KY 40503

John E. Carter
Grad. Dept. of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, Indiana 47809

Nancy Christoff
Ohio State U. F. & R
121 Ramseyer Hall
29 W. Woodruff
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Henry P. Cole
636 Bellcastle Road
Lexington, KY 40405

Clinton Collins
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Welden Crabtree
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, Ohio 44325

Norman A. Deeb
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Frank P. Diulus
Buffalo State College
1300 Elmwood Avenue
Buffalo. NY 14222

Charles D. Hopkins
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Bonnie Hume
College of Education
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Everett Jarboe
School of Education
Indiana University
BLoomington, IN 47401

Hanson A. Kappelman
University of Pittsburgh FQ5801
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Dr. John Geiger
School of Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio 45469

Dick Classer
85-09 Randor Street
Jamaica, NY 11432

Robert N. Grise
Eastern Kentucky University
College of Education
Richmind, KY 40475

Karen Hanson
Philosophy Dept.
Indiana University
Bloomingotn, IN 47405

Russell L. Hamm
213 Elm St.
Indiana State University
Rosedale, IN 47874

Bruce Haynes
Claremont Teachers College
Perth, Australia

John J. O'Neil
68 Sixth St.
Dover, NH 03820

Ralph C. Page
2040-A Orchard St.
Urbana, IL 61801

Daniel S. Parkinson
355 McGuffey Hall
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio 45056

Jerry Popp
Box 120 Sive
Edwardsville, IL 62026

Gerald Reagan
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43201

Tim Reagan
360 Education Bldg.
1310 S. Sixth St.
Champaign, IL 61820

Amy Ritchie
Philosophy of Education
Education Bldg. 203
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405

Steven Kay
Kentucky State University
Box 72
Frankfort, KY 40601

Richard La Brecque
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Charlotte N. Landvoight
Sycamore Springs Farm
Highland, WV 26346

Edward D. Makruski
2043 Ivka Ave.
Columbus, Ohio 43201

William A. McKenney
Eastern Kentucky University
Combs 406
Richmond, KY 40475

Dr. Richard W. Money
Indiana University - Purdue Univ.
Columbus Center
Indianapolis, IN 46205

Rita S. Saslaw
Dept. Of Educational Foundations
University of Akron
Akron, Ohio 44325

Dr. Frederick M. Schultz
2804 Chamberlain Rd.
Akron, Ohio 44313

Dennis M. Senchuk
203 Education Bldg.
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405

Mark Sheldon
Philosophy Dept.
Indiana Univ. - Purdue Univ.
Ft. Wayne, IN 46805

David Neil Silk
Indiana University - Kokomo
Kokomo, IN 46901

Robert J. Skovira
UHVC - Ed. Division
2302 C. Red River
Victoria, TX 77901

Dr. J. Bernard Smith
530 Lynohurst Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15216

Philip G. Smith
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405

Eleanor Kallman Roemer
College of Education
Bowling Green State Univ.
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Barnard Rosen
Philosophy Dept.
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43202

William Russell, PhD
5327 Dayton Avenue
Louisville, KY 40207

Patrick Socoski
235 W. Dithridge St.
Pittsburgh, PA 15206

Mittie Southerland
3012 Brookway Court
Louisville, KY 40214

Barbara S. Stengel
Foundations of Education
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Marilyn Stewart
648 Lathrop
Ohio State University

Kurt Varga
145 Ramseyer
29 W. Woodruff Ave.
Columbus, OH 43210

Joseph Watras
1548 N. Euclid
Dayton, OH 54506

Robert G. Watts
Department of Philosophy &
Religion
Women's External Degree Program
LeFer Hall
St. Mary-Of-The-Woods College
St. Mary-Of-The-Woods, IN 47876

Jamice F. Weaver
148 Pearl Croft Rd.
Cherry Hill, NV 08034

Robert L. Wilhoyte
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43566

Ray Wilkie
728 Bullock Place
Lexington, KY 40508

Jack Conrad Willers
Box 49, Peabody College
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN 37203

Ronald Zigler
Education Department
M.I.U.
Fairfield, Iowa 52556

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